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KVM flaw lets a rented cloud VM read its host's memory

KVM flaw lets a rented cloud VM read its host's memory

New Capabilities

A nested-virtualization bug on AMD chips left a stale page-table pointer; the fix reached stable Linux kernels within a month

Overview

Updated 4 hours ago

A rented DigitalOcean droplet read roughly 127 gigabytes of the physical machine beneath it, including the host kernel's version string. No guest should ever see that string. The bug was in KVM, the hypervisor built into the Linux kernel, and the only thing the attacker needed was root inside a virtual machine.

The flaw is a use-after-free in nested virtualization on AMD chips: an INIT reset pulls a virtual CPU out of a nested guest, and KVM resumes the outer guest holding a pointer to a page it already freed. Terra Security turned that into a forged page table covering all host memory. The fix merged to mainline Linux on November 2 and reached stable kernels on November 17.

Why it matters

Every tenant on a shared AMD host sits behind one kernel boundary. Unpatched, one customer's VM can read another's memory.

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Key Indicators

127 GB
Host RAM readable from one droplet
Terra Security mapped about 127 GB of host memory read-only from a DigitalOcean VM.
6 of 12
Successful exploit attempts per boot
The page-reallocation race worked on half the boots of a large droplet.
32 bytes
Arbitrary write into a live host kernel page
Demonstrated on Terra's own bare-metal AMD server, not on a customer's host.
12 days
Report to merged fix
Reported to KVM maintainers October 21, merged to mainline November 2.
262,144
Guest pages seeded for the address-guessing oracle
A gigabyte of guest RAM marked so host physical addresses could be brute-forced.

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Organizations Involved

Timeline

2022 November 2026

6 events Latest: Today
Tap a bar to jump to that date
  1. CVE-2026-99312 published with the full exploit chain

    Today Disclosure

    Terra Security details the race, the address oracle and the forged page table.

  2. Backports reach stable kernels

    Patch

    The fix ships in stable 7.3.5 and in long-term 6.18.64 and 6.12.118.

  3. Fix appears in a tagged release

    Patch

    The change is first tagged in Linux v7.4-rc2.

  4. Fix merged to mainline Linux

    Patch

    The patch forces an MMU context reset when emulating INIT, even with paging already disabled.

  5. Terra Security reports the bug

    Disclosure

    The firm sends its analysis of the stale page-table pointer to the Linux KVM maintainers.

  6. An earlier KVM reset bug gets fixed, incompletely

    Precedent

    The fix for CVE-2022-3344 switched back to the parent VM's control block but left its page-table pointer stale.

Scenarios

1

Cloud providers confirm AMD fleets were never exposed

Likely Resolves by Feb 28, 2027

Discussed by: Terra Security's mitigation section and Red Hat's CVE record

Terra Security found that many of the providers it surveyed never enabled nested virtualization on AMD, which closes the path entirely because the bug requires a nested guest. Providers that did enable it need kernel 7.3.5, 6.18.64 or 6.12.118, or the kvm_amd nested parameter set to zero. If the large providers confirm either state publicly, the practical exposure ends without an incident.

2

A working proof-of-concept lands in a public repository

Possible Resolves by May 31, 2027

Discussed by: Terra Security, which published the full chain but released no exploit code

The write-up gives every step: the INIT race, the page reallocation, the Accessed-bit oracle and the forged table. It withholds code. The race succeeds about half the time on a large droplet, which is a low bar for a motivated attacker with a rented host. A public implementation would move the bug from a paper to a tool.

3

The same reset path needs a third follow-on fix

Possible Resolves by Nov 18, 2027

Discussed by: Terra Security, which notes the 2022 fix has already required at least two follow-ons

The 2022 patch fixed the control block and missed the pointer inside it. This patch resets the MMU context unconditionally on INIT emulation. Whether that closes the whole class or just this instance is the open question, and the history of the code path suggests another attempt is plausible.

4

An in-the-wild host compromise is attributed to the bug

Unlikely Resolves by Nov 18, 2027

Discussed by: No source reviewed reports exploitation; Terra Security demonstrated on its own hardware

The read was shown on a rented droplet, but the write was deliberately confined to a bare-metal server Terra controls. Nobody has reported a host taken over through this path. Attribution would require a provider or a national agency to connect a specific intrusion to the stale-pointer race.

Historical Context

3 moments from history that rhyme with this story — and how they unfolded.

2022

CVE-2022-3344 (2022)

A reset signal pulled a virtual CPU out of a nested guest, and KVM kept running on the nested guest's control block, which was then freed. The fix switched execution back to the parent VM's control block before anything was released.

Then

KVM stopped running on a freed control block.

Now

The fix left the page-table pointer inside that block unrefreshed, and the code path has since needed at least two follow-on fixes.

Why this matters now

CVE-2026-99312 is one of those follow-ons: same reset path, same pointer, four years later.

May 2015

VENOM, CVE-2015-3456 (2015)

A buffer overflow in QEMU's virtual floppy disk controller let a guest crash the host and raised the prospect of code execution on it. Because the emulated hardware code was shared across virtualization stacks, the flaw reached many cloud platforms at once.

Then

Linux distributions and cloud providers patched QEMU within days.

Now

It became the reference case for how quickly a hypervisor bug propagates across shared infrastructure.

Why this matters now

Same structural problem: one flaw in shared virtualization code puts every tenant on a host at risk.

January 2018

Meltdown and Spectre (2018)

Researchers showed that speculative execution in processors leaked memory across protection boundaries, including between a guest and its host in cloud environments. Vendors coordinated a single disclosure date across competing hardware and software companies.

Then

Microcode and kernel patches shipped worldwide; cloud providers rebuilt host fleets.

Now

The mitigations carried measurable performance costs, and the rollout became a template for multi-vendor security coordination.

Why this matters now

It established that the shared physical host, not just the hypervisor, belongs in a cloud tenant's threat model.

Sources

(7)