Overview
On December 5, 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met in New Delhi for the 23rd India–Russia Annual Summit and unveiled a "Programme for Economic Cooperation" through 2030 that aims to boost annual trade to about $100 billion and diversify it beyond oil and arms. The roadmap includes joint production in India of parts for Russian weapons, a urea plant in Russia, expanded cooperation in agriculture, health, shipping and labor mobility, and a push to conclude a free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union, even as U.S. sanctions and tariffs loom over India’s purchases of discounted Russian oil.
Putin used the summit to promise "uninterrupted" fuel supplies and deeper civil nuclear cooperation, including at the Kudankulam plant, positioning Russia as a long‑term energy anchor for India’s fast‑growing economy. Modi in turn praised the relationship as a "pole star" or "guiding star" of Indian foreign policy, even as New Delhi faces 50% U.S. tariffs on its exports over Russian oil, rising Western pressure on its defense and energy ties with Moscow, and its own ambition to localize arms production and maintain balanced relations with both the West and Russia.
Key Indicators
People Involved
Organizations Involved
India’s central government manages a complex balancing act: sustaining a legacy strategic partnership with Russia, expanding ties with the U.S. and its allies, and securing affordable energy for a growing economy.
The Russian state sees India as a cornerstone market and political partner in Asia, especially for arms, energy, and nuclear exports, as Western sanctions constrict its access to finance and technology.
Washington views India as a crucial Indo‑Pacific partner but has repeatedly used sanctions and tariffs to pressure New Delhi over its energy and defense ties with U.S. adversaries like Iran and Russia.
Timeline
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Putin and Modi sign 2030 Economic Cooperation Programme in New Delhi
SummitDuring a state visit to India, Putin and Modi agree on an economic roadmap through 2030 that targets $100 billion in annual trade, expands cooperation into agriculture, health, shipping and labor mobility, and seeks to ease barriers to Indian exports and develop national‑currency settlement mechanisms. Putin also pledges uninterrupted fuel supplies and deeper civilian nuclear and defense co‑production.
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Kremlin says India’s dip in Russian oil imports is 'temporary'
EnergyAhead of Putin’s India visit, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov downplays a recent decline in Indian purchases of Russian crude due to new U.S. sanctions on producers and shippers, promising to use alternative routes and financial mechanisms to keep supplies flowing.
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Russia and India jointly denounce U.S. 'illegal trade pressure'
DiplomacyAt security talks in Moscow, Indian NSA Ajit Doval and Russian officials reaffirm the strategic partnership, criticize U.S. tariff pressure as illegitimate and discuss defense collaboration, including delayed S‑400 deliveries.
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U.S. raises tariffs on India to 50% over Russian oil imports
Sanctions & TradePresident Donald Trump announces an extra 25% tariff on Indian goods, doubling total duties to about 50%, explicitly citing India’s continued imports of Russian oil as funding Moscow’s war. Indian officials call the move unfair and warn of economic damage.
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India becomes largest importer of Russian oil
EnergyBy mid‑2024, India overtakes China as the largest buyer of Russian crude, with Russian supplies providing roughly 35–40% of India’s oil imports, solidifying energy interdependence between New Delhi and Moscow.
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Payments snarl leads to temporary halt in some Russian oil flows to India
Energy & FinanceAs Russian crude prices rise above the G7 cap, India’s State Bank of India and others refuse to process certain transactions, leaving billions of dollars stuck and prompting a temporary suspension of many oil deliveries in late 2023.
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Jaishankar in Moscow as trade hits 'all‑time high'
DiplomacyIndia’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar visits Moscow, meeting Putin and Lavrov. He describes trade as at an "all‑time high" above $50 billion and calls for making it more balanced and sustainable, anticipating the later 2030 roadmap.
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Russia invades Ukraine; India stays neutral and increases Russian oil buys
War & EnergyRussia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine triggers Western sanctions and a G7 oil price cap. India abstains on key UN votes and sharply increases imports of discounted Russian oil and fertilizers, making Russia its top crude supplier by 2023–24.
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21st India–Russia summit sets 2021–2031 defense roadmap
SummitPutin visits New Delhi and, with Modi, issues the "Partnership for Peace, Progress and Prosperity" joint statement, adopting a 2021–2031 long‑term defense cooperation program and emphasizing joint development and production under Make in India.
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India halts Iranian oil imports under U.S. pressure
SanctionsAfter the Trump administration ends sanctions waivers, India stops importing Iranian crude, illustrating how U.S. secondary sanctions can override New Delhi’s energy preferences and foreshadowing future pressure over Russian oil.
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India signs $5+ billion S‑400 missile deal with Russia
Defense DealDuring Putin’s visit to New Delhi, India signs a roughly $5.4 billion contract for five S‑400 Triumf air‑defense systems, despite U.S. CAATSA sanctions threats, underscoring the primacy of Russian hardware in India’s arsenal.
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Partnership elevated to 'Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership'
SummitAt a summit in the early 2010s, India and Russia formally upgrade their ties to a "Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership," underlining the depth of defense and energy cooperation.
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Strategic Partnership Declaration signed in New Delhi
SummitRussian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee sign the Declaration on Strategic Partnership in New Delhi, institutionalizing annual summits and deepening cooperation in defense, energy and counter‑terrorism.
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India–Russia Friendship and Cooperation Treaty
TreatyPost‑Soviet Russia and India sign a 20‑year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, reaffirming close political, defense and economic ties and replacing the earlier Indo‑Soviet treaty.
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Indo–Soviet Treaty anchors Cold War alignment
TreatyIndia and the Soviet Union sign the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, committing to close strategic consultation and effectively aligning India with Moscow during the Bangladesh crisis. This sets the historical foundation for India–Russia security ties.
Scenarios
Roadmap delivered: India and Russia hit or approach $100B trade while managing Western pressure
Discussed by: Reuters, AP, Indian business media and trade economists
Under this scenario, the 2030 Programme for Economic Cooperation broadly succeeds. India and Russia remove key non‑tariff barriers, streamline payments in national currencies, and expand trade in fertilizers, agriculture, pharmaceuticals, machinery, services and labor mobility so that Indian exports rise and the oil‑heavy trade structure becomes more balanced. Moscow keeps oil discounts attractive enough to offset U.S. tariff pain, and Washington ultimately moderates its approach as it prioritizes strategic cooperation with India against China. The Eurasian Economic Union FTA is concluded, giving Indian exporters better market access in Russia and Central Asia. This path assumes no dramatic escalation in Western secondary sanctions on Indian entities and that the Ukraine conflict grinds on without direct NATO–Russia confrontation.
Escalating U.S. sanctions force India to sharply cut Russian energy and defense ties
Discussed by: Western policy analysts and sanctions experts
In a harsher trajectory, Washington moves beyond broad tariffs to targeted financial sanctions on Indian refiners, banks, or defense companies dealing with Russian entities, similar to its approach on Iran or the more aggressive parts of CAATSA. European partners adopt parallel measures, and insurance and shipping constraints tighten. As compliance risk rises and discounts narrow, Indian refiners rapidly diversify back to Middle Eastern and U.S. crude; major new Russian arms deals are frozen; and joint production plans slow. India seeks U.S. concessions on tariffs and tech transfer in exchange for cutting Russian flows, but relations with Moscow cool and Russia leans more heavily on China. This scenario would likely be triggered by a major escalation in Ukraine or a U.S. decision to prioritize maximum economic pressure on Russia over accommodating India’s energy security concerns.
Russia supply shock or political instability forces involuntary decoupling
Discussed by: Energy market analysts and risk consultancies
Here, the constraint comes less from Western policy and more from disruptions inside Russia or along its export routes—such as intensified conflict in the Black Sea, infrastructure sabotage, or internal political turmoil that hits production and logistics. Indian refiners, faced with unreliable volumes or sudden cost spikes, are forced to pivot back toward Gulf and U.S. suppliers regardless of geopolitical preferences, echoing India’s earlier forced exit from Iranian oil. In this environment, the 2030 roadmap’s non‑energy components (agriculture, health, labor mobility) still progress, but the central energy pillar erodes and trade volumes stagnate or fall short of targets.
India leverages Russia to accelerate self‑reliance, then gradually diversifies away
Discussed by: Indian strategic community and defense industry commentators
In this scenario, India uses the next 5–10 years of deep cooperation with Russia to accelerate domestic capacity in defense production, nuclear technology and critical materials—through joint ventures, technology transfers, and localized manufacturing of spares and components—exactly as outlined in recent joint statements. Once key capabilities are indigenized and diversified, India gradually reduces dependence on Russian platforms and fuels, bringing imports closer in line with Western and domestic alternatives without a sudden rupture. Trade targets may be met, but the qualitative balance shifts from raw commodities and big‑ticket weapons toward co‑developed technologies and services, giving New Delhi even more room to maneuver between rival camps.
Historical Context
1971 Indo–Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation
1971–1991What Happened
On August 9, 1971, India and the Soviet Union signed a 20‑year Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation that committed them to mutual consultations in case of attack and effectively aligned India with Moscow during the Bangladesh crisis and the ensuing war with Pakistan. Analysts see this as a major shift from India’s earlier nonalignment, undertaken to counter Pakistan’s growing ties with the U.S. and China.
Outcome
Short term: The treaty deterred direct U.S. and Chinese military intervention on Pakistan’s side in 1971 and helped India secure a decisive victory that led to the creation of Bangladesh.
Long term: The agreement entrenched a long‑term security partnership and large‑scale Soviet arms transfers to India, and its spirit lived on in the 1993 Indo‑Russian Treaty and the 2000 Strategic Partnership Declaration that frame today’s relationship.
Why It's Relevant
The 1971 treaty shows that India has historically accepted significant alignment with Moscow when it serves core security interests, despite potential friction with the U.S. That precedent helps explain why New Delhi is willing to absorb U.S. displeasure—and now even tariffs—over Russian energy and arms if it believes those links are essential for its strategic autonomy.
Turkey’s Purchase of Russian S‑400 Systems and U.S. CAATSA Sanctions
2017–2020What Happened
In 2017, NATO member Turkey agreed to buy Russia’s S‑400 air‑defense system, and in July 2019 it received its first deliveries despite repeated U.S. warnings. Washington responded by removing Turkey from the F‑35 fighter program and later imposing CAATSA sanctions on its defense procurement agency, citing the risk that S‑400s could compromise NATO technology.
Outcome
Short term: Turkey faced suspension from the F‑35 program and targeted sanctions on its defense sector, while relations with Washington and NATO were strained but not severed.
Long term: Despite sanctions, Ankara retained the S‑400s and continued balancing between Russia and the West. The episode demonstrated both the potency of U.S. sanctions tools and their limits when applied to strategically important allies determined to assert autonomy.
Why It's Relevant
Turkey’s S‑400 case is a direct parallel to India’s own S‑400 purchase and broader Russia ties. It illustrates how far the U.S. is prepared to go with sanctions against partners buying Russian systems, but also that such measures do not always compel a full reversal—suggesting India may manage a similar, though costly, middle path.
U.S. Sanctions on Iranian Oil and India’s Forced Exit
2018–2019What Happened
After withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal, the Trump administration reimposed sanctions on Tehran’s oil sector in November 2018 and initially granted waivers to major buyers including India. In April 2019, it announced that no further waivers would be issued, forcing India—which had sourced about 10% of its crude from Iran—to halt Iranian oil imports by May 2019.
Outcome
Short term: India scrambled to replace Iranian volumes with supplies from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and others, and accepted higher logistical and sometimes price costs in order to avoid U.S. secondary sanctions.
Long term: Iran lost a key Asian customer and India lost a flexible, nearby supplier that offered favorable terms. The episode demonstrated that even large, strategically important importers like India can be compelled to change suppliers when U.S. sanctions are enforced strictly enough.
Why It's Relevant
The Iran precedent is a cautionary tale for India’s current reliance on Russian oil: it shows Washington’s willingness to force difficult energy choices on partners and the practical costs of compliance. At the same time, India’s subsequent rush into Russian crude underscores that it will exploit any sanctions‑created discounts if it judges the risk acceptable, highlighting the tug‑of‑war now playing out around Russian supplies.