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Trump’s unitary-executive showdown with independent agencies

Trump’s unitary-executive showdown with independent agencies

Rule Changes

From the firing of FTC commissioner Rebecca Slaughter to a Supreme Court test of 90 years of limits on presidential removal power

December 8th, 2025: Supreme Court hears Trump v. Slaughter and signals readiness to expand removal power

Overview

Updated May 10

In 2025, President Donald Trump challenged the 1935 Humphrey's Executor precedent by firing and removing independent agency officials before their terms expired.

The Supreme Court let Trump (via emergency docket) remove Democratic board members from the National Labor Relations Board, Merit Systems Protection Board, and Consumer Product Safety Commission. Trump fired FTC commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter in March 2025. He attempted to oust Federal Reserve governor Lisa Cook before her fixed term expired.

On December 8, 2025, the Supreme Court heard full arguments in Trump v. Slaughter, which directly challenges Humphrey's Executor and statutory protections that limit FTC commissioner removal to cases of cause. The Court's conservative majority signaled openness to expanding presidential removal power, while liberal justices warned that dismantling agency independence would erode checks and balances and open the door to politicizing expert regulators. A June 2026 ruling will determine Slaughter's fate, the scope of presidential control over dozens of independent agencies, and may shape Trump's attempt to remove Federal Reserve governor Lisa Cook.

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Key Indicators

≈25
Independent federal boards potentially affected
Rough number of multi‑member independent agencies and commissions whose for‑cause removal protections could be weakened or voided if the Court broadly overturns Humphrey’s Executor.
90 years
Age of Humphrey’s Executor precedent
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States was decided on May 27, 1935, and has long been the cornerstone for the legality of independent agencies insulated from at‑will presidential firing.
6–3
Ideological split in key emergency orders
In multiple 2025 shadow‑docket rulings, six conservative justices allowed Trump’s firings of independent‑agency officials to proceed over dissents from the Court’s three liberals.

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People Involved

Donald Trump
Donald Trump
President of the United States
Driving expansion of presidential removal power over independent agencies
Rebecca Kelly Slaughter
Rebecca Kelly Slaughter
Former Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission
Plaintiff challenging her firing in Trump v. Slaughter before the Supreme Court
Lisa D. Cook
Lisa D. Cook
Governor, Federal Reserve Board
Plaintiff in separate litigation to block Trump’s attempt to remove her from the Fed
D. John Sauer
D. John Sauer
Solicitor General of the United States
Lead advocate urging the Supreme Court to overturn or narrow Humphrey’s Executor
John G. Roberts Jr.
John G. Roberts Jr.
Chief Justice of the United States
Presiding over and often shaping the Court’s incremental expansion of presidential removal power
Elena Kagan
Elena Kagan
Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court
Leading liberal critic of the Court’s use of the shadow docket to expand presidential removal power
Sonia Sotomayor
Sonia Sotomayor
Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court
Liberal dissenter in key removal‑power orders and arguments
Ketanji Brown Jackson
Ketanji Brown Jackson
Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court
Liberal justice emphasizing historical practice and congressional design of independent agencies
Loren L. AliKhan
Loren L. AliKhan
U.S. District Judge for the District of Columbia
Issued key ruling reinstating Rebecca Slaughter to the FTC before Supreme Court intervention
Matthew Maddox
Matthew Maddox
U.S. District Judge for the District of Maryland
Ruled Trump’s firing of three CPSC commissioners unlawful before Supreme Court reversal
Neomi Rao
Neomi Rao
Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Dissented from D.C. Circuit decision that reinstated Rebecca Slaughter at the FTC
Alvaro M. Bedoya
Alvaro M. Bedoya
Former Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission
Former plaintiff; resigned and dropped his case after being fired alongside Slaughter

Organizations Involved

Supreme Court of the United States
Supreme Court of the United States
Federal Court
Hearing and shaping core precedent on presidential power over independent agencies

The Supreme Court is the nation’s highest judicial body, currently composed of a 6–3 conservative majority. It has become the central arena for debates over the constitutional status of independent regulatory agencies and the scope of presidential control.

Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
Federal regulator
Test case for whether presidents may fire independent commissioners at will

The FTC is an independent agency charged with enforcing antitrust and consumer‑protection laws, historically structured as a five‑member bipartisan commission whose members serve staggered terms and may be removed only for cause.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Federal Regulator
Central bank leadership targeted by Trump’s attempt to fire Governor Lisa Cook

The Federal Reserve Board is the governing body of the U.S. central bank, whose members serve staggered 14‑year terms and can be removed by the president only for cause under the Federal Reserve Act.

Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)
Government Body
Early 2025 test case where Supreme Court allowed Trump to remove three Democratic commissioners

The CPSC is an independent agency responsible for protecting the public from unreasonable risks of injury or death associated with consumer products, traditionally structured as a five‑member commission with for‑cause removal protections and bipartisan balance requirements.

Timeline

May 1935 December 2025

17 events Latest: December 8th, 2025 · 8 months ago Showing 8 of 17
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  1. Trump fires three Democratic Consumer Product Safety Commission members

    Presidential Action

    President Trump removes Mary Boyle, Alexander Hoehn‑Saric, and Richard Trumka Jr. from the CPSC, despite statutory protections allowing removal only for neglect of duty or malfeasance, as part of a broader effort to reshape independent agencies.

  2. Trump fires Democratic FTC commissioners Rebecca Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya

    Presidential Action

    President Trump removes two Democratic members of the five‑member FTC without stating cause, seeking to flip the commission’s partisan balance and directly challenge statutory removal protections.

  3. Humphrey’s Executor affirms limits on presidential removal of FTC commissioners

    Historical Precedent

    The Supreme Court unanimously rules in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States that Congress may restrict the president’s power to remove members of quasi‑judicial and quasi‑legislative independent agencies like the FTC, allowing removal only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance.

Historical Context

3 moments from history that rhyme with this story — and how they unfolded.

1933–1935

Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (FTC independence)

After President Franklin D. Roosevelt tried to fire FTC commissioner William Humphrey for policy disagreements, Humphrey’s estate sued for back pay, arguing the firing violated the Federal Trade Commission Act’s for‑cause removal clause. In 1935, the Supreme Court unanimously held that Congress could limit the president’s power to remove commissioners of an independent, quasi‑legislative and quasi‑judicial agency like the FTC, cementing the constitutionality of independent agencies.

Then

Humphrey’s estate recovered unpaid salary, and Roosevelt’s attempt to remove the commissioner for policy reasons was declared unlawful.

Now

Humphrey’s Executor became the bedrock precedent justifying for‑cause removal protections at many independent agencies, shaping the structure of the modern administrative state for 90 years until the Roberts Court began aggressively revisiting its scope.

Why this matters now

Trump v. Slaughter directly targets Humphrey’s Executor, effectively asking whether that New Deal‑era compromise between presidential control and agency independence should survive in the 21st century. The case’s facts—a president firing an FTC commissioner for policy reasons despite a for‑cause statute—closely parallel Roosevelt’s dispute with Humphrey, making the current litigation a near‑mirror test for whether the Court will preserve or discard its own landmark precedent.

1978–1988

Morrison v. Olson (independent counsel and removal restrictions)

In the wake of Watergate, Congress created an independent counsel mechanism to investigate senior officials, with the counsel removable by the attorney general only for good cause. In 1988, the Supreme Court upheld the statute in Morrison v. Olson, ruling that such removal limits did not unduly interfere with the president’s ability to execute the laws, over a lone but influential dissent by Justice Antonin Scalia arguing for a stronger unitary executive.

Then

The independent counsel law survived, and investigations of executive‑branch officials proceeded under a structure insulated from direct presidential control.

Now

Although the independent counsel statute later lapsed and Morrison has been increasingly questioned, the decision long stood as a high‑water mark for tolerating removal restrictions. The Roberts Court has since distanced itself from Morrison, and Scalia’s once‑minority unitary‑executive view has gained traction.

Why this matters now

Morrison underscores that for decades the Court accepted significant constraints on presidential removal power when Congress sought to protect investigative or quasi‑judicial functions. Today’s challenges to Humphrey’s Executor and agency independence reflect a reversal of that trajectory: a Court more sympathetic to Scalia’s Morrison dissent now weighs whether to curtail or abandon the older approach that permitted robust statutory protections for certain officers.

2017–2020

Seila Law v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (single‑director agency limits)

A law firm challenged the structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, arguing that its single director, protected from at‑will removal by the president, violated separation of powers. In 2020, the Supreme Court agreed, holding that the CFPB’s design was unconstitutional because it vested significant executive authority in a single official not answerable to the president, though it severed the removal protection rather than dismantling the agency.

Then

The CFPB director became removable at will, giving the president greater control over consumer‑finance enforcement while preserving the rest of the agency’s powers.

Now

Seila Law created a new test that treats “quasi‑legislative/quasi‑judicial” multi‑member commissions as possible exceptions to at‑will removal but views most powerful executive officials as subject to full presidential control, setting the doctrinal stage for the 2025 challenges to multi‑member independent boards.

Why this matters now

Seila Law shows the Court’s willingness to recalibrate long‑standing agency structures in favor of presidential control while avoiding total institutional collapse. It also limited Humphrey’s Executor to a narrow set of circumstances, which Trump and his Solicitor General now argue do not cover modern commissions like the FTC. The Slaughter and Cook cases test whether that logic will be extended from single‑director agencies to multi‑member boards.

Sources

(21)