Overview
Ten people died when Bering Air Flight 445 crashed onto Norton Sound sea ice on February 6, 2025. The Cessna 208B was flying 1,058 pounds over its maximum weight for icing conditions—a violation investigators could only discover after the crash because federal regulations don't require single-engine commuter operators to keep load manifests. The pilot received weather advisories warning of moderate icing three hours before takeoff. He flew anyway, overloaded, into freezing rain.
Since 1989, the NTSB has begged the FAA to close this loophole after crash after crash. Multi-engine Part 135 operators must document weight and balance before every flight. Single-engine operators—the backbone of Alaska's bush aviation network serving 80% of communities not on the road system—don't have to keep any records at all. The FAA has refused to act for 35 years. Alaska's fatal crash rate remains double the national average. Secretary of Transportation Sean Duffy toured Alaska in August 2025 calling the death toll "unacceptable" and promising $25 million for weather stations and 1970s-era equipment upgrades. He didn't mention the weight-and-balance rules.
Key Indicators
People Involved
Organizations Involved
Family-owned Nome-based carrier serving 29 villages across Western Alaska with 44 aircraft.
Federal agency investigating transportation accidents and issuing safety recommendations.
Federal agency regulating civil aviation, including Part 135 commuter and on-demand operations.
Timeline
-
Duffy Tours Alaska, Announces $25M Investment
PolicyTransportation Secretary calls Alaska crash rate "unacceptable," highlights funding for 174 weather stations and equipment upgrades. Does not address load manifest regulations.
-
NTSB Preliminary Report: Aircraft Overweight
InvestigationReport reveals Flight 445 took off 1,058 lbs over icing limit. Aviation weather advisories three hours prior warned of moderate icing 2,000-8,000 feet.
-
NTSB Chair Visits Crash Site
InvestigationChair Jennifer Homendy deploys 17-member team including forensic meteorologist to investigate weather data, operational decisions, and aircraft loading.
-
Victims Identified
RecoveryAuthorities release names: pilot Chad Antill, 34, and passengers aged 30-58 from Nome, Wasilla, Anchorage, Eagle River, and Unalakleet.
-
Coast Guard Confirms 10 Dead
RecoveryRecovery operation concludes. All victims brought back to Nome. No survivors.
-
Bering Air Flight 445 Departs Unalakleet
AccidentCessna 208B takes off for Nome with pilot Chad Antill and nine passengers. Aircraft weighs 9,865 lbs—1,058 lbs over icing limit, 803 lbs over normal limit.
-
Flight 445 Experiences Rapid Descent
AccidentRadar shows catastrophic loss of altitude and speed at 3,400 feet, 34 miles southeast of Nome. Aircraft crashes onto Norton Sound sea ice.
-
FAA Reauthorization Act Funds Alaska Safety Initiative
RegulatoryCongress authorizes $25M annually through 2028 for Don Young Alaska Aviation Safety Initiative targeting weather infrastructure. No weight-and-balance mandate included.
-
NTSB Reiterates Load Manifest Recommendation
RegulatorySpecial investigation report AIR-24-03 analyzing 500+ Part 135 crashes finds improper loading caused 11 deaths, six serious injuries. NTSB again urges FAA action.
-
Rediske Air Crash Kills 10 in Soldotna
AccidentDe Havilland Otter crashes on takeoff at Soldotna Airport, killing pilot and nine passengers from South Carolina on bear-viewing trip.
-
NTSB First Recommends Load Manifest Requirement
RegulatoryAfter multiple deadly crashes, NTSB urges FAA to require single-engine Part 135 operators to prepare and retain load manifests. FAA declines.
Scenarios
FAA Finally Mandates Part 135 Load Manifests
Discussed by: Aviation safety advocates, NTSB investigators, ProPublica investigative reporting
Political pressure from Flight 445's death toll—Alaska's deadliest crash since 2013—forces the FAA to close the 35-year loophole. The agency issues a rule requiring all Part 135 operators, single-engine and multi-engine alike, to prepare load manifests before every flight and retain weight-and-balance documentation. Alaska operators resist, citing paperwork burden and tight turnaround times in remote villages. The rule passes anyway. Within 18 months, Alaska's overweight-aircraft accident rate drops measurably. The NTSB closes a recommendation first issued when George H.W. Bush was president.
Bering Air Faces Civil Penalties, Ops Restrictions
Discussed by: Aviation attorneys, FAA enforcement specialists
NTSB's final report assigns probable cause to improper weight-and-balance management and inadequate operational controls at Bering Air. The FAA launches an enforcement action, levying civil penalties and imposing operational restrictions—mandatory third-party audits of loading procedures, reduced passenger limits until compliance is demonstrated, or temporary suspension of certain routes. Bering Air settles, pays fines, and implements new internal weight-verification protocols. The systemic regulatory gap remains unchanged; other Alaska operators continue flying without load manifest requirements.
Status Quo: Infrastructure Fixes, No Regulatory Reform
Discussed by: FAA leadership, Alaska congressional delegation focusing on infrastructure
Secretary Duffy's $25 million weather-station initiative becomes the administration's Alaska aviation safety answer. Congress funds better radar coverage, ADS-B ground stations, and automated weather reporting systems across the bush. Fatal crash numbers tick downward as pilots get better icing forecasts. But the Part 135 load manifest loophole remains. Operators still aren't required to document weight and balance. The NTSB issues another recommendation in 2027 after another overweight-aircraft crash. The FAA again declines to act. The cycle continues.
Alaska Aviation Consolidation Reduces Bush Service
Discussed by: Rural Alaska advocacy groups, aviation economists
Heightened scrutiny and potential new weight-and-balance regulations make Part 135 operations more expensive. Smaller carriers like Bering Air face insurance premium increases and operational cost hikes. Some operators exit the market. Remaining carriers reduce service to marginally profitable villages. Communities already isolated by lack of road access lose reliable air service. Freight costs spike. Medical evacuations become harder to coordinate. The push for safety inadvertently worsens access inequality in rural Alaska, where 82% of communities depend on aviation as primary transportation.
Historical Context
2013 Rediske Air Soldotna Crash
July 7, 2013What Happened
A de Havilland Otter operated by Rediske Air crashed on takeoff at Soldotna Airport, killing all 10 aboard—the pilot and nine passengers from Greenville, South Carolina, on a bear-viewing trip. The crash was Alaska's deadliest in over a decade at the time. Investigation revealed multiple safety lapses by the single-engine Part 135 operator.
Outcome
Short term: NTSB investigated, issued safety recommendations targeting Part 135 operational oversight.
Long term: Rediske Air ceased operations. The crash contributed to NTSB's 2024 special investigation (AIR-24-03) reiterating the need for load manifest requirements across all Part 135 aircraft.
Why It's Relevant
Both Rediske and Bering Air crashes involved single-engine Part 135 operators in Alaska where inadequate weight-and-balance documentation allowed unsafe loading practices to go undetected until after catastrophic failures.
Cessna 208 Icing Accidents (1987-2006)
1987-2006What Happened
For nearly 20 years, Cessna 208/208B aircraft experienced a series of icing-related crashes and incidents. The FAA and Transport Canada launched studies, issued airworthiness directives, and developed training programs addressing design flaws, pilot training gaps, and certification standards for known-icing operations. The Caravan's performance in ice accumulation became a focal point of aviation safety research.
Outcome
Short term: FAA mandated low-airspeed awareness systems for Cessna 208s operating in known icing. Airworthiness directives prohibited continued flight after encountering moderate or greater icing.
Long term: Icing-related Cessna 208 accidents decreased but didn't disappear. Regulatory focus remained on equipment and pilot decision-making, not weight-and-balance documentation.
Why It's Relevant
Flight 445's Cessna 208B was overweight for icing conditions and flew into forecasted moderate icing. The accident combines the aircraft type's known vulnerability to ice with the unchecked loading practices enabled by the Part 135 single-engine documentation loophole.
NTSB Part 135 Special Investigation (2010-2022)
2010-2022 (report published 2024)What Happened
The NTSB analyzed more than 500 Part 135 accidents over a 12-year period, identifying systemic safety vulnerabilities. Five accidents involving improper aircraft loading resulted in 11 fatalities and six serious injuries, with most occurring in remote Alaska. The investigation found that single-engine operators' lack of load manifest requirements prevented proactive identification of unsafe loading patterns.
Outcome
Short term: NTSB issued three new recommendations to the FAA and reiterated two longstanding recommendations, including the 1989 call for mandatory load manifests for all Part 135 aircraft.
Long term: As of 2025, the FAA has not implemented the load manifest requirement. The Flight 445 crash in February 2025 became yet another data point supporting the NTSB's recommendations.
Why It's Relevant
Flight 445 is the latest example of the exact safety vulnerability the NTSB documented: single-engine Part 135 operators flying overweight aircraft with no regulatory requirement to document or retain weight-and-balance calculations that could enable oversight and prevent fatal errors.