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End of nuclear arms control era

End of nuclear arms control era

Rule Changes
By Newzino Staff | |

New START Treaty Expires, Removing Limits on World's Largest Arsenals

February 5th, 2026: Trump Rejects Extension, Calls for New Pact

Overview

For fifty-three years, binding agreements constrained the world's two largest nuclear arsenals. That era ended on February 5, 2026, when the New START treaty expired at midnight without a successor, as confirmed by President Trump who rejected a Russian extension offer and directed work on a new pact including China. The United States and Russia now face no legal limits on their combined stockpile of roughly 10,700 nuclear warheads.

The collapse removes verification mechanisms that provided early warning against surprise buildupsโ€”on-site inspections, data exchanges, and notification requirements that both sides used to reduce miscalculation risks. The Kremlin expressed regret over the expiration but pledged a responsible approach, while Russia's nuclear doctrine lowered in November 2024 and China's arsenal growing by roughly 100 warheads annually mark a structural shift toward a more volatile nuclear landscape.

Key Indicators

53
Years of Continuous Arms Control
Unbroken nuclear limits between the superpowers since 1972, now ended
~10,700
Combined Warheads Now Unconstrained
Total US and Russian nuclear weapons, previously capped under New START
1,550
Former Deployed Warhead Limit
Maximum deployed strategic warheads each side could maintain under New START
0
Active Verification Inspections
On-site inspections suspended since Russia withdrew participation in February 2023

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People Involved

Vladimir Putin
Vladimir Putin
President of Russia (No new response post-expiration; prior extension offer unreciprocated)
Donald Trump
Donald Trump
President of the United States (Rejected extension; directing new treaty negotiations including China)
Marco Rubio
Marco Rubio
US Secretary of State (No new statements post-expiration)
Antรณnio Guterres
Antรณnio Guterres
United Nations Secretary-General (Issued statement calling expiration a 'grave moment')

Organizations Involved

U.S. Department of State
U.S. Department of State
Federal Agency
Status: Supporting administration push for new multilateral treaty

The US agency responsible for foreign affairs, including negotiation and implementation of arms control treaties.

United Nations
United Nations
International Organization
Status: Urging negotiations for successor framework

The international body promoting disarmament and nonproliferation through the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons framework.

Timeline

  1. Trump Rejects Extension, Calls for New Pact

    Statement

    President Trump announced he will not extend New START, calling it a 'badly negotiated deal,' and directed nuclear experts to pursue a new, improved treaty potentially including China.

  2. Kremlin Regrets Expiration, Pledges Restraint

    Statement

    Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov expressed regret over New START's end but affirmed Russia will act responsibly based on national interests and security analysis.

  3. New START Expires

    Treaty Expiration

    New START expires at midnight, ending 53 years of binding nuclear arms limits between the superpowers. No successor agreement exists.

  4. Trump Dismisses Treaty Expiration

    Statement

    In an interview with The New York Times, Trump says of New START: 'If it expires, it expires. We'll just do a better agreement.'

  5. Putin Proposes One-Year Voluntary Extension

    Proposal

    Putin offers to maintain New START limits for one year after expiration if the US does the same and abandons space-based missile defense plans.

  6. Russia Lowers Nuclear Use Threshold

    Doctrine Change

    Putin signs revised nuclear doctrine allowing nuclear response to conventional attacks that threaten Russian or Belarusian sovereignty, including from non-nuclear states backed by nuclear powers.

  7. US Revokes Russian Inspector Visas

    Response

    The State Department cancels visas for Russian nuclear inspectors as a 'lawful countermeasure' to Moscow's treaty suspension.

  8. Russia Suspends New START Participation

    Suspension

    Putin announces Russia will suspend participation in New START, halting inspections and data exchanges, while continuing to observe warhead limits.

  9. New START Extended for Five Years

    Treaty

    Presidents Biden and Putin agree to extend New START until February 2026, preserving limits and verification measures.

  10. US Withdraws from INF Treaty

    Treaty Collapse

    The Trump administration formally withdraws from the INF Treaty, citing Russian violations. Both countries begin developing previously banned intermediate-range missiles.

  11. New START Treaty Signed

    Treaty

    President Obama and Russian President Medvedev sign New START in Prague, limiting each side to 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed delivery systems.

  12. START I Achieves Largest Arms Reductions

    Treaty

    The United States and Soviet Union sign the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, requiring the largest arms control reductions in historyโ€”limiting each side to 6,000 warheads.

  13. INF Treaty Eliminates Intermediate-Range Missiles

    Treaty

    Reagan and Gorbachev sign the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, eliminating an entire class of ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.

  14. SALT I Treaty Signed

    Treaty

    President Nixon and Soviet leader Brezhnev sign the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty in Moscow, establishing the framework for superpower nuclear constraints.

Scenarios

1

New Framework Reached Within Two Years

Discussed by: Arms Control Association, Council on Foreign Relations analysts, former State Department negotiators

Both sides agree to a new bilateral or trilateral (including China) arms control framework that reinstates verification measures and caps. This would require China to accept constraints on its growing arsenalโ€”something Beijing has consistently refusedโ€”and Washington to address Moscow's concerns about missile defense. Analysts note that even during the Cold War's worst periods, arms control negotiations continued; the infrastructure for talks exists if political will emerges.

2

Informal Restraint Without Treaty

Discussed by: Chatham House, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Russian foreign policy analysts

Both Russia and the US voluntarily maintain approximate parity near current levels without formal agreement. Both sides have signaled they see limited value in expensive buildups. This scenario preserves stability but eliminates transparencyโ€”neither side would have verification of the other's actual deployments, increasing the risk of miscalculation during crises.

3

Gradual Buildup and Modernization Race

Discussed by: Federation for American Security, Heritage Foundation, Congressional defense hawks

Without constraints, both nations expand deployments while accelerating modernization programs already underway. The US completes its $946 billion nuclear modernization; Russia deploys new hypersonic and underwater delivery systems. China reaches parity with deployed US and Russian warheads by the early 2030s. The trilateral dynamic creates new escalation risks not seen during the bilateral Cold War.

4

Crisis Triggers Emergency Talks

Discussed by: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, former national security officials, European security analysts

A near-miss incident or regional conflict escalationโ€”potentially involving Ukraine, Taiwan, or a misinterpreted military exerciseโ€”forces rapid diplomatic engagement. Historical precedent exists: the Cuban Missile Crisis produced the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Washington-Moscow hotline within months. Crisis-driven negotiations could yield interim measures faster than peacetime diplomacy.

Historical Context

Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)

October 1962

What Happened

The Soviet Union deployed nuclear missiles to Cuba, 90 miles from Florida. For 13 days, President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev confronted the closest approach to nuclear war in history. Kennedy established a naval quarantine; Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the missiles in exchange for US pledges not to invade Cuba and secret removal of US missiles from Turkey.

Outcome

Short Term

The crisis ended with Soviet missiles removed and a direct communication 'hotline' established between Washington and Moscow.

Long Term

Both superpowers, sobered by near-catastrophe, signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963 and accelerated arms control efforts that produced SALT I in 1972.

Why It's Relevant Today

The crisis demonstrates that existential nuclear danger can catalyze rapid arms control progress. Today's treaty collapse occurred during elevated nuclear risks; a future crisis could similarly force negotiations that seem impossible in peacetime.

SALT I Breakthrough (1972)

May 1972

What Happened

After two and a half years of negotiations during the Vietnam War and broader superpower tensions, Nixon and Brezhnev signed the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty in Moscow. The agreement froze intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missile numbers and limited anti-ballistic missile sites to two per country.

Outcome

Short Term

SALT I established the framework for superpower arms control and launched a period of dรฉtente.

Long Term

The treaty architectureโ€”verification, data exchange, bilateral commissionsโ€”became the template for every subsequent agreement through New START.

Why It's Relevant Today

SALT I was negotiated during extreme US-Soviet tensions, proving that arms control is possible even between adversaries. The 53-year framework it established has now ended; rebuilding equivalent institutions will require similar sustained diplomatic effort.

INF Treaty Collapse (2019)

February-August 2019

What Happened

The Trump administration withdrew from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, citing Russian deployment of the SSC-8 cruise missile in violation of the treaty. Russia denied violations and announced reciprocal suspension. Within months, both sides tested previously banned intermediate-range systems.

Outcome

Short Term

Both nations resumed development and testing of ground-launched intermediate-range missiles.

Long Term

The collapse left New START as the sole remaining arms control agreement. European allies expressed alarm at the loss of constraints that had protected them since the Cold War.

Why It's Relevant Today

The INF collapse previewed the current moment: accusations of violations, withdrawal, and rapid development of unconstrained weapons. New START's expiration follows the same pattern, suggesting that rebuilding arms control requires addressing underlying distrust, not just drafting new treaty text.

13 Sources: