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Trump‑Brokered DRC–Rwanda Peace Deal Tested by Renewed Fighting

Trump‑Brokered DRC–Rwanda Peace Deal Tested by Renewed Fighting

The 2025 Washington Accord links peace in eastern Congo to critical minerals and U.S. power—but excludes key rebels now challenging the deal on the ground.

Overview

In early 2025, a massive new offensive by the Rwanda‑backed M23 rebellion and its allies seized Goma and Bukavu in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, displacing millions and triggering urgent diplomacy. The United States stepped in as chief mediator, culminating in the June 27 Washington Accord between Kinshasa and Kigali and a high‑profile ratification ceremony on December 4, 2025, hosted by President Donald Trump at the rebranded Donald J. Trump United States Institute of Peace. The deal promises Rwandan troop withdrawals, an end to Congolese support for anti‑Rwanda militias, and a U.S.-linked economic framework centered on critical minerals.

But the main Rwandan‑backed rebel coalition, Alliance Fleuve Congo/M23, was not a party to the Washington agreement, and its leaders have repeatedly signaled they do not consider it binding. Within hours of Trump showcasing the accord alongside Presidents Félix Tshisekedi and Paul Kagame in Washington on December 4, heavy fighting resumed in South Kivu, with both the Congolese army and AFC/M23 accusing each other—and alleged Burundian forces—of violating ceasefires and bombing civilians. The renewed clashes immediately undercut U.S. claims of a diplomatic breakthrough and raised doubts about whether an elite minerals‑for‑peace bargain can pacify one of the world’s deadliest and most complex conflicts.

Key Indicators

7 million+
People displaced in DRC
Estimated number of people uprooted by conflict nationwide, making Congo one of the world’s most severe and protracted humanitarian crises.
4,000
Estimated Rwandan troops in eastern DRC
UN and analyst estimates of Rwanda’s deployed forces backing M23 and AFC, underscoring the interstate dimension of the conflict.
$24 trillion
Estimated value of DRC’s mineral reserves
U.S. Commerce Department estimate frequently cited in coverage of the peace deal, highlighting why cobalt, copper and other resources anchor U.S. and Chinese interest.
2
Major Washington signings in 2025
The Washington Accord was first signed by foreign ministers on June 27, then ceremonially ratified by Presidents Tshisekedi and Kagame at the White House/Institute of Peace on December 4.

People Involved

Donald Trump
Donald Trump
President of the United States (Chief political sponsor of the Washington Accord; under scrutiny as renewed fighting clouds his claimed diplomatic win)
Félix Tshisekedi
Félix Tshisekedi
President of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Seeking to regain territory from M23 and leverage U.S. backing while facing domestic skepticism about concessions to Rwanda and foreign investors)
Paul Kagame
Paul Kagame
President of Rwanda (Party to the Washington Accord while facing international allegations of backing M23 and exploiting eastern Congo’s minerals)
Corneille Nangaa
Corneille Nangaa
Leader of Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), political coalition linked to M23 (Key rebel political leader; accuses Kinshasa and Burundian forces of sabotaging peace while rejecting deals made without AFC/M23 at the table)
Marco Rubio
Marco Rubio
U.S. Secretary of State (Lead U.S. diplomat for the Washington Accord and related minerals framework)
Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner
Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner
Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Principal Congolese signatory of the Washington Accord)
Olivier Nduhungirehe
Olivier Nduhungirehe
Foreign Minister of Rwanda (Principal Rwandan signatory of the Washington Accord)
Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani
Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani
Emir of Qatar (Regional mediator hosting parallel Doha talks between DRC and AFC/M23)

Organizations Involved

Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo
Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo
National Government
Status: Conflict party; signatory to the Washington Accord; fighting continues against AFC/M23

The internationally recognized government seated in Kinshasa, controlling most of DRC’s territory but challenged in the east by M23/AFC and other armed groups.

Government of Rwanda
Government of Rwanda
National Government
Status: Conflict party; signatory to the Washington Accord; alleged backer of M23/AFC

Rwanda’s government, dominated by the Rwandan Patriotic Front under Paul Kagame, is a central actor in the Great Lakes security landscape.

Alliance Fleuve Congo / March 23 Movement (AFC/M23)
Alliance Fleuve Congo / March 23 Movement (AFC/M23)
Armed Group / Rebel Coalition
Status: Primary Rwanda‑backed rebel actor; excluded from the Washington Accord but central to on‑the‑ground fighting

An alliance of armed and political groups centered on the Tutsi‑led M23 rebellion, controlling swathes of eastern DRC with Rwandan backing.

United States Government
United States Government
Foreign Government
Status: Mediator and economic partner; seeks minerals access and regional stability

The U.S. government, under President Trump, is the chief external broker of the DRC–Rwanda peace framework and a major prospective investor in Congolese minerals.

Gécamines
Gécamines
State-Owned Enterprise
Status: Key DRC mining company in new U.S.-linked mineral ventures

Gécamines is Congo’s state‑owned mining firm, holding major stakes in copper and cobalt projects across the country.

Timeline

  1. Minerals deals advance as violence continues

    Economic Agreement

    The Financial Times reports that, following the peace framework, DRC has agreed to give U.S. companies preferential access to key minerals through joint ventures with Gécamines and financing from the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation. The same day, AP and others describe intensified fighting, raising questions about whether economic deals can proceed amid instability.

  2. Fighting resumes within hours of Trump‑backed ceremony

    Conflict Escalation

    Heavy fighting flares in South Kivu near Luvungi and Kamanyola less than a day after the Washington ceremony. AFC/M23 accuses the Congolese army and allied Burundian troops of attacking densely populated areas with jets and drones; Kinshasa blames Rwandan bombings and rebel shelling of civilians.

  3. Trump hosts Tshisekedi and Kagame for White House peace ceremony

    Diplomatic Ceremony

    President Trump hosts Presidents Tshisekedi and Kagame in Washington to ratify the Washington Accord and unveil an expanded economic and minerals partnership. He hails the agreement as a historic breakthrough and personal diplomatic victory, while critics note that fighting continues and that M23 is still outside the deal.

  4. Both sides accuse each other of sabotaging pre‑ceremony ceasefires

    Conflict Escalation

    Days before a presidential‑level White House ceremony, the DRC military and AFC/M23 trade accusations of attacks in South Kivu. Kinshasa claims rebels are sabotaging U.S. and Qatari peace efforts; AFC/M23 leader Corneille Nangaa blames Congolese and Burundian forces.

  5. Implementation stalls amid continued clashes

    Implementation

    By mid‑September, analysts report that implementation of both the Washington Accord and the Doha principles has largely stalled. Rwandan troop withdrawals are incomplete, M23 remains entrenched, and heavy fighting continues in several areas.

  6. DRC and AFC/M23 sign Doha declaration of principles

    Peace Framework

    The DRC government and AFC/M23 sign a Doha declaration of principles committing to negotiate a final peace agreement and full ceasefire aligned with the Washington Accord. The text calls for restoration of state authority over all national territory but leaves many details unresolved.

  7. Analysts warn M23 exclusion may limit deal’s impact

    Analysis

    Coverage of the Washington Accord notes that the most potent armed actor, M23/AFC, is not directly party to the agreement and has suggested it does not consider the deal binding, raising immediate doubts about whether the accord will end fighting.

  8. Washington Accord signed by DRC and Rwanda

    Peace Agreement

    DRC Foreign Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner and Rwandan Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe sign the U.S.-mediated Washington Accord at the State Department. The deal pledges respect for territorial integrity, Rwandan troop withdrawal, an end to Congolese support for the FDLR, and a framework for disarming and integrating armed groups while deepening economic ties—including in critical minerals—with U.S. partners.

  9. Doha summit calls for immediate ceasefire

    Diplomatic Meeting

    Presidents Tshisekedi and Kagame meet in Doha with Qatar’s emir and issue a joint call for an "immediate and unconditional ceasefire" in eastern DRC. Days later, M23 seizes the town of Walikale, underscoring the gap between high‑level statements and realities on the ground.

  10. AFC/M23 declares unilateral ceasefire

    Public Statement

    The Rwandan‑backed M23 announces a unilateral humanitarian ceasefire, citing the crisis around Goma. Within days, however, the group resumes advances into South Kivu, and Kinshasa questions whether the ceasefire is genuine.

  11. M23 captures Goma and advances toward Bukavu

    Military Offensive

    M23 and allied AFC fighters seize Goma, a city of about two million people, in their biggest offensive since 2012. Nearly 3,000 people are reported killed and roughly 500,000 displaced in the advance, prompting fears of a march on Kinshasa.

  12. New DRC–Rwanda conflict ignites as M23 resurges

    Conflict Escalation

    Rwandan forces enter eastern DRC to support a resurgent M23 rebellion, igniting a new interstate crisis layered atop the long‑running Kivu conflicts. UN experts later estimate thousands of Rwandan troops are involved.

  13. Nairobi Declarations end first M23 rebellion

    Peace Agreement

    The DRC government and M23 rebels sign a peace deal in Nairobi that formally disbands M23 and promises demobilization and reintegration. Many fighters later remobilize, and grievances remain unresolved.

Scenarios

1

Painful but Gradual Stabilization Under the Washington–Doha Framework

Discussed by: International Crisis Group, Atlantic Council analysts, some U.S. and Qatari officials

In this scenario, sustained U.S. and Qatari pressure, combined with targeted sanctions threats and incentives, eventually brings AFC/M23 into a binding ceasefire aligned with the Washington Accord. A joint security mechanism verifies a phased Rwandan withdrawal and the cantonment or integration of at least part of M23’s forces. Sporadic violence persists, but major fronts quiet over 12–24 months, allowing humanitarian access and early infrastructure and mining projects to move ahead. To succeed, this path requires meaningful concessions on political representation and local governance in eastern DRC, some accountability for abuses, and credible monitoring of cross‑border support to armed groups.

2

Elite Peace Deal Collapses into Renewed Regional War

Discussed by: USIP experts, regional conflict researchers, Congolese civil society voices warning about exclusion

Here, M23/AFC offensives continue and the Congolese army, backed by Burundi and other regional forces, escalates counter‑attacks. Rwanda maintains or deepens its military presence despite formal commitments, and the joint security mechanism remains toothless. Mounting atrocities and displacement push Kinshasa to declare the Washington Accord void, while Trump’s administration blames Congolese non‑compliance and scales back engagement. The conflict risks widening into a multi‑state confrontation reminiscent of the Second Congo War, with Uganda and other neighbors pulled in and critical mineral corridors militarized, severely disrupting global supply chains.

3

Frozen Conflict and De Facto Partition of Eastern Congo

Discussed by: Some African and Western analysts skeptical of full demobilization; business actors betting on "good enough" stability around key corridors

Under this scenario, major cities like Goma and Bukavu remain under or adjacent to M23/AFC influence, while Kinshasa and its allies control other urban centers and transport routes. The Washington Accord is nominally in force, but Rwanda retains covert influence through proxies, and M23 holds territory and taxation powers. Violence drops below the peak of early 2025 but persists as low‑intensity skirmishes and human rights abuses. International mining and infrastructure projects proceed in select areas under heavy security, generating revenue for national elites and external partners but leaving much of eastern DRC in a gray zone of limited state authority.

4

Rebalanced Mediation Dilutes U.S. Lead and Reopens the Deal

Discussed by: Commentary in African regional media, some European diplomats and think‑tank analysts

Continued fighting and perceptions that the Washington Accord is too U.S.-centric and mineral‑driven could lead regional organizations (African Union, East African Community) and possibly China or the EU to push for a broader, more inclusive negotiation format. A new round of talks might revisit key provisions on mineral governance, justice for atrocities, and power‑sharing in eastern provinces, potentially diluting U.S. leverage but addressing some legitimacy deficits. This could either produce a more sustainable settlement—or stall in great‑power competition, leaving Congo stuck in limbo.

Historical Context

Nairobi Declarations Ending the 2012–2013 M23 Rebellion

2013

What Happened

In December 2013, the DRC government and M23 signed declarations in Nairobi that formally ended the rebellion, provided for demobilization and reintegration of fighters, and denied blanket amnesty for serious crimes. The deal followed a major UN‑backed government offensive that had pushed M23 out of its strongholds.

Outcome

Short term: M23’s visible presence largely disappeared and thousands of fighters were disarmed or went into exile, giving the impression that a key armed group had been neutralized.

Long term: Underlying political and security grievances were not fully resolved, and many ex‑fighters later remobilized, contributing to the renewed M23/AFC offensive starting in 2022–2025.

Why It's Relevant

The 2013 experience shows that even a seemingly successful demobilization can prove temporary when rebel networks remain intact and cross‑border backers retain incentives. It underscores the risk that the Washington and Doha frameworks, if not paired with deep reforms and robust verification, could simply reset the clock for a future resurgence.

Second Congo War (“Africa’s World War”)

1998–2003 (with violent aftermath)

What Happened

The Second Congo War drew in nine African states and dozens of militias in a struggle over power in Kinshasa and control of mineral‑rich eastern regions. Although formal peace agreements in 2002–2003 created a transitional government and ended open interstate warfare, an estimated 5.4 million people died from violence, disease and displacement, and conflict persisted in the east.

Outcome

Short term: Hostilities between national armies gradually subsided, foreign forces withdrew on paper, and a transitional power‑sharing government was established in Kinshasa.

Long term: Eastern Congo remained plagued by armed groups and foreign interference, fueled by conflict minerals and unresolved local grievances—laying the groundwork for later crises like the current M23/AFC rebellion and DRC–Rwanda standoff.

Why It's Relevant

The current DRC–Rwanda peace push is haunted by memories of the Second Congo War, when elite deals ended formal war but did not dismantle the war economy or address local grievances. The risk is that the Washington Accord could similarly end open interstate confrontation while leaving proxy dynamics and mineral‑driven violence intact.

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

2005 (with effects into 2011 and beyond)

What Happened

The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Sudan’s government and the SPLM ended the Second Sudanese Civil War, set up wealth‑ and power‑sharing arrangements, and laid out a path to a 2011 referendum that led to South Sudan’s independence. The CPA was heavily backed by the U.S., UK, Norway and regional mediators.

Outcome

Short term: The CPA stopped large‑scale north–south warfare and created a structured transition culminating in South Sudan’s secession in 2011.

Long term: Many core governance and security issues remained unresolved; South Sudan fell into its own civil war in 2013, and conflicts persisted in Sudan’s peripheries, highlighting the limits of an elite, partition‑oriented peace deal.

Why It's Relevant

The CPA shows how a U.S.-backed, resource‑linked peace framework can both achieve major milestones and still fail to deliver lasting stability when local grievances, security sector reform and inclusive governance are under‑addressed. This offers a cautionary parallel for the Trump‑brokered Washington Accord in DRC.