Trump–brokered DRC–Rwanda peace deal tested by renewed fighting
Force in Play
The 2025 Washington Accord ties peace in eastern Congo to critical minerals and U.S. power. Rebel drone strikes, legal challenges to the minerals deal, and looming sanctions on Rwanda are already testing it.
The 2025 Washington Accord ties peace in eastern Congo to critical minerals and U.S. power. Rebel drone strikes, legal challenges to the minerals deal, and looming sanctions on Rwanda are already testing it.
In early 2025, the Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion and its allies seized Goma and Bukavu in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, displacing millions. The United States stepped in and brokered the June 27 Washington Accord.
Presidents Félix Tshisekedi and Paul Kagame ratified it with Donald Trump on December 4, 2025, at the Donald J. Trump United States Institute of Peace. The accord promises Rwandan troop withdrawals, an end to Congolese support for anti-Rwanda militias, and a U.S.-linked economic framework centered on critical minerals. Alliance Fleuve Congo/M23 was excluded and considers the deal non-binding.
Fighting resumed immediately after the signing and has continued into 2026, including an M23 drone attack on Kisangani airport in February and clashes around Minembwe. The U.S.-DRC Strategic Partnership on minerals faces a constitutional challenge in Congo's courts, and Washington is preparing sanctions on Rwandan officials over M23 support. Doha ceasefire verification talks continue, but conditions on the ground keep undermining the accord in one of the world's deadliest conflicts.
Congolese lawyers petition Constitutional Court to void Strategic Partnership Agreement signed December 2025, citing unconstitutionality amid rebel control of mineral zones.
M23 claims drone attack on Kisangani airport
Conflict Escalation
AFC/M23 admits targeting army drone command center at Bangoka Airport; DRC forces claim to down eight kamikaze drones in major strike far from frontline.
DRC-M23 sign Doha ceasefire verification terms
Peace Framework
Parties agree on terms of reference for ICGLR-led monitoring mechanism; AU, Qatar, UN, U.S. observe as clashes continue in South Kivu.
December 2025
Minerals deals advance as violence continues
Economic Agreement
The Financial Times reports that, following the peace framework, DRC has agreed to give U.S. companies preferential access to key minerals through joint ventures with Gécamines and financing from the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation. The same day, AP and others describe intensified fighting, raising questions about whether economic deals can proceed amid instability.
Fighting resumes within hours of Trump‑backed ceremony
Conflict Escalation
Heavy fighting flares in South Kivu near Luvungi and Kamanyola less than a day after the Washington ceremony. AFC/M23 accuses the Congolese army and allied Burundian troops of attacking densely populated areas with jets and drones; Kinshasa blames Rwandan bombings and rebel shelling of civilians.
Trump hosts Tshisekedi and Kagame for White House peace ceremony
Diplomatic Ceremony
President Trump hosts Presidents Tshisekedi and Kagame in Washington to ratify the Washington Accord and unveil an expanded economic and minerals partnership. He hails the agreement as a historic breakthrough and personal diplomatic victory, while critics note that fighting continues and that M23 is still outside the deal.
Both sides accuse each other of sabotaging pre‑ceremony ceasefires
Conflict Escalation
Days before a presidential‑level White House ceremony, the DRC military and AFC/M23 trade accusations of attacks in South Kivu. Kinshasa claims rebels are sabotaging U.S. and Qatari peace efforts; AFC/M23 leader Corneille Nangaa blames Congolese and Burundian forces.
September 2025
Implementation stalls amid continued clashes
Implementation
By mid‑September, analysts report that implementation of both the Washington Accord and the Doha principles has largely stalled. Rwandan troop withdrawals are incomplete, M23 remains entrenched, and heavy fighting continues in several areas.
July 2025
DRC and AFC/M23 sign Doha declaration of principles
Peace Framework
The DRC government and AFC/M23 sign a Doha declaration of principles committing to negotiate a final peace agreement and full ceasefire aligned with the Washington Accord. The text calls for restoration of state authority over all national territory but leaves many details unresolved.
June 2025
Washington Accord signed by DRC and Rwanda
Peace Agreement
DRC Foreign Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner and Rwandan Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe sign the U.S.-mediated Washington Accord at the State Department. The deal pledges respect for territorial integrity, Rwandan troop withdrawal, an end to Congolese support for the FDLR, and a framework for disarming and integrating armed groups while deepening economic ties—including in critical minerals—with U.S. partners.
Analysts warn M23 exclusion may limit deal’s impact
Analysis
Coverage of the Washington Accord notes that the most potent armed actor, M23/AFC, is not directly party to the agreement and has suggested it does not consider the deal binding, raising immediate doubts about whether the accord will end fighting.
March 2025
Doha summit calls for immediate ceasefire
Diplomatic Meeting
Presidents Tshisekedi and Kagame meet in Doha with Qatar’s emir and issue a joint call for an "immediate and unconditional ceasefire" in eastern DRC. Days later, M23 seizes the town of Walikale, underscoring the gap between high‑level statements and realities on the ground.
February 2025
AFC/M23 declares unilateral ceasefire
Public Statement
The Rwandan‑backed M23 announces a unilateral humanitarian ceasefire, citing the crisis around Goma. Within days, however, the group resumes advances into South Kivu, and Kinshasa questions whether the ceasefire is genuine.
January 2025
M23 captures Goma and advances toward Bukavu
Military Offensive
M23 and allied AFC fighters seize Goma, a city of about two million people, in their biggest offensive since 2012. Nearly 3,000 people are reported killed and roughly 500,000 displaced in the advance, prompting fears of a march on Kinshasa.
June 2022
New DRC–Rwanda conflict ignites as M23 resurges
Conflict Escalation
Rwandan forces enter eastern DRC to support a resurgent M23 rebellion, igniting a new interstate crisis layered atop the long‑running Kivu conflicts. UN experts later estimate thousands of Rwandan troops are involved.
December 2013
Nairobi Declarations end first M23 rebellion
Peace Agreement
The DRC government and M23 rebels sign a peace deal in Nairobi that formally disbands M23 and promises demobilization and reintegration. Many fighters later remobilize, and grievances remain unresolved.
Historical Context
3 moments from history that rhyme with this story — and how they unfolded.
1 of 3
2013
Nairobi Declarations Ending the 2012–2013 M23 Rebellion
In December 2013, the DRC government and M23 signed declarations in Nairobi that formally ended the rebellion, provided for demobilization and reintegration of fighters, and denied blanket amnesty for serious crimes. The deal followed a major UN‑backed government offensive that had pushed M23 out of its strongholds.
Then
M23’s visible presence largely disappeared and thousands of fighters were disarmed or went into exile, giving the impression that a key armed group had been neutralized.
Now
Underlying political and security grievances were not fully resolved, and many ex‑fighters later remobilized, contributing to the renewed M23/AFC offensive starting in 2022–2025.
Why this matters now
The 2013 experience shows that even a seemingly successful demobilization can prove temporary when rebel networks remain intact and cross‑border backers retain incentives. It underscores the risk that the Washington and Doha frameworks, if not paired with deep reforms and robust verification, could simply reset the clock for a future resurgence.
2 of 3
1998–2003 (with violent aftermath)
Second Congo War (“Africa’s World War”)
The Second Congo War drew in nine African states and dozens of militias in a struggle over power in Kinshasa and control of mineral‑rich eastern regions. Although formal peace agreements in 2002–2003 created a transitional government and ended open interstate warfare, an estimated 5.4 million people died from violence, disease and displacement, and conflict persisted in the east.
Then
Hostilities between national armies gradually subsided, foreign forces withdrew on paper, and a transitional power‑sharing government was established in Kinshasa.
Now
Eastern Congo remained plagued by armed groups and foreign interference, fueled by conflict minerals and unresolved local grievances—laying the groundwork for later crises like the current M23/AFC rebellion and DRC–Rwanda standoff.
Why this matters now
The current DRC–Rwanda peace push is haunted by memories of the Second Congo War, when elite deals ended formal war but did not dismantle the war economy or address local grievances. The risk is that the Washington Accord could similarly end open interstate confrontation while leaving proxy dynamics and mineral‑driven violence intact.
3 of 3
2005 (with effects into 2011 and beyond)
Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Sudan’s government and the SPLM ended the Second Sudanese Civil War, set up wealth‑ and power‑sharing arrangements, and laid out a path to a 2011 referendum that led to South Sudan’s independence. The CPA was heavily backed by the U.S., UK, Norway and regional mediators.
Then
The CPA stopped large‑scale north–south warfare and created a structured transition culminating in South Sudan’s secession in 2011.
Now
Many core governance and security issues remained unresolved; South Sudan fell into its own civil war in 2013, and conflicts persisted in Sudan’s peripheries, highlighting the limits of an elite, partition‑oriented peace deal.
Why this matters now
The CPA shows how a U.S.-backed, resource‑linked peace framework can both achieve major milestones and still fail to deliver lasting stability when local grievances, security sector reform and inclusive governance are under‑addressed. This offers a cautionary parallel for the Trump‑brokered Washington Accord in DRC.
