Pull to refresh
Logo
Daily Brief
Following Why
The FDIC just cut the SVB/Signature “bailout bill” — and added a refund clause

The FDIC just cut the SVB/Signature “bailout bill” — and added a refund clause

Rule Changes
By Newzino Staff |

After two years of collecting to cover uninsured-depositor losses, the FDIC recalibrates the final installment and promises offsets if it overcharges.

December 19th, 2025: Interim final rule takes effect

Overview

The FDIC spent 2024–2025 billing big banks for the emergency decision to make SVB and Signature depositors whole. Now, with one quarter left in the planned eight-quarter collection, the agency is lowering that final rate and trying to prevent an awkward ending: collecting more than the losses it’s legally required to recover.

The twist is the new “true-up” logic. If the FDIC ultimately recovers more than the systemic-risk losses—especially depending on a high-stakes fight with SVB Financial Trust—it says it will pay banks back indirectly by offsetting future regular deposit-insurance bills. That turns what looked like a clean, finite levy into a longer story: a running tab that won’t be final until litigation ends and the receiverships eventually close.

Key Indicators

2.97 bps
New eighth-quarter special-assessment rate
Down from 3.36 bps to reduce overcollection risk in the final planned quarter.
$16.7B
Estimated systemic-risk losses (as of 2025-09-30)
Losses tied to protecting uninsured depositors that must be recovered by special assessment.
$12.7B
Collected through first six quarters
Amount already raised before the seventh and eighth planned invoices.
2026-03-30
Planned invoice payment date for the eighth collection quarter
The last installment of the initial eight-quarter collection schedule.

Interactive

Exploring all sides of a story is often best achieved with Play.

Ever wondered what historical figures would say about today's headlines?

Sign up to generate historical perspectives on this story.

Sign Up

Debate Arena

Two rounds, two personas, one winner. You set the crossfire.

People Involved

Travis Hill
Travis Hill
FDIC Acting Chairman; Board lead on the interim final rule (Overseeing the special-assessment recalibration and future offsets framework)
Martin J. Gruenberg
Martin J. Gruenberg
Former FDIC Chairman; architect of the original special assessment (No longer leading the FDIC; his 2023 rule set the collection framework)
Beth Labson Freeman
Beth Labson Freeman
U.S. District Judge (N.D. California) (Presiding over key SVB Financial Trust litigation affecting FDIC loss outcomes)
Gregory Becker
Gregory Becker
Former CEO, Silicon Valley Bank (Named in FDIC lawsuit seeking to recover losses after SVB collapse)

Organizations Involved

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Agency
Status: Collector and scorekeeper for the SVB/Signature systemic-risk losses

The FDIC is billing the banking industry for the uninsured-depositor backstop used in the 2023 crisis.

Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF)
Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF)
Financial Backstop Fund
Status: Absorbed the SVB/Signature resolution costs; being replenished via special assessment

The DIF is the pool of money that pays insured depositors when banks fail—and took the hit in 2023.

SVB Financial Trust
SVB Financial Trust
Litigation Entity
Status: Counterparty in litigation that the FDIC calls the biggest swing factor for losses

SVB’s former parent successor is fighting to recover deposits, potentially changing final FDIC losses.

U.S. Department of the Treasury
U.S. Department of the Treasury
Federal Agency
Status: Approved systemic-risk action that triggered the legally required special assessment

Treasury’s systemic-risk approval in March 2023 set the payback requirement in motion.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Central bank
Status: Partnered in the systemic-risk decision; provided broader liquidity backstop

The Fed helped authorize the systemic-risk move and launched emergency funding to calm deposit runs.

Timeline

  1. Interim final rule takes effect

    Rule Changes

    The rule became effective upon Federal Register publication; comments are due January 20, 2026.

  2. FDIC board approves an interim rule to avoid overcollection

    Rule Changes

    The FDIC reduced the eighth-quarter rate and created an offsets framework tied to SVB litigation and receivership closeout.

  3. Capital One sues over special-assessment calculation

    Legal

    Capital One challenged the FDIC’s assessment methodology, arguing it was overcharged—signaling broader industry friction.

  4. SVB Financial Trust lawsuit survives key hurdle

    Legal

    A judge allowed SVB Financial Trust to pursue a claim to recover roughly $1.93 billion, a potential loss swing for the FDIC.

  5. FDIC sues SVB’s former leaders

    Legal

    The FDIC sued former SVB executives and directors, seeking to recover losses tied to the collapse.

  6. First special-assessment invoice comes due

    Money Moves

    The collection began on the schedule set by the 2023 rule, spreading costs over eight quarters.

  7. FDIC finalizes the special-assessment rule

    Rule Changes

    The FDIC adopted the rule implementing an eight-quarter special assessment focused on banks with large uninsured deposits.

  8. SVB franchise sold to First Citizens

    Resolution

    First Citizens agreed to assume SVB Bridge Bank deposits and loans under an FDIC deal designed to maximize recoveries.

  9. Signature sold (mostly) to Flagstar/NYCB

    Resolution

    The FDIC struck a deal for Flagstar Bank (NYCB subsidiary) to assume most Signature deposits and select loans.

  10. Systemic-risk exception: uninsured deposits protected

    Rule Decision

    Treasury, the Fed, and the FDIC announced actions making SVB and Signature depositors whole, and promised losses would be recovered via a special assessment on banks.

  11. Signature fails; FDIC creates a bridge bank

    Crisis

    New York regulators closed Signature Bank; the FDIC transferred deposits and most assets to a bridge bank to market the franchise.

  12. SVB fails; FDIC steps in

    Crisis

    California regulators closed Silicon Valley Bank and appointed the FDIC as receiver, kicking off the 2023 banking panic.

Scenarios

1

FDIC wins the SVB Trust fight; offsets are small or never materialize

Discussed by: FDIC leadership statements; bank-regulatory reporters covering the litigation variable

If the SVB Financial Trust case resolves in a way that doesn’t materially reduce FDIC losses—or drags on without a clear liability reduction—the interim rule’s offset feature becomes mostly a backstop, not a payout. Banks still benefit from the near-term rate cut, but the story ends quietly: the FDIC closes the initial collection period, then waits years for receivership termination to confirm there’s no under- or over-collection.

2

SVB Trust wins meaningful recovery; banks get a “refund” through future assessment offsets

Discussed by: Reuters legal coverage; industry analysts focused on DIF-loss sensitivity to the SVB Trust claim

If SVB Financial Trust materially reduces the FDIC’s realized losses, the interim rule forces the FDIC to acknowledge overcollection and begin offsetting future regular deposit-insurance assessments for the same banks that paid the special assessment. It’s not a check in the mail—it’s a future bill that gets smaller—but it would be a reputational win for the FDIC’s “pay exactly the loss” promise and a political win for banks that complained the levy was turning into a blunt instrument.

3

Losses rise late; a one-time “shortfall” bill arrives years from now

Discussed by: The FDIC’s rule text and prior special-assessment framework; bank-risk analysts tracking receivership tail risk

If receivership expenses or asset recoveries break the wrong way—or litigation expands losses instead of shrinking them—the FDIC can still impose a one-time final shortfall special assessment when the receiverships terminate. That outcome would revive a story banks thought they had paid off, and it would reinforce the uncomfortable truth embedded in the new rule: this tab isn’t truly final until the FDIC turns out the lights on both receiverships.

Historical Context

FDIC’s 2009 special assessment after the financial crisis

2009-05 to 2009-09

What Happened

As bank failures surged after 2008, the FDIC moved to shore up the Deposit Insurance Fund by imposing a special assessment on insured banks. The point wasn’t punishment; it was liquidity and confidence—making sure the insurance promise stayed credible.

Outcome

Short Term

The FDIC collected billions quickly to bolster the DIF.

Long Term

It set a modern precedent: extraordinary stress can trigger extraordinary industry-funded replenishment.

Why It's Relevant Today

It’s the closest recent template for today’s SVB/Signature levy: crisis first, industry bill second.

FDIC’s Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP) fees

2008-10 to 2009

What Happened

During the 2008 panic, the FDIC guaranteed certain bank debt and expanded protection for transaction accounts under the TLGP. The program came with explicit fees, turning a stability backstop into a priced product.

Outcome

Short Term

The guarantee reduced funding stress for participating institutions.

Long Term

It normalized the idea that emergency guarantees can be paired with targeted industry charges.

Why It's Relevant Today

The SVB/Signature special assessment follows the same political logic: stabilize first, then charge for the stabilizer.

Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) and the S&L cleanup

1989-08 to 1995-12

What Happened

After the savings-and-loan collapse, Congress created the RTC to resolve failed thrifts and dispose of assets. Funding and loss absorption became a long, messy tail—years of asset sales, lawsuits, and political fights over who ultimately paid.

Outcome

Short Term

Hundreds of failed institutions were resolved and assets were liquidated over time.

Long Term

The cleanup illustrated how “final cost” is rarely knowable upfront in large-scale resolutions.

Why It's Relevant Today

It explains why the FDIC is building explicit offsets and true-ups: receiverships have long tails.

13 Sources:
+10
Federal Register (via Justia) FDIC Reuters FDIC FDIC FDIC FDIC FDIC FDIC Reuters FDIC FDIC FDIC