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The US-China semiconductor cold war

The US-China semiconductor cold war

Rule Changes

Washington Now Polices Where Chinese Computing Runs, as Trump Talks Up a 'Comprehensive Deal' With Beijing

Overview

Updated Yesterday

The 180-day deadline for HieFo Corporation to hand EMCORE's indium phosphide chip business back to US control passed on July 1, 2026, and no public confirmation of compliance has been reported. Since then Washington has moved from unwinding individual deals to policing where Chinese computing runs.

Rules that took effect November 19 require a US licence when an overseas data center remotely supplies large amounts of computing power to companies headquartered in China or Macau. TSMC stopped taking advanced orders from Chinese chip designers without licences the same week, limiting them to older processes. Trump says the US should sell Beijing "only older chips" while a "very comprehensive deal" is negotiated, and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent says older Nvidia sales need no further restrictions.

Why it matters

Which chips Washington lets China buy—and which factories Beijing can control—shapes how the next war is fought.

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Key Indicators

$2.92M
Deal value HieFo paid
Tiny acquisition that triggered presidential intervention: size doesn't matter when the tech is critical
879,000
AI chips approved for China as of May 2026
Commerce's export arm cleared the sales to buyers including Alibaba and Tencent, per documents Congress released in November
3.4M
Licence requests for chip sales to China
Requests from Nvidia and AMD between December and May, according to the House Foreign Affairs Committee
25%
US cut of H200 sales to China
Trump allowed Nvidia to ship its older Hopper chips to approved Chinese customers in exchange for a share of the revenue

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People Involved

Organizations Involved

Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)
U.S. government interagency panel
HieFo's 180-day divestment window closed around July 1, 2026; no public confirmation of compliance has been reported

The interagency committee that reviews foreign acquisitions of US companies for national security risks.

HieFo Corporation
HieFo Corporation
Semiconductor Manufacturer
Ordered to divest all EMCORE assets by around July 1, 2026; no public confirmation of the divestment has been reported

A Delaware-incorporated semiconductor company controlled by Chinese national Genzao Zhang, now at the center of a forced divestment order.

EMCORE Corporation
EMCORE Corporation
Defense Technology Manufacturer
Former owner of divested semiconductor operations

The world's largest independent provider of inertial navigation solutions to aerospace and defense, which sold its chip division to HieFo.

Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
Federal Agency
Published an interim final rule in November 2026 extending licence requirements to overseas data centers serving Chinese-headquartered firms; facing congressional scrutiny of its chip approvals

The Commerce Department arm that licenses chip exports and writes the export rules at the center of the China controls.

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC)
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC)
Semiconductor foundry
Limiting Chinese chip designers to older processes unless they obtain US export licences

The world's largest contract chipmaker, which manufactures advanced processors for Nvidia and other chip designers.

Timeline

September 2017 November 2026

22 events Latest: 2 days ago Showing 8 of 22
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  1. Trump Says Only Older Chips Should Go to China

    Latest Statement

    Trump said the US wants only older chips sold to China and that his administration is discussing "a very comprehensive deal" with Beijing. His administration had said earlier in the week that it would further restrict China's access to advanced AI chips.

  2. Bessent Says Older Nvidia Sales Need No New Limits

    Statement

    Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said no further restrictions are needed on sales of older Nvidia chips to China, after the administration moved to block China's remote access to the newest semiconductors.

  3. Commerce Requires Licences for Overseas Data Centers Serving China

    Policy

    An interim final rule extends export controls to data centers abroad that remotely supply significant computing power to companies headquartered in China or Macau, and updates controls on advanced-node chips, supercomputers and chipmaking equipment. It took effect the day it was published.

  4. TSMC Halts Advanced Orders From Chinese Chip Designers

    Corporate

    TSMC told customers that orders using 16-nanometre processes and below would stop unless they obtained US export licences, and limited Chinese designers to 28- and 40-nanometre work without high-bandwidth memory or advanced packaging. The Financial Times reported Samsung also suspended some shipments.

  5. House Panel Releases Documents on 879,000 Approved Chip Sales

    Oversight

    Documents released by the House Foreign Affairs Committee showed the Commerce Department approved more than 879,000 AI chips for Chinese buyers including Alibaba and Tencent as of May 2026, against 3.4 million licence requests from December through May. Some approvals went to companies the Pentagon lists as Chinese military companies.

  6. Commerce Approved 580,000 Nvidia Chip Sales Under Revenue-Share Plan

    Policy

    The Commerce Department approved the sale of almost 580,000 Nvidia AI chips to Chinese companies under a plan that lets the sales proceed in exchange for a cut of the revenue, The Washington Post reported on November 20.

  7. Trump Makes State Visit to Beijing With Musk, Cook, and Jensen Huang

    Diplomacy

    Trump arrived in China for a state summit with Xi Jinping, with Elon Musk, Tim Cook, and Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang in the delegation. AI chip export controls, H200 licenses, and Chinese rare earth restrictions were the central tech issues on the table.

  8. US-China Trade Truce Cuts Tariffs Sharply

    Diplomacy

    US and China agreed to cut tariffs: US duties on Chinese goods fell from 145% to 30%, Chinese duties on US goods from 125% to 10%. AI chip export controls remained unresolved heading into the Beijing summit.

  9. MATCH Act Introduced in Congress

    Legislation

    Senate and House lawmakers introduced the MATCH Act to ban sales of deep ultraviolet lithography equipment to China and add SMIC, CXMT, YMTC, and Huawei to restricted lists. The House Foreign Affairs Committee advanced it in what lawmakers called the largest semiconductor export control markup in congressional history.

  10. AI OVERWATCH Act Clears House Foreign Affairs Committee

    Legislation

    The House Committee on Foreign Affairs voted 42-2-1 to advance the AI OVERWATCH Act. The bill would give Congress a 30-day window to veto AI chip export licenses before they take effect, covering sales to China, Russia, and Iran.

  11. Commerce Allows H200 Chip Exports to China

    Policy

    BIS shifted export review for Nvidia H200 and AMD MI325X chips from 'presumption of denial' to case-by-case review, with a 25% tariff and a 50% volume cap relative to US domestic sales. The reversal came 13 days after Trump ordered HieFo to divest EMCORE's defense chip assets.

  12. Treasury Confirms National Security Findings

    Statement

    Treasury detailed CFIUS findings: risk from potential access to EMCORE IP and diversion of indium phosphide chip supply from US defense customers.

  13. Trump Orders HieFo Divestment

    Presidential Action

    Trump signed executive order blocking HieFo's ownership of EMCORE assets and ordering complete divestment within 180 days, citing IP access and supply diversion risks.

  14. China Suspends Critical Minerals Export Ban

    Diplomacy

    China paused export ban on gallium, germanium, and antimony to US through November 2026 as part of trade truce.

  15. Trump-Xi Trade Truce Announced

    Diplomacy

    Trump and Xi struck deal in South Korea to delay new semiconductor tariffs until mid-2027, seeking to stabilize US-China tech tensions.

  16. Biden Tightens Semiconductor Export Controls

    Policy

    Biden expanded China chip controls, adding 140 companies to Entity List and restricting high-bandwidth memory and packaging equipment. China immediately banned gallium, germanium, and antimony exports to US.

  17. Treasury Expands CFIUS Enforcement Powers

    Regulatory

    Treasury issued final rule enhancing CFIUS authority to review historical deals and enforce compliance, effective December 26, 2024.

  18. HieFo Begins Operating Semiconductor Facility

    Operations

    Zhang and Moore officially started as HieFo CEO and co-founder, taking control of EMCORE's manufacturing facility and intellectual property.

  19. HieFo Acquires EMCORE Chip Business

    Transaction

    Genzao Zhang and Harry Moore completed $2.92 million management buyout of EMCORE's indium phosphide semiconductor operations in California.

  20. China Retaliates With Critical Minerals Ban

    Retaliation

    China imposed export restrictions on gallium and germanium—semiconductor materials the US doesn't domestically produce—following US chip controls.

  21. Biden Imposes Sweeping Semiconductor Export Controls

    Policy

    Biden administration restricted exports of advanced chips, chipmaking equipment, and design tools to China to impair AI and supercomputing capabilities.

  22. Trump Blocks First Chinese Chip Acquisition

    Presidential Action

    Trump blocked Canyon Bridge's $1.3 billion acquisition of Lattice Semiconductor, citing Chinese government funding and IP transfer risks. Only fourth presidential CFIUS block in history.

Scenarios

1

HieFo Divests, EMCORE Reclaims Assets

Likely

Discussed by: Legal analysts at Morrison Foerster and trade compliance experts

HieFo completes full divestment within 180 days, returning the semiconductor facility, IP, and operations to EMCORE or selling to a US buyer. This is the most likely outcome given presidential orders carry the force of law and non-compliance risks criminal penalties. EMCORE could resume chip production or find a US buyer for the division. The case becomes a precedent warning that even small management buyouts face retroactive CFIUS review if foreign nationals control defense-critical technology. Zhang returns to China or remains in US without the business; HieFo potentially challenges the decision in court but ultimately complies.

2

Legal Challenge Delays Divestment

Possible

Discussed by: CFIUS legal practitioners and constitutional law experts

HieFo sues to block the order, arguing it operates as an American company under American management and the Chinese control finding is wrong. The company seeks injunctive relief claiming the 180-day timeline is unreasonable and the order exceeds presidential authority. Canyon Bridge attempted similar challenges in 2017 and lost. Courts historically defer to presidential CFIUS determinations on national security grounds. Even if HieFo wins a temporary delay, the underlying national security concerns remain and divestment becomes inevitable. The case drags through 2026 with the facility in operational limbo.

3

Trade War Escalates, China Retaliates

Possible

Discussed by: China analysts at CSIS and international trade economists

Beijing views the HieFo block as violation of the Trump-Xi trade truce and retaliates by reimposing critical minerals export bans or targeting American companies operating in China. The semiconductor cold war intensifies despite the October 2025 deal to stabilize relations. China accelerates domestic indium phosphide production to replace lost EMCORE supply chain access. Washington responds with additional CFIUS enforcement actions against completed deals involving Chinese investors. The fragile détente collapses, triggering the mid-2027 semiconductor tariffs early and potentially derailing broader trade negotiations. Both sides dig in for protracted technological decoupling.

4

MATCH Act Passes, Colliding With Trump's Beijing Diplomacy

Possible Resolves by End of 2026

Discussed by: Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Risch, Ricketts, Kim); House Foreign Affairs Committee

Congress passes the MATCH Act, banning deep ultraviolet lithography equipment sales to China and requiring allied countries to align export controls within 150 days or face expanded US jurisdiction. Whether Trump signs or vetoes it becomes the test of which wins—his security enforcement posture or the commercial deal-making he pursued in Beijing. A veto would expose a widening gap between the executive and Congress on China tech policy.

5

Trump and Xi Sign a Deal That Draws the Line at Older Chips

Possible Resolves by Q2 2027

Discussed by: Trump, speaking to reporters after his Asia trip; US-China trade analysts

The 'very comprehensive deal' Trump says is under discussion turns into a signed agreement that lets US firms sell older accelerators to approved Chinese buyers while keeping the newest chips out. It would formalize what Trump described on November 20 and give Nvidia a predictable export lane. Congress could still move to block it, since the AI OVERWATCH Act would give lawmakers a veto window over such licences.

Historical Context

3 moments from history that rhyme with this story — and how they unfolded.

2017

Canyon Bridge-Lattice Semiconductor (2017)

Trump blocked a $1.3 billion Chinese state-backed buyout of Lattice Semiconductor, a US chipmaker, after CFIUS found national security risks from IP transfer and Chinese government funding. Canyon Bridge was a private equity fund created specifically to minimize CFIUS scrutiny, with China Reform Holdings as sole investor. CFIUS determined this was a cover transaction that couldn't obscure Chinese state control. The parties refiled their CFIUS notice three times attempting to address concerns before Trump ultimately ordered abandonment within 30 days.

Then

Deal collapsed; Lattice remained independent and US-controlled.

Now

Became the template for aggressive CFIUS enforcement against Chinese semiconductor acquisitions, establishing that complex corporate structures won't hide ultimate control.

Why this matters now

The HieFo case follows the same playbook: a small Delaware company created to acquire US chip assets, but with Chinese control CFIUS sees through. Like Canyon Bridge, HieFo's American incorporation didn't matter—control is what counts.

2012

Obama Blocks Ralls Wind Farm (2012)

President Obama ordered Ralls Corporation, owned by Chinese executives, to divest wind farm projects near restricted Navy airspace in Oregon. This was only the third presidential CFIUS block in history. Ralls sued claiming the order violated due process, marking the first constitutional challenge to a CFIUS presidential determination. The DC Circuit Court upheld presidential authority but required better process for disclosing unclassified evidence.

Then

Ralls divested the projects; legal challenge failed to overturn the order.

Now

Established that presidential CFIUS determinations are reviewable but courts defer heavily on national security findings. Set precedent that proximity to military installations triggers intense scrutiny.

Why this matters now

Shows that Chinese investors challenging presidential CFIUS blocks lose in court. If HieFo litigates, history suggests they'll fail. Also demonstrates CFIUS has no statute of limitations—even completed deals can be unwound.

2024

MineOne Cryptocurrency Mining Divestment (2024)

Biden's CFIUS forced Chinese-owned MineOne to divest cryptocurrency mining operations near a strategic missile base in Wyoming. The facility operated for two years before a public tip alerted CFIUS, which launched a non-notified transaction investigation. The case revealed CFIUS's expanding focus beyond traditional tech acquisitions to any foreign investment near critical infrastructure, and its reliance on tips to discover unreported deals.

Then

MineOne divested the Wyoming real estate and mining operations.

Now

Signaled that CFIUS will aggressively investigate historical transactions not voluntarily disclosed, and geography near military sites remains a red flag regardless of business sector.

Why this matters now

Like MineOne, the HieFo deal wasn't voluntarily disclosed to CFIUS and faced retroactive investigation. Both cases show CFIUS's 2024-2025 enforcement surge targeting non-notified transactions years after closing.

Sources

(30)