Overview
In early 2025, the Rwanda‑backed M23 rebellion in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo surged into one of its worst phases in decades, with rebels and allied Rwandan troops seizing Goma and Bukavu and displacing hundreds of thousands of civilians. Under intense international pressure and amid fears of a broader regional war, the United States and Qatar brokered the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity between DR Congo and Rwanda, promising a Rwandan troop withdrawal, the neutralisation of Hutu militias like the FDLR, and a new mineral‑driven economic integration framework.
Yet by December 2025, Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi was accusing Rwanda of breaching the freshly ratified accords after M23 seized new territory near the Burundi border and a blast in Sange killed dozens of civilians, even as a Reuters investigation showed M23 had tripled in size to roughly 14,000 fighters and set up parallel administrations, tax systems, and border controls in parts of eastern Congo. The Washington Accords have thus far failed to halt fighting or dismantle Rwanda’s proxy structures, raising the risk of a durable rebel‑run quasi‑state embedded in critical global supply chains for coltan, cobalt and other minerals, and underscoring how peace diplomacy, great‑power competition and resource extraction are now tightly intertwined in the Great Lakes conflict.
Key Indicators
People Involved
Organizations Involved
The government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the internationally recognized authority over Africa’s second‑largest country by land area, rich in cobalt, copper, coltan, gold and other minerals but wracked by decades of conflict.
The Rwandan government is a central actor in Great Lakes security dynamics, officially focused on neutralizing anti‑Rwandan militias in eastern Congo while facing persistent allegations of resource‑driven interventionism.
M23 is a predominantly Tutsi armed group originating from a 2012 mutiny in the Congolese army, later defeated and exiled before re‑emerging in 2021 as the most powerful rebel movement in eastern DR Congo.
The United States has positioned itself as the main international broker of the DR Congo–Rwanda peace process, linking security commitments to long‑term access to critical minerals and infrastructure deals.
Timeline
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Tshisekedi Accuses Rwanda of Violating Peace Deal as M23 Expands Quasi‑State
Public StatementSpeaking to lawmakers, President Tshisekedi accuses Rwanda of breaching US‑ and Qatar‑brokered peace agreements after M23 seizes the village of Luvungi near the Burundi border. A blast in nearby Sange kills more than 30 civilians following clashes between the Congolese army and pro‑government militia. A Reuters investigation the same day details how M23 has tripled in size to around 14,000 fighters and entrenched a parallel state structure over key mineral and border assets.
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Renewed Fighting Undercuts ‘Historic’ Deal
Military EscalationDays after the Washington ceremony, residents across eastern Congo report continued shelling and clashes between M23 and Congolese forces. M23 spokespersons dismiss the Washington agreement as not binding on them, while Congolese authorities blame M23 and its backers for violating ceasefire commitments.
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Heads of State Ratify Washington Accords in High‑Profile Ceremony
Peace AgreementPresidents Félix Tshisekedi and Paul Kagame formally sign the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity in Washington, DC, in a ceremony overseen by US President Donald Trump and attended by regional leaders. The International Contact Group for the Great Lakes welcomes the commitment but stresses the need for implementation and respect for Congo’s territorial integrity.
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Doha Framework Agreement Signed Between DRC and M23
Peace FrameworkIn Doha, DR Congo and M23 sign a framework agreement aimed at ending their conflict, under Qatari facilitation. The deal gestures toward disarmament and political dialogue but leaves many core issues unresolved, and M23 maintains its territorial grip.
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Regional Economic Integration Framework Signed in Washington
Economic AgreementDelegations from DR Congo and Rwanda sign the Regional Economic Integration Framework in Washington, formalizing cross‑border cooperation on mineral supply chains, infrastructure, and energy. In parallel, DRC agrees to give US companies preferential access to critical minerals, with the US government and Mercuria each pledging up to $1 billion in investment.
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Implementation of Washington Accords Stalls Amid Ongoing Fighting
Implementation SetbackBy mid‑September, core security provisions of the peace agreement—Rwandan troop withdrawal, disbanding of the FDLR, and concrete progress in DRC–M23 talks—have not been met. Analysts note that economic components are delayed and fighting continues in eastern DR Congo.
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First Post‑Deal Talks Held; Economic Focus Raises Skepticism
Diplomatic StepDR Congo and Rwanda hold their first talks since the June deal, affirming sovereign control over natural resources and outlining mineral‑driven economic integration plans linked to the US‑backed Lobito Corridor and power projects. Rights groups warn the accord is ‘a mineral deal first, an opportunity for peace second’.
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UN Experts Detail ‘Unprecedented’ Rwandan Support and Mineral Smuggling
InvestigationA UN experts’ report accuses Rwanda of backing M23 with advanced military equipment, including armed drones and air defense systems, and says coltan smuggling from M23‑controlled territories into Rwanda has reached ‘unprecedented levels’. The report underscores fears that Rwanda seeks de facto control over parts of eastern DR Congo and its resources.
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Washington Peace Agreement Signed by Foreign Ministers
Peace AgreementDRC Foreign Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner and Rwandan Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe sign the DR Congo–Rwanda peace agreement in Washington, mediated by the US and Qatar. The deal calls for a 90‑day Rwandan troop withdrawal, neutralisation of the FDLR, and creation of a regional economic integration framework focused on critical minerals.
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DRC and Rwanda Agree Declaration of Principles in Washington Track
Diplomatic StepNegotiators for DR Congo and Rwanda agree a declaration of principles that commits both sides to respect territorial integrity, address security concerns, and cooperate with the US on economic projects, laying groundwork for a broader Washington‑based peace framework.
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M23 Seizes Walikale Mining Hub, Then Signals Tactical Pullback
Military EscalationM23 captures Walikale, a key mining hub in North Kivu and its farthest westward advance to date, deepening fears over rebel control of strategic minerals. The group later announces a withdrawal as a ‘gesture’ amid talks, though its broader territorial control remains intact.
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UN Security Council Demands Rwanda Withdraw Troops and Stop Backing M23
International ResolutionThe UN Security Council adopts a resolution urging Rwanda to withdraw its forces from eastern DR Congo without preconditions and to cease all support for M23. The resolution also criticizes DR Congo for collaborating with the FDLR and demands unhindered humanitarian access.
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M23 Captures Bukavu, Extending Control in Eastern DR Congo
Military EscalationFollowing the fall of Goma, M23 advances into the city centre of Bukavu in South Kivu with limited resistance. The capture of both provincial capitals marks the group’s strongest position since its creation, and Kinshasa accuses Rwanda of ignoring ceasefire calls.
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M23 and Rwandan Forces Seize Goma in Major Escalation
Military EscalationM23 rebels, backed by Rwandan troops according to UN and humanitarian reporting, seize control of Goma, the capital of North Kivu. Hundreds of thousands are displaced within days and international agencies warn of a rapidly worsening humanitarian crisis.
Scenarios
Fragmented De Facto Partition: M23 Consolidates a Rebel Proto‑State in Eastern Congo
Discussed by: Reuters investigations, UN experts, regional security analysts
In this scenario, implementation of the Washington Accords continues to lag while M23 tightens its grip on territory, governance and revenue streams. The group further institutionalizes its parallel administrations—governors, mayors, courts, tax systems, and border controls—across large swathes of North and parts of South Kivu, financed by mining revenues and cross‑border trade. Rwanda sustains covert support, calculating that a friendly buffer entity secures its security and economic interests without formal annexation. Kinshasa lacks the military capacity to retake key urban and mining areas without massive external backing, which is unlikely given US and regional fatigue. The Doha process with M23 stalls or produces only limited confidence‑building steps. Over time, the international community informally adapts to the new reality, treating M23‑run areas as a de facto entity even while affirming Congo’s territorial integrity on paper. This entrenched fragmentation resembles past Rwandan‑backed entities during the Second Congo War and risks normalizing armed‑group governance over critical mineral supply chains.
Managed but Fragile Peace: Washington and Doha Processes Slowly De‑Escalate the Conflict
Discussed by: Optimistic strands of US diplomacy, some International Contact Group and African Union statements
Here, sustained diplomatic pressure from the US, Qatar, the African Union and key African capitals nudges all parties toward gradual de‑escalation. Washington conditions economic benefits and investment flows on measurable security steps: verifiable Rwandan troop drawdowns, reduced M23 operations, and credible moves by Kinshasa to disengage from the FDLR and regularize local militias. Over time, the Doha track yields an agreement that combines cantonment and partial integration of M23 fighters with political concessions—perhaps greater decentralization or representation for communities aligned with M23—while MONUSCO and regional forces help monitor compliance. Violence diminishes but does not disappear; sporadic clashes and abuses continue, and large‑scale disarmament remains incomplete. Nevertheless, civilian displacement slows, cross‑border trade stabilizes, and the Washington Accords are seen as fragile but functioning. The risk is that structural drivers—resource competition, ethnic grievances, weak governance—remain unresolved, leaving a ‘cold conflict’ that could reignite.
Accords Collapse and Regional War Escalates
Discussed by: More pessimistic analysts, some humanitarian and advocacy groups warning of ‘Africa’s World War’ redux
In a darker scenario, large‑scale violations—such as major massacres, overt cross‑border incursions, or direct confrontations between Rwandan, Burundian, Ugandan and Congolese forces—shatter the residual legitimacy of the Washington and Doha frameworks. Domestic pressure in Kinshasa and Kigali pushes leaders toward militarized solutions; Burundi and other neighbours escalate involvement via proxies or direct deployment. The peace architecture unravels, with the International Contact Group and US unable or unwilling to impose sufficient costs on spoilers. Mineral exports from contested areas become more openly militarized and illicit, drawing in additional regional and extra‑regional actors. Displacement surges beyond current record levels, and attacks on peacekeepers and aid workers increase. This scenario echoes the escalation patterns of the late 1990s Second Congo War, with potentially catastrophic humanitarian consequences and global supply‑chain disruptions.
Renegotiated Grand Bargain that Formally Incorporates M23 and Local Stakeholders
Discussed by: Some regional commentators and civil‑society voices critical of elite‑only deals
Recognizing that the current Washington Accords under‑represent key belligerents and local constituencies, mediators could pivot toward a more inclusive negotiation process. This scenario envisions a ‘grand bargain’ that brings M23, other armed groups, political opposition, and civil society into a structured dialogue alongside DRC and Rwanda. Such a process might lead to far‑reaching reforms: security‑sector restructuring, formal recognition of certain local authorities, stronger provincial autonomy, and more transparent, community‑benefiting management of mineral revenues. International actors might back a more robust monitoring and accountability mechanism, including independent oversight of supply chains. While this path could offer a more durable settlement, it faces steep obstacles—distrust among parties, incumbent fears of power‑sharing, and the risk of rewarding armed rebellion—making its realization uncertain.
Historical Context
Second Congo War and Rwandan‑Backed Rebel Entities (1998–2003)
1998–2003What Happened
The Second Congo War, often called ‘Africa’s World War’, saw Rwanda and Uganda support rebel groups like RCD‑Goma that carved out de facto statelets in eastern DR Congo, controlling cities such as Goma and Bukavu and exploiting mineral wealth, especially coltan. The conflict drew in up to nine African countries and dozens of armed factions, causing an estimated 5.4 million excess deaths over a decade.
Outcome
Short term: Peace agreements in the early 2000s formally ended large‑scale interstate warfare and led to power‑sharing in Kinshasa, but left many militias intact and failed to fully demilitarize the economy of eastern Congo.
Long term: Eastern DR Congo remained fragmented, with cycles of rebellion, proxy warfare and resource‑driven violence persisting into the 2020s, providing a template for later movements like M23 and today’s fears of renewed regional war.
Why It's Relevant
The current M23 crisis and Rwanda’s alleged strategy of backing a quasi‑state in eastern Congo closely mirror patterns from the Second Congo War, where Rwanda‑aligned entities controlled territory and minerals while international actors struggled to impose accountability. This history underscores how partial peace deals that leave proxy structures and resource exploitation intact can entrench instability rather than resolve it.
2012–2013 M23 Rebellion and Defeat
2012–2013What Happened
The original M23 rebellion emerged from a mutiny of Congolese army units who claimed Kinshasa had violated the 2009 peace accord that integrated former rebels. Backed by external support, M23 briefly seized Goma in 2012, prompting international condemnation, before being defeated by UN‑backed Congolese forces and regional pressure, after which many fighters reportedly fled to Rwanda and Uganda.
Outcome
Short term: M23’s military defeat in 2013 created an impression that the group had been dismantled, and some commanders were integrated or exiled, but accountability for massacres and abuses was limited.
Long term: The movement’s grievances and external backing were never fully addressed, allowing M23 to re‑emerge from 2021 onward with renewed strength. Today’s conflict shows how incomplete demobilization and weak follow‑through on peace accords can set the stage for even more dangerous future rebellions.
Why It's Relevant
The earlier M23 cycle demonstrates that military setbacks and elite deals are insufficient without structural reforms and credible guarantees. It also shows how quickly Goma can fall to rebel forces and how difficult it is for Kinshasa to project power in the east—direct parallels to 2025.
Resource‑Linked Peace Deals in Conflict Zones (e.g., Post‑War Angola)
Early 2000sWhat Happened
In countries like Angola after its civil war, peace agreements were intertwined with oil and diamond sector arrangements that helped cement an elite pact and attract foreign investment, but often left governance deficits and inequality intact. Extractive industries became both a stabilizing revenue source and a vector for corruption and local grievances.
Outcome
Short term: Post‑war governments consolidated power and oversaw rapid growth in extractive exports, while violence declined compared with wartime levels.
Long term: Entrenched patronage networks and uneven development persisted, and communities in resource‑producing regions often saw limited benefits, fueling latent tensions and localized unrest.
Why It's Relevant
The Washington Accords’ heavy emphasis on critical minerals and infrastructure echoes past ‘peace‑through‑business’ approaches. These examples suggest that while resource‑backed peace can bring short‑term stability and investment, failing to address local rights, environmental impacts and governance can entrench new forms of structural violence and future instability in eastern Congo.