Overview
Andrej Babiš just pulled off the comeback everyone said was over. Four years after losing power and then a presidential race to pro‑Western ex‑general Petr Pavel, the billionaire populist is back as Czech prime minister, sworn in on December 9, 2025, atop a majority coalition with the far‑right SPD and the anti‑green Motorists for Themselves party.
The new government controls 108 of 200 seats and is openly skeptical of EU climate and migration rules and of pouring weapons into Ukraine. That sets up a collision course with Brussels and Kyiv, and an immediate test of whether President Pavel and EU partners can keep a key NATO frontline state from drifting toward the Hungary–Slovakia camp on Russia and the rule of law.
Key Indicators
People Involved
Organizations Involved
Babiš’s vehicle from protest movement to dominant governing party, blending welfare populism with business interests.
Nationalist, anti‑immigration party now wielding new clout inside the governing coalition.
A protest party of drivers turned national kingmaker, railing against green rules and urban elites.
Bloc that funds Czech development and Ukraine aid, now confronting another skeptical government inside its ranks.
Timeline
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Babiš sworn in again as Czech prime minister
GovernmentAt Prague Castle, President Pavel appoints Andrej Babiš prime minister for the third time. The ANO–SPD–Motorists coalition prepares a 16‑member cabinet and signals a more critical stance toward EU climate and migration policies and a scaling back of military and humanitarian support for Ukraine.
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Babiš moves Agrofert empire into independent trust
LegalTo meet President Pavel’s conditions and address EU conflict‑of‑interest rulings from his first term, Babiš announces he is transferring his Agrofert conglomerate into a stricter independent trust, while still denying any wrongdoing over earlier subsidy fraud allegations.
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ANO, SPD and Motorists sign coalition agreement
GovernmentOn parliament’s opening day, Babiš and the leaders of SPD and Motorists sign a coalition deal giving them 108 of 200 lower‑house seats. Negotiations continue on a policy program that promises tougher lines on migration and a review of Ukraine support.
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President Pavel asks Babiš to form new government
GovernmentAfter meeting Babiš, President Pavel formally tasks him with forming a cabinet based on an ANO–SPD–Motorists majority. All three parties are openly critical of EU policies and skeptical of continued large‑scale support for Ukraine.
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Babiš’s ANO wins parliamentary election
ElectionANO secures about 34.5% of the vote in elections held on October 3–4, outpacing Fiala’s governing bloc. Babiš signals plans to partner with the far‑right SPD and the Motorists party to secure a majority.
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Zelensky visit cements Fiala government’s backing for Ukraine
InternationalUkrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky visits Prague and secures new pledges from Prime Minister Fiala for ammunition deliveries and pilot training, reinforcing Czechia’s image as one of Kyiv’s staunchest EU allies.
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Pavel vows to extend Czech‑led ammunition drive for Ukraine
PolicyPresident Pavel announces that a Czech‑coordinated scheme to buy artillery shells for Ukraine has delivered around 1.6 million rounds and will continue beyond April 2025, underscoring Prague’s frontline role in arming Kyiv.
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Petr Pavel defeats Babiš in presidential runoff
ElectionRetired NATO general Petr Pavel wins the presidency with about 58% of the vote against Babiš, campaigning on truth, dignity and firm support for Ukraine and the EU. Many analysts call it a blow to oligarchic populism.
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Centre‑right blocs oust Babiš in 2021 election
ElectionThe SPOLU and Pirates–STAN coalitions win 108 seats, defeating ANO amid anger over corruption revelations and pandemic management. Petr Fiala later forms a five‑party pro‑EU government, sending Babiš into opposition.
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Babiš becomes prime minister for the first time
GovernmentPresident Miloš Zeman appoints Andrej Babiš prime minister after ANO wins the 2017 election, beginning his first term atop a minority government supported informally by Communists and tolerated by SPD.
Scenarios
Prague Joins Orbán–Fico Bloc, Slashes Ukraine Aid
Discussed by: Reuters, AP, Euronews, regional analysts in Central European think tanks
The coalition leans fully into its campaign rhetoric: cabinet posts go to hardliners; Czech ammunition shipments and new training commitments for Ukraine are frozen or drastically scaled back; Prague obstructs future EU Ukraine packages, migration burden‑sharing and Green Deal legislation alongside Hungary and Slovakia. Domestic pressure from ANO’s base, SPD voters and Motorists activists outweighs Pavel’s warnings, while Babiš uses the majority to shield himself from a full retrial in the Capi Hnízdo case. Czechia remains in NATO but becomes an unreliable partner, weakening EU unity on Russia.
Pavel and Brussels Force a Pragmatic Middle Course
Discussed by: European policy commentary, Czech liberal media, Brussels diplomats quoted off‑record
Fearing market jitters, EU funding freezes and a frontal clash with President Pavel, Babiš moderates once in office. The government reduces the pace of arms deliveries and tightens refugee benefits but avoids a clean break with Prague’s ammunition initiative or EU‑backed training missions. On climate and migration, Czechia becomes more obstructionist but trades concessions for budget and industrial sweeteners, playing tough without fully joining Orbán’s spoiler camp. ANO’s technocrats and the Motorists’ business‑minded wing restrain SPD’s most radical demands, producing noisy rhetoric but incremental policy shifts.
Fraud Case or Coalition Infighting Topples Babiš Early
Discussed by: Czech investigative outlets, opposition politicians, some EU legal experts
Renewed legal moves in the Capi Hnízdo subsidy case, or fresh revelations about Agrofert’s EU funding, put Babiš back under intense scrutiny. If public outrage spikes or Brussels threatens to withhold cohesion funds, coalition partners – especially the image‑sensitive Motorists – may calculate that keeping him is too costly. Simultaneously, deep splits emerge over how far to go on Ukraine aid and climate rollbacks. A confidence vote fails or ANO replaces Babiš with a less polarizing figure, leaving the coalition bruised or collapsing into early elections and restoring a more conventional, pro‑EU alignment.
Historical Context
Robert Fico’s 2023 Comeback in Slovakia
2023-09 to 2023-10What Happened
After years in the political wilderness following corruption scandals and mass protests, Slovakia’s Robert Fico rode discontent over inflation and ‘Ukraine fatigue’ back into office in late 2023. He formed a nationalist‑leaning coalition and quickly moved to halt arms deliveries to Ukraine and weaken anti‑corruption institutions, clashing with EU partners.
Outcome
Short term: Bratislava pivoted from Kyiv ally to skeptical spoiler, complicating EU decisions on sanctions and aid.
Long term: Slovakia’s institutions and media came under heavier political pressure, and the country aligned more closely with Orbán’s Hungary on Russia and rule‑of‑law fights.
Why It's Relevant
Fico’s trajectory shows how a scandal‑tainted leader can return on a wave of anger and then rapidly redirect a small EU state’s Ukraine and rule‑of‑law stance — a template Babiš may follow or adapt.
Viktor Orbán’s Post‑2010 Consolidation in Hungary
2010-2018What Happened
Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz returned to power in 2010 with a big majority and used it to rewrite Hungary’s constitution, reshape the media landscape and channel state and EU funds toward loyal business networks. Over time, Orbán cultivated close ties with Moscow, clashed with Brussels over migration and democratic norms, and leveraged his EU veto power to extract concessions.
Outcome
Short term: Hungary became a predictable veto player inside the EU, slowing joint responses on migration, Russia and rule‑of‑law sanctions.
Long term: Orbán entrenched an illiberal system that survived multiple elections, showing how economic patronage and culture wars can lock in dominance.
Why It's Relevant
Comparisons between ‘Babisconi’ and Orbán highlight the risk that Babiš could use control over state resources and EU cash to consolidate power and shift Czechia from awkward partner to chronic spoiler.
Silvio Berlusconi’s Business‑Politics Nexus in Italy
1994-2011What Happened
Media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi cycled in and out of Italy’s premiership across nearly two decades, governing while owning sprawling business interests, repeatedly facing trials over tax fraud and corruption and fighting regulators over conflicts of interest. Despite scandals, his control of television and patronage networks kept him central to Italian politics.
Outcome
Short term: Italy endured persistent concerns about media freedom, judicial independence and EU credibility whenever Berlusconi governed.
Long term: His era normalized the fusion of tycoon wealth and political power in Europe, with lingering damage to public trust in institutions.
Why It's Relevant
Babiš’s renewed premiership, Agrofert trust structure and unresolved EU subsidy case echo Berlusconi’s conflicts of interest and legal shadows, illustrating how oligarch‑leaders can bend democratic systems around their business empires.