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Huawei rebuilds global smartphone ambitions on homegrown chips despite US export controls

Huawei rebuilds global smartphone ambitions on homegrown chips despite US export controls

New Capabilities
By Newzino Staff |

The Mate 80 Pro's international debut marks the furthest reach yet of China's domestic semiconductor supply chain

2 days ago: Huawei debuts Mate 80 Pro globally in Madrid

Overview

In May 2019, the United States placed Huawei on an export blacklist, cutting the world's largest telecom equipment maker off from American chips, software, and chipmaking tools. Seven years later, Huawei launched its Mate 80 Pro smartphone globally from a stage in Madrid, powered entirely by a processor designed in-house and manufactured by China's largest chipmaker using equipment the US tried to deny it. The phone runs on HarmonyOS, an operating system Huawei built from scratch after losing access to Google's Android services.

Key Indicators

$118B
Huawei 2024 revenue
Second-highest in company history, approaching the pre-sanctions peak of $122 billion in 2020
17%
China smartphone market share
Huawei reclaimed the number one position in China's smartphone market in 2025, up from sixth place in 2023
~5nm class
Kirin 9030 process node
SMIC's N+3 node approaches 5-nanometer density using only deep ultraviolet lithography, without the extreme ultraviolet tools China cannot obtain
$33B+
Estimated US firm revenue losses
Conservative estimate of sales lost by Intel, Qualcomm, Teradyne, and other American companies from Huawei export controls between 2021 and 2024

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People Involved

Ren Zhengfei
Ren Zhengfei
Founder and chief executive of Huawei Technologies (Leading Huawei through sanctions and global re-expansion)
Richard Yu (Yu Chengdong)
Richard Yu (Yu Chengdong)
Chairman of Huawei Consumer Business Group (Leading Huawei's device strategy and global product launches)
Gina Raimondo
Gina Raimondo
Former US Secretary of Commerce (2021-2025) (Left office in January 2025)

Organizations Involved

Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Telecommunications and consumer electronics company
Status: Rebuilding global presence while under US export restrictions

China's largest technology company by revenue, operating across telecom infrastructure, smartphones, cloud computing, and automotive electronics.

Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC)
Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC)
Semiconductor foundry
Status: Manufacturing Huawei's most advanced chips using workaround lithography techniques

China's largest chip foundry, fabricating the Kirin 9030 using deep ultraviolet multi-patterning after being cut off from extreme ultraviolet lithography equipment.

Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
US government agency within the Department of Commerce
Status: Administering and expanding export controls on Chinese semiconductor technology

The US Commerce Department division responsible for maintaining the Entity List and enforcing technology export restrictions that form the backbone of the Huawei sanctions regime.

ASML Holding
ASML Holding
Semiconductor equipment manufacturer
Status: Barred from selling advanced lithography systems to Chinese customers

The Dutch company that holds a global monopoly on extreme ultraviolet lithography machines, the equipment essential for manufacturing chips below 7 nanometers at competitive cost.

Timeline

  1. Huawei debuts Mate 80 Pro globally in Madrid

    Product

    At its Global Innovative Product Launch event days before Mobile World Congress, Huawei introduced the Mate 80 Pro to international markets alongside the Watch GT Runner 2 and FreeBuds Pro 5, its most significant global product push since sanctions took effect.

  2. Huawei launches Mate 80 series in China with Kirin 9030

    Product

    Huawei unveiled the Mate 80 lineup domestically, powered by the Kirin 9030 processor fabricated on SMIC's N+3 process node, its most advanced yet. Richard Yu claimed a 42 percent performance improvement over the prior generation.

  3. Think tank concludes export controls helped Huawei

    Analysis

    The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation published a report finding that US export controls had strengthened Huawei while costing American firms an estimated $33 billion in lost sales between 2021 and 2024.

  4. SMIC tests domestically manufactured DUV lithography tool

    Technology

    SMIC began testing a deep ultraviolet lithography system built by Shanghai-based Yuliangsheng, a significant step toward reducing reliance on ASML for the older lithography equipment still in use.

  5. Huawei reclaims top smartphone position in China

    Market

    With 46.8 million units shipped and a 17 percent market share, Huawei overtook Apple to become China's best-selling smartphone brand for the first time in five years.

  6. Netherlands restricts DUV lithography exports to China

    Regulation

    New Dutch export controls took effect, requiring licenses for ASML to sell its advanced deep ultraviolet immersion lithography systems to Chinese customers, tightening restrictions beyond the existing EUV ban.

  7. Huawei quietly launches Mate 60 Pro with 7nm chip

    Product

    Without any advance marketing, Huawei listed the Mate 60 Pro on its website. Teardowns revealed a Kirin 9000S processor manufactured by SMIC at 7 nanometers, demonstrating that Chinese firms had produced a more advanced chip than sanctions were believed to allow.

  8. US issues broadest semiconductor export controls in decades

    Regulation

    The Bureau of Industry and Security restricted China's access to advanced computing chips, chipmaking equipment, and even barred US citizens from working in Chinese semiconductor facilities. Analysts called it the most significant technology trade action since the Cold War.

  9. Huawei smartphone sales collapse globally

    Market

    Without access to advanced chips or Google services, Huawei fell out of the global top five smartphone vendors. Annual revenue declined from its 2020 peak as the consumer business contracted sharply.

  10. SMIC added to Entity List

    Regulation

    The US placed China's largest chipmaker on the Entity List, restricting its ability to purchase advanced manufacturing equipment including extreme ultraviolet lithography systems from ASML.

  11. US tightens rules to block TSMC chip supply

    Regulation

    The Commerce Department expanded export controls so that any chip designed using American software or manufactured with American equipment required a license before being sold to Huawei, cutting off Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) as a supplier.

  12. Google suspends Huawei's Android license

    Industry

    Google revoked Huawei's access to Android updates and Google Mobile Services, including the Play Store, Gmail, and Maps. Existing Huawei phones kept functioning, but new devices could no longer ship with Google apps.

  13. Huawei placed on US Entity List

    Regulation

    The Bureau of Industry and Security added Huawei and 68 non-US affiliates to the Entity List, effectively banning American companies from selling chips, software, and technology to the company without a license.

  14. Huawei chief financial officer arrested in Canada

    Legal

    Canadian authorities detained Meng Wanzhou, Huawei's chief financial officer and Ren Zhengfei's daughter, on a US extradition request related to alleged sanctions violations involving Iran.

  15. US bans Huawei equipment from federal networks

    Regulation

    The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2019 prohibited US government agencies from using Huawei and ZTE equipment, citing national security concerns.

Scenarios

1

Huawei regains meaningful share in Europe and Asia, built on domestic technology

Discussed by: The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, South China Morning Post technology analysts, and Digitimes industry researchers

Huawei's global smartphone share recovers to high single digits by 2027 as HarmonyOS matures for international use and the Kirin chip line continues narrowing the gap with Qualcomm and Apple. Markets in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and parts of Europe where Google services are less entrenched prove receptive. This scenario depends on Huawei building a viable international app ecosystem and SMIC continuing to improve yields on its advanced process nodes. Huawei would remain locked out of the US market but reclaim a significant portion of the roughly 160 countries where it once sold phones.

2

Global expansion stalls as app ecosystem and chip limitations persist

Discussed by: TechInsights semiconductor analysts, Council on Foreign Relations technology policy researchers, and Mobile World Live industry coverage

The Mate 80 Pro sells modestly outside China because international consumers find the absence of Google Mobile Services too inconvenient, and HarmonyOS's app library remains thin for non-Chinese users. Meanwhile, SMIC's multi-patterning approach hits cost and yield ceilings that prevent Huawei from matching Apple or Samsung on price-to-performance. Huawei remains dominant domestically but its international presence stays limited to niche markets and regions with strong existing Huawei brand loyalty.

3

US escalates export controls, targeting SMIC's remaining equipment access

Discussed by: Brookings Institution semiconductor policy researchers and the Congressional Research Service

The US government, interpreting SMIC's progress as evidence that existing controls are insufficient, pressures the Netherlands, Japan, and South Korea to further restrict maintenance, spare parts, and software updates for DUV equipment already installed in Chinese fabs. This would degrade SMIC's manufacturing capability over time and slow the chip improvement trajectory. However, it would also accelerate China's parallel effort to build entirely domestic lithography equipment, currently being tested at SMIC, and further reduce American technology firms' access to the Chinese market.

4

SMIC achieves competitive 5nm production, eroding the rationale for controls

Discussed by: TechInsights, American Affairs Journal, and SMIC industry analysts

SMIC's N+3 process matures to commercially viable yields and the company begins qualifying a true 5-nanometer-class node, closing the gap with TSMC to a single generation. At that point, the strategic logic of export controls weakens significantly because the controls would be restricting technology that China can now produce domestically. This could trigger a policy reassessment in Washington, or alternatively a more aggressive push to maintain the remaining gap at 3-nanometer and below.

Historical Context

US-Japan Semiconductor Trade War (1985-1991)

1985-1991

What Happened

Japanese chipmakers captured 75 percent of the global memory chip market by the mid-1980s, alarming the US semiconductor industry and defense establishment. The Reagan administration imposed 100 percent tariffs on Japanese electronics in 1985 and negotiated the 1986 Semiconductor Trade Agreement, which set price floors on Japanese chips and mandated that Japan purchase more American semiconductors.

Outcome

Short Term

The trade agreement raised chip prices globally, hurting American computer manufacturers who relied on Japanese memory chips while protecting US chipmakers.

Long Term

Japan's semiconductor dominance faded by the late 1990s as South Korea and Taiwan rose. The episode demonstrated that trade restrictions can shift market share but rarely determine which country leads in the long run.

Why It's Relevant Today

The 1980s US-Japan chip conflict is the closest precedent for using trade policy to contain a rising semiconductor power. Like today's Huawei situation, it raised the question of whether restrictions protect domestic industry or simply redirect innovation elsewhere.

ZTE Sanctions Crisis (2018)

April-July 2018

What Happened

The Commerce Department banned American companies from selling components to ZTE, China's second-largest telecom equipment maker, after the company violated the terms of a sanctions settlement related to exports to Iran and North Korea. ZTE, which depended heavily on Qualcomm chips and Google's Android, effectively ceased operations within weeks.

Outcome

Short Term

After direct intervention by President Trump as part of broader US-China trade negotiations, ZTE paid a $1.4 billion fine, replaced its entire management team, and accepted a decade of embedded compliance monitors.

Long Term

ZTE's near-death experience became what Chinese media called a 'Sputnik moment,' galvanizing government and industry investment in domestic chip alternatives. Huawei explicitly cited ZTE's vulnerability as motivation for building its own supply chain.

Why It's Relevant Today

ZTE's collapse demonstrated what happens when a Chinese tech company depends on American components and loses access. Huawei learned from ZTE's experience and spent years building alternatives before similar restrictions hit, which is a key reason Huawei survived where ZTE nearly did not.

Cold War COCOM Technology Controls (1949-1994)

1949-1994

What Happened

The United States and its Western allies created the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) to restrict technology transfers to the Soviet Union and communist bloc. Controls covered semiconductors, computers, telecommunications equipment, and manufacturing tools. The Soviet Union responded by investing heavily in domestic alternatives, achieving breakthroughs in nuclear weapons and space technology while falling behind in commercial computing and consumer electronics.

Outcome

Short Term

COCOM successfully slowed Soviet access to advanced Western technology, forcing costly and often inferior domestic substitutes.

Long Term

The Soviet Union achieved self-sufficiency in strategic military technology but never built competitive commercial technology industries. The controls contributed to a widening civilian technology gap that persisted until the Soviet collapse.

Why It's Relevant Today

The COCOM precedent shows that export controls can work in narrow strategic domains while failing to prevent targeted breakthroughs. China's approach differs from the Soviet model because Huawei operates as a commercially competitive company, not a state lab, and can sell its outputs globally to fund further development.

Sources

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