Overview
Parsons just landed a task order worth more than $100 million to help Nammo design and manage construction of a new rocket-motor manufacturing facility in Perry, Florida. That sounds like a normal contract win—until you remember rocket motors are one of the parts the U.S. keeps running short of when wars drag on.
The hook isn’t Florida. It’s the bottleneck. This Perry build-out is being treated like a strategic asset: one more domestic line that can feed Raytheon and other missile primes, reduce single-source fragility, and turn “we need more missiles” from a budget line into physical capacity. That’s why this case file tracks Perry as a front in the wider U.S. push to expand and diversify solid rocket motor supply.
Key Indicators
People Involved
Organizations Involved
Parsons is acting as the “speed layer” turning demand for rocket motors into buildable factory capacity.
Nammo is betting that U.S. demand for solid rocket motors will stay high long enough to justify new capacity.
A rural Florida site becoming a strategic node in the U.S. rocket-motor supply chain.
Raytheon is pushing to diversify rocket-motor suppliers so missile production can scale without hitting a wall.
The Pentagon’s industrial-growth shop—writing checks and setting priorities to add surge capacity fast.
Timeline
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Parsons wins $100M+ task order for Perry rocket-motor facility build
ContractParsons disclosed a task order exceeding $100M from Nammo for design and construction/program management of the Perry facility.
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L3Harris doubles down with a major Arkansas expansion
Capacity ExpansionReuters reported L3Harris planned a $400M investment to expand solid rocket motor production capacity in Camden, Arkansas.
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Nammo breaks ground in Perry
ConstructionReporting said Nammo held a groundbreaking for a new rocket-motor factory in Perry, targeting operations by end of 2027.
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Local reporting sizes Perry’s build-out and stakes
Local ImpactFlorida Trend described a $130M Nammo expansion in Perry, including a rocket-motor production plant and multiple new buildings.
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A new U.S. SRM supplier breaks the duopoly
Market ShiftReuters reported Anduril opened an SRM facility in Mississippi, becoming a third U.S. SRM supplier amid surging demand.
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Raytheon dual-sources early work on a key rocket motor
ProcurementRaytheon awarded Nammo and Northrop Grumman contracts for initial MK72 solid rocket motor development work.
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Lockheed and General Dynamics move to make their own motors
Supply ChainReuters reported a partnership to produce solid rocket motors for GMLRS, reflecting pressure to diversify beyond incumbents.
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Nammo and Raytheon signal a new U.S. rocket-motor source
PartnershipReporting tied Nammo’s Perry expansion to Raytheon demand, positioning Perry as an independent domestic SRM source with a 2027 target.
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DoD backs a new SRM supplier path for hypersonics
Industrial PolicyDoD announced a $64M award to X-Bow to expand SRM capacity and lower costs for hypersonic-class motors.
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Pentagon funds a major rocket-motor capacity build
Industrial PolicyAerojet Rocketdyne entered a $215.6M cooperative agreement to modernize and expand solid rocket motor manufacturing for key missile programs.
Scenarios
Perry Comes Online in 2027, Becomes a Stable “Merchant” Rocket-Motor Source
Discussed by: Nammo and Raytheon statements amplified by trade and local business reporting; Parsons’ contract disclosure
Construction stays close to plan, staffing ramps up, and qualification milestones clear without major rework. The payoff is less glamorous than a new missile program but more decisive: a reliable domestic motor line that can feed Raytheon and other customers, easing one of the hardest constraints in missile production and giving the Pentagon another lever during surges.
The Factory Gets Built—But Motor Qualification Slows Real Output
Discussed by: Defense industrial-base coverage highlighting the gap between building capacity and certifying energetics
The buildings rise, but “making motors” turns out to be the easy part. Qualification, safety approvals, and process repeatability create a slower ramp than the ribbon-cutting implied. The facility exists on paper, yet usable, high-rate production arrives later—pushing meaningful relief out by quarters or years.
Demand Keeps Spiking—Perry Triggers a Second Expansion Wave
Discussed by: Reuters coverage of new entrants and big-ticket capacity investments across the SRM ecosystem
Instead of stabilizing, demand broadens—air defense, naval missiles, and long-range fires all pull on the same propulsion supply. In that world, Perry isn’t just a fix; it’s a template. Nammo and partners pursue follow-on buildings, more test capacity, and longer-term offtake-style commitments from primes, turning Perry into a multi-customer propulsion hub.
Budgets Tighten, Wars Cool, and New Rocket-Motor Capacity Sits Underused
Discussed by: Industry skeptics who point to boom-bust cycles after past surge periods
If procurement slows, the U.S. can end up with more motor capacity than near-term orders can absorb. The facility still matters as “insurance,” but utilization drops, hiring slows, and the industrial-base story shifts from “build fast” to “keep warm” so the line doesn’t go cold again.
Historical Context
World War II’s “Arsenal of Democracy” Factory Sprint
1940-1945What Happened
The U.S. converted civilian industry and rapidly built capacity to produce ships, aircraft, vehicles, and munitions at a scale that overwhelmed adversaries. Success depended less on single wonder-weapons and more on repeatable production, standardized parts, and relentless throughput.
Outcome
Short term: U.S. and allied forces gained decisive logistical and production advantage.
Long term: Industrial mobilization became a lasting model for surge manufacturing in crises.
Why It's Relevant
Perry fits the same logic: the constraint isn’t ideas—it’s factories and throughput.
Post–Cold War Drawdown and the “Atrophy Trap” in Munitions Capacity
1991-2015What Happened
After the Cold War, demand signals weakened, production lines consolidated, and surge capacity thinned. Specialized suppliers became fewer, and “single points of failure” crept into critical components that looked mundane—until they were needed fast.
Outcome
Short term: Lower costs and fewer redundant lines, but less resilience.
Long term: A fragile industrial base that struggled to surge when new conflicts erupted.
Why It's Relevant
The rush to expand rocket-motor capacity is partly a reversal of that long consolidation.
The 1950s Missile Age: Building a New Propulsion Industry From Scratch
1950-1965What Happened
Early Cold War missile programs forced rapid advances in propulsion manufacturing, test infrastructure, and safety disciplines for energetic materials. Programs learned—often painfully—that propulsion supply chains are slow to create and easy to bottleneck.
Outcome
Short term: A fast build-out of propulsion know-how and industrial capability.
Long term: A mature missile-industrial base that later consolidated into fewer suppliers.
Why It's Relevant
Today’s expansion wave echoes the same lesson: propulsion capacity is strategic and slow-moving.