In early December 2025, the Trump administration published a National Security Strategy abandoning Russia as a primary threat, emphasizing 'flexible realism,' reviving the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere, and seeking a negotiated Ukraine peace while re-establishing stability with Moscow. Within days, the Kremlin praised the strategy, saying it 'corresponds in many ways' with Russia's worldview and welcoming the shift from treating Russia as a direct adversary.
The new NSS also ends the perception of NATO as a perpetually expanding alliance, crystallizing a Trump-era shift in U.S. foreign policy around spheres of influence, accelerated peace talks on Ukraine, and criticism of Europe's support for Kyiv. European leaders reacted with alarm, warning that Washington is undermining NATO and legitimizing Russian demands, while Moscow signals cautious optimism about a lasting U.S.–Russia accommodation. This realignment will reshape the geopolitical order in Europe and beyond for years to come.
Times Russia labeled a ‘direct threat’ in the 2025 NSS
Past U.S. strategies after Crimea in 2014 and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine explicitly branded Russia a major threat; the 2025 document notably does not.
5 hours
Length of Putin–U.S. envoys Ukraine peace meeting in Moscow
A December 2, 2025 negotiating session in Moscow where Putin accepted some elements of a U.S. peace draft but insisted on full control of Donbas.
3
Core strategic shifts in the 2025 NSS
Recasting Russia from threat to potential partner in ‘strategic stability,’ reviving the Monroe Doctrine in the Americas, and urging a rapid negotiated settlement in Ukraine while criticizing Europe’s trajectory.
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11 events
Latest: December 8th, 2025 · 6 months ago
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December 2025
New security roadmap omits North Korea denuclearization, reflecting broader strategy shift
LatestPolicy Detail
A follow‑on U.S. security roadmap tied to the NSS notably omits reference to North Korea’s denuclearization after two decades of such language in U.S. strategy documents. Analysts see this as part of Trump’s ‘flexible realism,’ focusing on deterrence and diplomacy rather than maximalist objectives, mirroring his approach to Russia and Ukraine.
Kremlin publicly welcomes Trump’s new U.S. security strategy
Public Statement
The Kremlin issues rare praise for a U.S. National Security Strategy, saying Trump’s new doctrine largely aligns with Russia’s own view of the world. Peskov highlights the NSS’s call to revive the Monroe Doctrine, end the idea of NATO as a perpetually expanding alliance, treat ending the Ukraine war as a core U.S. interest, and re‑establish strategic stability with Russia, while noting concerns about resistance from the U.S. ‘deep state.’
European leaders warn of rift over Trump’s 2025 NSS
Allied Reaction
European leaders, including France’s Emmanuel Macron and Poland’s Donald Tusk, voice concern that the new U.S. NSS marks a break with decades of transatlantic cooperation, criticizes European liberal policies and support for Ukraine, and appears to back far‑right movements. Analysts warn the document could be a watershed that undermines NATO, weakens EU cohesion, and emboldens pro‑Kremlin forces in Europe.
Trump administration publishes 2025 National Security Strategy
Policy Document
The White House releases the 2025 National Security Strategy, signed by President Trump. The document presents a doctrine of ‘flexible realism,’ revives the Monroe Doctrine, warns that Europe faces ‘civilizational erasure’ without major policy shifts, calls for a negotiated end to the Ukraine war, and advocates re‑establishing strategic stability with Russia while ending the perception of NATO as a perpetually expanding alliance.
Kremlin encouraged by progress in Ukraine peace talks
Public Statement
Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov says Russia and the United States are making progress on key aspects of Ukraine negotiations following the December 2 talks, and that Moscow is ready to continue working with Trump’s team despite unresolved disputes over territory, especially Donbas.
Five‑hour Moscow talks on U.S. Ukraine peace plan
Diplomacy
Putin meets two U.S. envoys in Moscow for five hours to discuss a U.S.-drafted peace proposal for Ukraine. The Kremlin later says Putin has accepted some elements but insists on full control of Ukraine’s Donbas region, threatening to take it by force if Ukrainian troops do not withdraw.
September 2025
Kremlin says Russia–U.S. relations improving slower than desired
Public Statement
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov notes that efforts to restore Russia–U.S. relations are progressing “much more slowly than desired,” but reiterates Moscow’s desire to remove “irritants” and deepen mutually beneficial cooperation, reflecting cautious expectations ahead of a new U.S. strategy.
August 2025
Putin praises U.S. efforts and signals openness to arms control deal
Public Statement
On the eve of an Alaska summit with President Trump, Vladimir Putin tells senior officials that the U.S. is making “energetic and sincere efforts” to halt the Ukraine war and suggests that Moscow and Washington could agree on a nuclear arms control deal as part of a broader peace framework.
March 2025
U.S.-brokered Black Sea and energy truce between Ukraine and Russia
Diplomacy
The United States announces separate accords with Kyiv and Moscow to ensure safe navigation in the Black Sea and to halt attacks on energy facilities. President Zelenskyy says the truce is effective immediately but warns that Russia is already manipulating and distorting the agreements, and vows to seek more weapons and sanctions if Moscow violates them.
February 2025
Trump publicly revives the Monroe Doctrine for the Western Hemisphere
Public Statement
In remarks and policy guidance, Trump declares a renewed Monroe Doctrine as the organizing principle for Latin America policy, prioritizing U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere and countering Chinese and European influence, foreshadowing the spheres‑of‑influence logic later embedded in the 2025 NSS.
December 2017
First Trump NSS labels Russia a ‘revisionist power’ and major threat
Background
During his first term, President Trump signs a National Security Strategy that describes Russia (and China) as ‘revisionist powers’ seeking to undermine the U.S.-led order, reflecting the post‑Crimea consensus in Washington despite Trump’s personal rhetoric toward Putin.
Historical Context
3 moments from history that rhyme with this story — and how they unfolded.
1 of 3
1972–1975
Nixon–Brezhnev Détente and the 1972 Moscow Summit
In the early 1970s, U.S. President Richard Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev pursued détente to reduce Cold War tensions. At the 1972 Moscow Summit they signed the SALT I agreement and the Anti‑Ballistic Missile Treaty, limiting strategic nuclear weapons and establishing new rules for U.S.–Soviet competition.
Then
Détente produced major arms‑control milestones and a period of reduced superpower tensions, while both sides continued proxy competition elsewhere.
Now
The spirit of détente eroded by the late 1970s amid renewed rivalry and events like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but the arms‑control framework laid groundwork for later agreements.
Why this matters now
The Trump administration’s search for a Ukraine deal bundled with a strategic stability or arms‑control framework with Russia echoes the logic of détente—trading specific concessions for managed competition. The historical record shows such arrangements can reduce immediate risks but are fragile and often contested domestically and among allies.
2 of 3
2009–2013
Obama’s 2009 ‘Russia Reset’
The Obama administration sought a ‘reset’ with Russia, symbolized by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s presentation of a mislabeled ‘reset button’ to Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in 2009. Washington aimed to cooperate on issues like arms control and Iran, while downplaying disputes. The reset yielded some successes, such as the New START treaty, but soured as disagreements over NATO, missile defense, and Russia’s internal politics resurfaced.
Then
Relations improved briefly, enabling limited cooperation on arms control and Afghanistan transit.
Now
The reset collapsed amid Russia’s 2012 political turn, the 2014 annexation of Crimea, and growing U.S. skepticism about Putin’s intentions. ‘Reset’ became shorthand for the perceived naivety of expecting sustainable partnership without addressing core strategic conflicts.
Why this matters now
The 2025 NSS goes further than the reset by changing how the U.S. labels Russia in its core doctrine and by explicitly criticizing Europe. The mixed legacy of the reset highlights the risk that tactical cooperation with Moscow, absent shared fundamentals, can quickly unravel and provoke political backlash.
3 of 3
1823–20th century
The Monroe Doctrine and Spheres of Influence in the Americas
First articulated in 1823, the Monroe Doctrine declared the Western Hemisphere off‑limits to new European colonization or interference and evolved into a justification for U.S. dominance in Latin America. Over the 19th and early 20th centuries, it was expanded by doctrines like Theodore Roosevelt’s corollary, under which Washington asserted the right to intervene in Latin American states to protect U.S. interests.
Then
The doctrine helped deter European powers from establishing new colonies, but it also enabled frequent U.S. interventions in Latin America, often resented as imperial overreach.
Now
While the U.S. later adopted more cooperative regional policies, the Western Hemisphere has remained widely seen as a U.S. sphere of influence, shaping how both Washington and others think about regional security and external involvement.
Why this matters now
Trump’s 2025 NSS explicitly calls for reviving the Monroe Doctrine and adopts a broader spheres‑of‑influence logic—accepting Russian primacy in parts of its neighborhood in exchange for U.S. dominance in the Americas. The Monroe Doctrine’s history illustrates both the power and the costs of such claims: they can stabilize great‑power competition in one sense, but at the price of smaller states’ sovereignty and frequent tensions with neighbors.
