Benin’s Foiled 2025 Coup and the Fragile Road to a 2026 Civilian Transition

Discussed by: Regional and international media (AP, Reuters, Financial Times), ECOWAS diplomats and security analysts quoted in coverage of the coup attempt

Under this scenario, Benin’s leadership uses the failed mutiny to justify a sweeping purge and restructuring of the security forces, particularly the National Guard and units suspected of sympathy with Lt. Col. Tigri. Civilians and soldiers linked—even tenuously—to the plot face prosecution under Benin’s terrorism and state‑security laws, continuing the pattern set in the 2024–25 trial of Olivier Boko and Oswald Homéky. ECOWAS and Nigeria continue to back Talon and his chosen successor, Romuald Wadagni, as long as the two‑term limit is respected and the April 2026 election formally goes ahead. With the main opposition candidate excluded, Wadagni wins comfortably, potentially serving a seven‑year term under the new constitution. Domestic repression of dissent intensifies but does not provoke enough international pressure or internal resistance to destabilize the regime in the short term.

Discussed by: West African security experts and think tanks (e.g., International Crisis Group analysts cited in media), drawing parallels to repeated coups in Burkina Faso and Niger

The grievances cited by Tigri’s group—military favoritism, inadequate support for troops fighting in the north, and perceptions of a closed political system—may run deeper than a single faction. If Talon’s post‑coup response is primarily punitive and fails to address conditions in the ranks or the north, other officers could attempt copy‑cat mutinies or organize a more coordinated coup, especially if morale deteriorates under continued jihadist attacks. Regionally, the precedent of multiple coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger—where repeated interventions followed initial takeovers—suggests that once the norm against coups is broken in a political system, further military interventions become more likely. A successful second attempt could align Benin with the Alliance of Sahel States and deepen the fracture between ECOWAS members and junta‑led neighbors.

Discussed by: Some governance and security analysts, as well as AU and ECOWAS officials who emphasize dialogue in public statements

Under a more optimistic scenario, the shock of the coup attempt prompts both Talon and his likely successor Wadagni to combine limited purges with tangible reforms. These could include improved welfare and recognition for soldiers killed in the north, more transparent promotion processes, and targeted investments in the northern regions most affected by jihadist violence. In the political sphere, authorities might relax some restrictions on opposition parties and civil society, perhaps by easing sponsorship rules or tolerating a somewhat more competitive 2026 campaign, in order to reduce the perceived legitimacy gap that soldiers exploited in their rhetoric. ECOWAS and the AU would likely encourage such moves, framing Benin as a test case for reversing democratic backsliding without regime change. This outcome requires political will that current trends do not strongly indicate but cannot be ruled out, especially if donors link support to concrete reforms.

Discussed by: Regional policy commentators, drawing on comparisons with ECOWAS actions in The Gambia and its threatened intervention in Niger

The rapid Nigerian and ECOWAS response to the Benin mutiny—contrasting with the bloc’s inability to roll back coups in Mali, Burkina Faso or Niger—could mark the start of a more selective but forceful security doctrine: draw a hard line in remaining democracies while effectively conceding junta‑run states. In this scenario, ECOWAS maintains a visible standby force presence in Benin for some time, engages in joint operations against jihadist groups along the Benin–Niger–Burkina Faso frontier, and uses Benin to showcase the benefits of remaining within the bloc versus joining the Alliance of Sahel States. This would deepen Benin’s dependence on external security guarantees and could provoke retaliatory moves by jihadist groups or information campaigns by neighboring juntas, but it might also deter further coups in coastal ECOWAS states if seen as credible. The durability of this scenario depends on ECOWAS’ political cohesion and Nigeria’s willingness to sustain deployments.

Discussed by: Security researchers tracking jihadist expansion into coastal West Africa

A more structural risk is that jihadist violence in northern Benin continues to intensify, straining the armed forces and eroding central authority regardless of whether the government remains civilian or experiences further coups. Benin has already experienced a sharp increase in attacks and displacement, and groups linked to both Al‑Qaeda and Islamic State are competing for influence along its borders. If resources are diverted to internal political repression or prolonged ECOWAS deployments around Cotonou, the north could become more vulnerable. This scenario would mirror dynamics in Mali and Burkina Faso, where coups did little to improve security and in some cases coincided with insurgent gains, suggesting that governance reform and local engagement, not just military measures, are critical to long‑term stability.