Overview
Tren de Aragua, a Venezuelan prison gang that evolved into a transnational crime syndicate, has become a central target of U.S. security policy. After years of expansion along Venezuelan migration routes into Colombia, Peru, Chile and beyond, the group drew mounting concern for human trafficking, migrant smuggling, extortion and drug trafficking. In July 2024, the U.S. Treasury designated Tren de Aragua a significant transnational criminal organization, formally bringing it under the U.S. sanctions regime.
Under President Donald Trump’s second administration, Washington escalated further: the State Department listed Tren de Aragua as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist and Foreign Terrorist Organization in February 2025, the White House invoked the Alien Enemies Act in March 2025 to frame its members as an “invading” force, and Treasury has rolled out successive waves of OFAC sanctions on its leaders, financiers and support networks. The December 3, 2025 move against a money‑laundering and entertainment network fronted by Venezuelan celebrity Jimena “Rosita” Araya Navarro is the latest step, coupled with a reward increase to $5 million for one fugitive leader, as the U.S. seeks to choke off the gang’s finances and reinforce a hard‑line border and migration agenda.
Key Indicators
People Involved
Organizations Involved
Venezuelan prison gang turned transnational criminal syndicate, involved in human smuggling, trafficking, extortion, illegal mining and drug trafficking across South America and increasingly in the United States.
Cabinet department responsible for U.S. economic and financial policy, including the implementation of economic sanctions through the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
Leads U.S. diplomacy and manages terrorism designations and rewards programs used against Tren de Aragua.
Alleged Venezuelan state‑linked cartel made up of senior military and political figures accused of trafficking drugs and aiding terrorist‑designated cartels and gangs.
The executive branch under Trump’s second term, driving an integrated terrorism, sanctions and immigration narrative around Tren de Aragua.
Timeline
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Reward for Tren de Aragua Leader Mosquera Serrano Raised to $5 Million
RewardsAlongside the new sanctions, the State Department increases the reward for information leading to the arrest or conviction of Giovanni Vicente Mosquera Serrano from $3 million to $5 million, underscoring his priority status.
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Treasury Targets Money-Laundering Network Tied to Rosita and Tren de Aragua
SanctionsOFAC sanctions Venezuelan entertainer Jimena “Rosita” Araya Navarro and other entertainment‑industry figures, along with one entity, for providing material support to Tren de Aragua through drug‑fueled parties and money‑laundering schemes across South America. The move blocks their property in U.S. jurisdiction and cuts them off from the U.S. financial system.
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Cartel de los Soles Sanctioned for Supporting Tren de Aragua
SanctionsTreasury designates Venezuela’s Cartel de los Soles as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist network headed by Nicolás Maduro and other high‑ranking officials, accusing it of providing material support to Tren de Aragua and the Sinaloa Cartel.
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Treasury Sanctions Top Tren de Aragua Leaders Including Niño Guerrero
SanctionsOFAC designates Héctor “Niño Guerrero” and five other key leaders and affiliates of Tren de Aragua, citing their role in expanding the organization from a prison gang into a regional threat involved in drug trafficking, human trafficking and murder.
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DOJ Indicts High-Ranking Tren de Aragua Leaders; Treasury Sanctions Mosquera Serrano
Legal ActionThe Justice Department unseals a superseding indictment in Houston charging Giovanni Vicente Mosquera Serrano and another alleged leader with providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization and conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The FBI adds Mosquera Serrano to its Ten Most Wanted list, State offers up to $3 million for information, and OFAC sanctions him the same day.
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White House Invokes Alien Enemies Act Over Tren de Aragua
Executive ActionThe White House issues a proclamation invoking the Alien Enemies Act, describing Tren de Aragua as a Foreign Terrorist Organization whose members have infiltrated the U.S. and are conducting “irregular warfare” in coordination with Venezuela’s Cartel de los Soles.
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State Publishes SDGT Designation of Tren de Aragua
DesignationThe Federal Register publishes a determination by Secretary of State Marco Rubio listing Tren de Aragua and several cartels as Specially Designated Global Terrorists under Executive Order 13224, stating they pose a significant terrorism risk to U.S. security.
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Trump Orders Expanded FTO Designations for Gangs and Cartels
PolicyUpon returning to office, President Trump signs an order directing his administration to designate several Latin American criminal organizations—including Tren de Aragua—as foreign terrorist organizations, extending a tool traditionally used for ideologically motivated groups.
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State Department Offers $12 Million in Rewards for Tren de Aragua Leaders
RewardsConcurrent with the TCO designation, the State Department announces reward offers totaling up to $12 million for information leading to the arrest or conviction of several Tren de Aragua leaders.
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Treasury Designates Tren de Aragua as Transnational Criminal Organization
SanctionsThe U.S. Treasury’s OFAC sanctions Tren de Aragua as a significant transnational criminal organization under Executive Order 13581, citing its involvement in human smuggling, trafficking, money laundering and drug trafficking.
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Venezuela Raids Tocorón; Tren de Aragua Leadership Escapes
Law EnforcementVenezuelan security forces storm Tocorón prison to reassert control, but Tren de Aragua’s leadership reportedly escapes, and the group’s transnational cells continue operating across the region.
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Gang Expands Along Venezuelan Migration Routes
BackgroundBetween roughly 2018 and 2023, Tren de Aragua leverages Venezuelan migration flows to establish cells in Colombia, Peru, Chile and other countries, specializing in migrant smuggling, extortion, trafficking and local drug markets.
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Tren de Aragua Emerges Inside Venezuela’s Tocorón Prison
BackgroundIn the early 2010s, inmates at Tocorón prison in Aragua state, led by Héctor “Niño Guerrero,” organize into a powerful gang that gradually extends control over the prison and nearby communities, forming Tren de Aragua.
Scenarios
Financial Squeeze and Targeted Arrests Fragment Tren de Aragua but Violence Persists
Discussed by: U.S. officials, regional security analysts, think tanks such as InSight Crime
In this scenario, sustained OFAC designations, terrorism charges and rewards lead to the capture or killing of several senior Tren de Aragua leaders, while sanctions complicate the group’s ability to move funds through formal channels. Cells in Colombia, Peru, Chile and emerging U.S. nodes adapt by relying more heavily on cash, informal remittances and crypto, and by decentralizing their structures. Analysts of MS‑13 and other TCOs suggest that such crackdowns often fragment gangs without eliminating underlying criminal markets, leading to localized turf wars and intermittent spikes in violence rather than clean dismantlement.
Terrorism Narrative Deepens, Fueling Broader Deportation and Detention Programs
Discussed by: Trump administration officials, critics quoted in AP and InSight Crime analyses
Here, the Alien Enemies Act framing of Tren de Aragua as an invading terrorist force becomes a durable cornerstone of U.S. domestic politics. The administration expands expedited removals and preventive detention of Venezuelan migrants suspected of gang ties, often on intelligence or social‑media indicators rather than proven criminal conduct. Legal challenges slow but do not fully block the program. Human‑rights groups and some Latin American governments warn that conflating mass migration with terrorism will erode due‑process protections and strain U.S. relations with countries hosting Venezuelan refugees, but the policy remains politically popular with segments of the U.S. electorate focused on crime and border security.
Regional Pushback and Conditional Cooperation on Tren de Aragua
Discussed by: Latin American leaders, diplomatic reporting, regional security commentators
Some South American governments already conducting their own operations against Tren de Aragua’s cells in Chile, Peru and Colombia are likely to cooperate with specific intelligence leads and joint policing, while rejecting the broader U.S. terrorism framing and Alien Enemies Act rhetoric. Governments concerned about sovereignty may resist U.S. calls for expansive terrorism statutes or mass deportation flights but accept targeted extraditions and financial‑intelligence sharing. Over time, this produces a patchwork: effective joint investigations in some jurisdictions, and safe‑haven risks in others where political incentives or corruption blunt enforcement.
Politicization of Terrorist Designations Prompts Future Reassessment
Discussed by: Legal scholars and terrorism‑designation experts referencing precedents like FARC delisting
Critics argue that labeling primarily profit‑driven gangs and cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations stretches the legal tool beyond its original intent and risks undermining its credibility. They point to prior episodes where designations were later reversed as political and security conditions changed, such as the removal of Colombia’s FARC from the U.S. FTO list after the 2016 peace accord. If a future U.S. administration seeks to reset relations with Latin American partners or refocus terrorism tools on ideologically motivated actors, it could revisit the FTO label for Tren de Aragua while maintaining TCO‑based sanctions. That would not immediately change prosecutions already brought, but it would signal a shift back toward distinguishing organized crime from terrorism.
Tren de Aragua Adapts and Deepens Alliances With Other Cartels
Discussed by: Regional crime researchers and investigative outlets such as InSight Crime
Another path is adaptation. Facing direct U.S. sanctions pressure, Tren de Aragua could lean further into alliances with other powerful criminal actors—such as Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital or Mexico’s cartels—to access logistics, protection and laundering channels less exposed to U.S. jurisdiction. As with MS‑13, sanctions may constrain some financial activity but also push the group to rely more on local cash economies, front businesses and corrupt state actors. This scenario would leave Tren de Aragua more embedded in a broader hemispheric criminal ecosystem, complicating efforts to isolate it as a discrete target.
Historical Context
U.S. Sanctions Campaign Against MS‑13
2012–presentWhat Happened
In 2012 the U.S. Treasury designated Mara Salvatrucha (MS‑13) as a significant transnational criminal organization under Executive Order 13581, the first time a street gang received such treatment. Subsequent actions targeted individual leaders, aiming to disrupt the gang’s finances across the United States and Central America. Despite these measures, MS‑13 has persisted by fragmenting into local cliques, adapting its revenue streams and leveraging informal economies.
Outcome
Short term: Designations signaled U.S. resolve and improved information‑sharing with regional partners, but only modestly affected MS‑13’s operational capabilities.
Long term: MS‑13 remains active, though leadership decapitation and local policing have reduced its structure in some areas. The case shows that sanctions alone rarely dismantle entrenched gangs but can raise costs and constrain some activities.
Why It's Relevant
The MS‑13 precedent suggests that designating Tren de Aragua as a TCO—and now as a terrorist organization—may fragment rather than eliminate it, and that real impact depends on how sanctions integrate with law‑enforcement, social and migration policies.
FARC Terrorist Designation and Later Delisting
1997–2021What Happened
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was designated by the U.S. as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and SDGT in the late 1990s and early 2000s for insurgent violence funded by narcotrafficking, kidnappings and extortion. After the 2016 peace accord and FARC’s formal demobilization, the Biden administration removed the group from the FTO and SDGT lists in November 2021 while designating two violent splinter groups that refused to disarm.
Outcome
Short term: The designation supported military and law‑enforcement campaigns and restricted FARC’s international financing, but did not by itself end the conflict.
Long term: Delisting followed a negotiated settlement and changed political context; terrorism tools were re‑focused on remaining violent factions.
Why It's Relevant
FARC’s trajectory illustrates that terrorist designations can be both long‑lasting and reversible, depending on political settlements and group behavior. It highlights the possibility that Tren de Aragua’s FTO status could one day be revisited, especially if critics’ concerns about politicization of the label gain traction or if the group’s structure changes.
Past U.S. Efforts to Frame Cartels as Terrorist Organizations
2010s–2020sWhat Happened
Across multiple administrations, there have been periodic pushes in Washington to treat Latin American cartels not only as organized‑crime groups but as terrorists, citing their mass casualties and territorial control. Under Obama and Trump’s first term, however, the U.S. typically relied on Kingpin and TCO authorities rather than formal FTO labels, fearing diplomatic fallout with partners like Mexico. Trump’s second‑term decision to designate Tren de Aragua, MS‑13 and several Mexican cartels as FTOs marks a significant departure from that prior caution.
Outcome
Short term: Earlier debates did not result in widespread FTO use against cartels, but they normalized the language of “narco‑terrorism” in U.S. politics.
Long term: Tren de Aragua’s case may become a test of whether expanded FTO use against criminal groups is sustainable or will prompt legal and diplomatic recalibration.
Why It's Relevant
This background helps explain why the current designations are controversial: they extend a tool designed for ideologically motivated groups to profit‑driven criminal syndicates, raising questions about efficacy, overreach and the future direction of U.S. counter‑terrorism policy.