Trump’s Gaza Ceasefire Plan Hits a Critical Test Over Who Governs and Who Disarms

Discussed by: Supporters of the Trump plan in the U.S. administration, some European and Arab diplomats, and commentary in outlets like Euronews, The Guardian and The Washington Post

In this relatively optimistic scenario, the Board of Peace is constituted by the end of 2025 with buy‑in from key Arab and Western states, and a compromise is found on the International Stabilization Force’s mandate and troop contributors—including a role for regional actors like Turkey and Egypt without alienating Israel. A Palestinian technocratic committee and vetted police force, trained by Arab states and overseen by the ISF, gradually assume day-to-day control of Gaza, while Hamas formally relinquishes governance and enters talks about its political future within a broader Palestinian movement. Disarmament proceeds in stages, with verified decommissioning of heavy weapons and offensive infrastructure tied to concrete milestones: increased aid, phased Israeli withdrawal and a clearer, if still conditional, pathway to Palestinian self-determination. Sporadic violence continues, but large-scale hostilities do not resume.

Discussed by: Sceptical analysts and humanitarian agencies quoted by AP, Al Jazeera and The Washington Post; Hamas statements; some European diplomats

Here, the ceasefire technically holds but implementation of phase two stalls. Israel maintains a significant military footprint inside Gaza, citing Hamas’ refusal to disarm and security concerns. The ISF deployment is delayed or limited to a small observer footprint amid disagreements over rules of engagement and who commands the force. The Board of Peace is formed on paper but lacks Palestinian legitimacy and faces internal divisions; the Palestinian technocratic committee struggles to operate under overlapping Israeli, international and Hamas influences. Hamas keeps most of its weapons, arguing that disarmament without a concrete timeline for ending occupation and for statehood is unacceptable, while Israel and the U.S. insist that demilitarisation is a precondition for deeper political concessions. Violence remains at a low but chronic level—targeted Israeli raids, factional clashes, attacks on the ISF—fueling public frustration and humanitarian suffering without returning to full-scale war.

Discussed by: Mediators at the Doha Forum, including Qatar and Turkey, and analysts warning of 'critical moment' risks in AP and Reuters coverage

In this downside scenario, accumulated violations, political shocks or spoilers cause the fragile ceasefire to unravel. A major incident—such as a mass-casualty Israeli strike, a large Hamas rocket barrage, or attacks on Israeli or ISF forces—leads one side to declare the agreement void. Netanyahu’s government, under domestic pressure, resumes full-scale ground operations, while Hamas and other factions respond with intensified rocket fire and asymmetric attacks. International actors blame each other: Israel points to Hamas’ refusal to disarm; Hamas cites continued occupation and lack of progress on governance and statehood. The Board of Peace and ISF are either never fully deployed or quickly sidelined. Humanitarian conditions in Gaza deteriorate further, regional tensions spike (including along the Lebanon front), and diplomatic capital spent on the Trump plan is largely lost, forcing the international community back to crisis containment rather than long-term settlement.

Discussed by: Some Arab and European diplomats who pushed for references to Palestinian statehood in the UN resolution, as reported by Euronews, The Guardian and The Washington Post

In a more transformative outcome, the Gaza plan, despite its flaws, becomes a springboard for a wider political process. Arab states and the EU leverage their support for the Board of Peace and ISF on a firmer commitment to a two‑state framework, extracting clearer benchmarks and timelines for Palestinian self-determination in subsequent Security Council resolutions or side agreements. Israel’s domestic politics shift—whether through elections or coalition realignment—toward leadership more open to a demilitarised Palestinian state in stages, in exchange for robust security guarantees and regional normalisation. Hamas, under pressure from regional patrons and facing a changing Palestinian political landscape, repositions itself as part of a broader, partially demilitarised Palestinian movement. While far from guaranteed, this scenario would mirror past peace processes where security-first arrangements (like disarmament and policing reforms) gradually fed into more ambitious political settlements.

Discussed by: Security analysts drawing parallels with Lebanon’s UNIFIL experience and critical commentary on vague demilitarisation provisions in The Washington Post and AIPAC/UNIFIL analyses

A middle-ground but unstable scenario mirrors Lebanon after Resolution 1701: formal frameworks exist, but real power is fragmented. The Board of Peace and ISF deploy but with limited capacity and political backing. Israeli forces withdraw from much of Gaza but maintain a permanent 'perimeter' presence and reserved right of intervention. Hamas formally steps back from overt governance yet retains clandestine security and patronage networks, weapons caches and influence over parts of the population, similar to Hezbollah’s role in south Lebanon. Palestinian police operate but face legitimacy and capacity challenges, and the ISF focuses more on de‑confliction than active disarmament. Over time, Gaza becomes a patchwork of authorities, with periodic flare‑ups but no decisive resolution of sovereignty or armed power, complicating both Palestinian statehood and Israeli security calculations.