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Treasury targets 29 Iran “shadow fleet” ships, turning tanker logistics into a sanctions minefield

Treasury targets 29 Iran “shadow fleet” ships, turning tanker logistics into a sanctions minefield

Force in Play
By Newzino Staff |

Washington is trying to starve Tehran’s war machine by blacklisting the floating infrastructure that moves its oil.

December 18th, 2025: Treasury blocks 29 Iran-linked shadow fleet vessels

Overview

Treasury just hit Iran’s oil-smuggling “shadow fleet” where it actually hurts: the ships. On December 18, 2025, OFAC blocked 29 vessels and a web of managers and front-company operators that keep Iranian oil moving when the paperwork is fake and the GPS goes dark.

The stakes aren’t just political theater. If you can’t insure, charter, refuel, port, or pay for these tankers without tripping U.S. sanctions, Iran’s discounted barrels become harder to sell—and less profitable when they do sell. That’s the point: squeeze the cash that funds Iran’s military and weapons programs, while giving ports and crews a narrow safety valve to avoid accidents and chaos.

Key Indicators

29
Vessels newly identified as blocked property
Tankers linked to Iranian petroleum and petroleum-product shipments were added in this action.
180+
Vessels sanctioned since Trump resumed office
Treasury says repeated rounds are raising costs and cutting per-barrel revenue.
7
Vessels tied to one businessman’s network
Treasury singled out Egyptian shipping businessman Hatem Elsaid Farid Ibrahim Sakr’s network.
2026-01-18
General License S expiration (12:01 a.m. EST)
Temporary authorization for limited safety/environmental actions and specific offloading conditions.

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People Involved

John K. Hurley
John K. Hurley
Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, U.S. Treasury (Leading Treasury’s sanctions and illicit-finance pressure campaign on Iran)
Scott Bessent
Scott Bessent
Secretary of the Treasury (Driving an expanded Iran sanctions enforcement campaign under NSPM-2)
Bradley T. Smith
Bradley T. Smith
Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) (Signed the time-limited General License S tied to the December 18 designations)
Hatem Elsaid Farid Ibrahim Sakr
Hatem Elsaid Farid Ibrahim Sakr
Egyptian shipping businessman operating via UAE-based companies (Designated by OFAC for operating in Iran’s petroleum sector)
Masoud Pezeshkian
Masoud Pezeshkian
President of Iran (Leading Iran amid renewed international sanctions pressure and maritime enforcement risk)

Organizations Involved

U.S. Treasury — Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
U.S. Treasury — Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
Treasury Department Office
Status: Designated ship managers and vessels; issued General License S to manage safety/offloading risks

OFAC is the U.S. sanctions engine that turns targets into blocked property and market fear into compliance.

U.S. Department of the Treasury
U.S. Department of the Treasury
Federal Agency
Status: Leading maximum-pressure sanctions enforcement against Iran’s oil revenue streams

Treasury is using sanctions to make Iranian oil exports more expensive, riskier, and less profitable.

Phoenix Ship Management FZE
Phoenix Ship Management FZE
Shipping Management Firm
Status: Designated; linked to four tankers carrying Iranian petroleum products in 2025

A UAE-based ship manager Treasury says operated multiple vessels carrying Iranian petroleum products.

Red Sea Ship Management LLC
Red Sea Ship Management LLC
Shipping Management Firm
Status: Designated as part of Sakr-linked network; vessels identified as blocked property

A UAE-based manager Treasury says operated tankers moving Iranian petroleum products across the Gulf region.

Qatrat Alnada Almasi Ship Management L.L.C
Qatrat Alnada Almasi Ship Management L.L.C
Shipping Management Firm
Status: Designated; linked to four tankers tied to Iranian petroleum-product movements

A UAE-based manager OFAC says operated tankers moving Iranian products, including vessels calling at Yemen ports.

Timeline

  1. Treasury blocks 29 Iran-linked shadow fleet vessels

    Legal

    OFAC designated managers and vessels tied to Iranian petroleum shipments and sanctions evasion.

  2. OFAC issues General License S to prevent safety and environmental spillover

    Rule Changes

    GL S authorizes limited safety/environmental actions and tightly conditioned offloading through Jan 18.

  3. Sanctions squeeze tanker availability and push rates higher

    Market

    Reuters reported sanctions sidelined ships, strengthening rates and expanding shadow-fleet distortions.

  4. Iran recalls ambassadors amid snapback dispute escalation

    Diplomacy

    Reuters reported Iran recalled envoys to Germany, France, and the UK over the process.

  5. UN Security Council vote fails, clearing snapback path

    Rule Changes

    A UN vote failed to extend relief, triggering automatic reimposition mechanics under 2231.

  6. China’s Iranian oil imports surge again as teapot demand rebounds

    Market

    Reuters reported June imports hit records as shipments accelerated and discounts tightened.

  7. Treasury targets Chinese importers and the China-bound shipping chain

    Legal

    OFAC designated a teapot refinery and sanctioned firms and vessels facilitating Iran-to-China shipments.

  8. Iran-to-China flows hit record levels despite sanctions

    Market

    Reuters reported March imports exceeded 1.8 million bpd, driven by sanctions fears.

  9. Sanctions expand across brokers, tankers, and Iranian oil leadership

    Legal

    Treasury and State sanctioned over 30 persons and vessels tied to Iranian petroleum trade.

  10. White House orders “maximum pressure” reboot

    Statement

    NSPM-2 directs continual enforcement and aims to drive Iran’s oil exports to zero.

  11. EO 13902 sets the petroleum-sector sanctions baseline

    Rule Changes

    EO 13902 established authority targeting Iran’s petroleum and petrochemical sectors.

Scenarios

1

“Treasury Blacklists Another 100 Tankers, Shadow Fleet Scrambles Again”

Discussed by: Treasury’s stated maximum-pressure enforcement campaign; Reuters coverage of escalating tanker sanctions impacts

More ship managers, owners, and service providers get designated in waves—especially those enabling ship-to-ship transfers and Asia delivery routes. The trigger is continued evidence of Iran-linked cargo movements plus political pressure to show measurable revenue squeeze. Expect more “name-and-flag” churn by operators—and more aggressive compliance de-risking by ports, insurers, and brokers.

2

“From Paper Sanctions to Ship Seizures: U.S. Starts Taking Tankers”

Discussed by: Reuters reporting on enforcement and market disruption; White House NSPM-2 language on impounding illicit Iranian oil cargoes

Sanctions enforcement shifts from designations to physical interdiction: forfeiture cases, port detentions, and selective seizures tied to spoofing, false flags, or sanctions violations. The trigger is a high-profile evasion incident or a broader maritime-security push that reframes tankers as contraband carriers, not neutral logistics.

3

“Iran’s Oil Still Moves: New Front Companies Replace the Ones OFAC Burned”

Discussed by: Reuters reporting on resilient Iran-to-China flows and evasive logistics; shipping and compliance analysts tracking reflagging and management swaps

Iran’s exports remain surprisingly durable because the trade keeps mutating: new shell owners, swapped managers, fresh flags, longer dark periods, and more transshipment. The trigger is steady demand from price-sensitive buyers plus an ecosystem of intermediaries willing to charge higher fees for higher risk—keeping volumes afloat even as margins get squeezed.

Historical Context

2012–2015 Iran oil sanctions squeeze leading into the JCPOA

2012-01 to 2015-07

What Happened

The U.S. and partners escalated oil and financial restrictions to isolate Iran’s exports and banking channels. Iran kept selling, but discounts widened and payment pathways became more complex and costly.

Outcome

Short Term

Iran’s accessible oil revenue fell and trade frictions rose across shipping and finance.

Long Term

Sanctions pressure became leverage in negotiations that produced the 2015 nuclear deal.

Why It's Relevant Today

It shows how sustained logistics-and-finance pressure can become bargaining leverage without stopping all exports.

2018–2020 “maximum pressure” and the rise of evasive maritime tactics

2018-05 to 2020-12

What Happened

After the U.S. exited the JCPOA, Iran leaned harder on covert shipping: reflagging, shell ownership, spoofed tracking, and ship-to-ship transfers. Enforcement became a cat-and-mouse cycle between designations and adaptation.

Outcome

Short Term

Legal risk spread to global shippers, insurers, and ports—even beyond Iran-specific trade.

Long Term

A durable sanctions-evasion playbook formed and is now reused across multiple sanctioned regimes.

Why It's Relevant Today

Today’s shadow-fleet crackdown is fighting a system engineered during the last maximum-pressure era.

2022–present: Russia’s “shadow fleet” and sanctions-driven shipping distortions

2022-02 to present

What Happened

Western sanctions pushed Russian crude into alternative shipping and service ecosystems, expanding opaque ownership and non-Western insurance. The market adapted, but the cost was a larger, older, riskier fleet operating outside normal governance.

Outcome

Short Term

Shipping rates and compliance costs rose as sanctioned tonnage left the mainstream market.

Long Term

A parallel maritime economy grew—creating safety, environmental, and enforcement challenges.

Why It's Relevant Today

Iran’s shadow fleet is part of the same global trend: sanctions reshape shipping, not just trade.

11 Sources:
+6
U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) The White House Reuters United Nations Office at Geneva Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) U.S. Department of the Treasury U.S. Department of the Treasury Reuters Reuters Reuters