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Treasury goes after Mexico’s “gasoline cartel”

Treasury goes after Mexico’s “gasoline cartel”

Rule Changes
By Newzino Staff | |

After OFAC’s CSRL hit, Senate investigators turn to the tanker-and-logistics layer that moves illicit fuel.

December 19th, 2025: Senate Finance Committee inquiry targets tanker-shipping exposure to cartel fuel smuggling

Overview

After Treasury sanctioned the Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL) and its jailed leader José Antonio Yépez Ortiz (“El Marro”) on December 17, 2025, Washington’s campaign against huachicol money moved quickly toward the infrastructure that can make stolen hydrocarbons tradable: shipping, routing, and due diligence.

On December 19, 2025, Sen. Ron Wyden (ranking member of the Senate Finance Committee) launched an inquiry by sending letters to seven major tanker operators seeking details on how they vet cargoes and counterparties to prevent cartel-linked fuel smuggling—an early sign that U.S. pressure may expand from naming cartels to scrutinizing the commercial pipes that carry their product.

Key Indicators

2
New SDN listings tied to this action
CSRL and its leader “El Marro” were added to OFAC’s blocking sanctions.
$827M
Suspicious transactions flagged after FinCEN’s oil-smuggling alert
Filers reported over $827 million in suspicious transactions in four months.
$5M
Average oil-smuggling transaction size (FinCEN analysis)
Treasury cited an average transaction size of about $5 million (outliers removed).
164,000 liters
Stolen hydrocarbons seized from CSRL-linked activity (Mexico, August 2025)
Treasury cited a major seizure alongside tanker trucks and pipeline-tap equipment.
60 years
El Marro’s prison sentence
He was sentenced in 2022 after a kidnapping conviction, per Treasury.
7
Tanker operators asked for due-diligence details in Senate inquiry
Wyden sent letters to seven major shipping companies asking how they ensure tankers are not used to transport illicit, cartel-linked fuel.
>$20B
Estimated annual value of illegal fuel entering Mexico (reporting/official estimates cited by Reuters)
Reuters reported estimates that illicit fuel imports into Mexico are worth more than $20 billion annually, underscoring why the logistics layer is drawing attention.

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People Involved

José Antonio Yépez Ortiz
José Antonio Yépez Ortiz
Leader of Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL) (Imprisoned in Mexico; sanctioned by OFAC on 2025-12-17)
Scott Bessent
Scott Bessent
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury (Leading Treasury’s cartel-focused sanctions push)
Claudia Sheinbaum
Claudia Sheinbaum
President of Mexico (Facing rising fuel-theft pressure amid cartel violence)
Ron Wyden
Ron Wyden
U.S. Senator; ranking member, Senate Finance Committee (Opened an inquiry into tanker-shipping exposure to cartel-linked fuel smuggling (2025-12-19))

Organizations Involved

Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL)
Cartel de Santa Rosa de Lima (CSRL)
Transnational Criminal Organization
Status: Sanctioned by OFAC; accused of fueling a cross-border energy black market

A Guanajuato-based cartel built around fuel theft, extortion, and violent turf war economics.

U.S. Treasury — Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
U.S. Treasury — Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
Treasury Department Office
Status: Designated CSRL and El Marro; expanded compliance exposure for facilitators

Treasury’s sanctions engine—built to isolate targets from the dollar system and scare off enablers.

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)
Federal Agency
Status: Pushing banks to spot cartel-linked oil and money laundering patterns

Treasury’s watchdog that turns bank reporting into a map of criminal supply chains.

Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex)
Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex)
State-owned Oil Company
Status: Victim and vulnerability point in the fuel-theft economy

Mexico’s oil giant—and the physical infrastructure cartels keep trying to siphon.

U.S. Senate Committee on Finance
U.S. Senate Committee on Finance
Legislative Committee
Status: Oversight spotlight on cartel-linked fuel smuggling and maritime/shipping compliance

A Senate committee with jurisdiction over taxation, trade, and key economic-policy levers relevant to fuel-smuggling incentives and enforcement.

Timeline

  1. Senate Finance Committee inquiry targets tanker-shipping exposure to cartel fuel smuggling

    Congressional Oversight

    Sen. Ron Wyden sent letters to seven major tanker operators seeking information on vetting and due diligence to prevent vessels being used to move cartel-linked illicit fuel; responses were requested by 2026-01-10.

  2. OFAC sanctions CSRL and its imprisoned boss

    Sanctions

    Treasury blocks CSRL and El Marro’s property under U.S. jurisdiction and bans U.S. dealings.

  3. A big seizure signals CSRL is still moving product

    Law Enforcement

    Treasury cites Mexican seizures of 164,000 liters and fuel-theft equipment tied to CSRL activity.

  4. Mexico finds clandestine refining capacity

    Law Enforcement

    Authorities uncover a clandestine mini-refinery, showing how the huachicol economy industrializes.

  5. Treasury points at crude-smuggling money flows

    Enforcement

    OFAC sanctions CJNG-linked fuel theft actors as FinCEN warns banks about cartel oil-smuggling typologies.

  6. Cartels get the terrorism label

    Rule Change

    U.S. designations take effect for multiple cartels, tightening liability for facilitators.

  7. Trump creates a terrorism-designation pipeline for cartels

    Rule Change

    A new executive order sets a process to label cartels as FTOs/SDGTs, raising legal stakes.

  8. A 60-year sentence—but the network persists

    Legal

    El Marro is sentenced to 60 years for kidnapping; Treasury later says he kept directing CSRL.

  9. Mexico arrests “El Marro”

    Law Enforcement

    Authorities capture CSRL’s leader in Guanajuato after years of violence tied to fuel theft.

  10. Pemex claims major progress in Guanajuato

    Statement

    Pemex reports large drops in fuel theft indicators versus 2018, amid heavy enforcement.

  11. Fuel theft turns into mass tragedy

    Turning Point

    A catastrophic pipeline explosion underscores how pervasive—and deadly—huachicol has become.

  12. CSRL and CJNG go to war over fuel

    Escalation

    CSRL declares war on CJNG for control of Guanajuato’s “Bermuda Triangle” fuel-theft corridor.

  13. A cartel is born in a refinery state

    Origin

    Treasury dates CSRL’s origins to 2014 in Santa Rosa de Lima, Guanajuato.

Scenarios

1

OFAC Follows the Money: Brokers and Importers Get Named Next

Discussed by: Compliance law firms and sanctions practitioners tracking Treasury’s cartel-finance strategy

If FinCEN’s oil-smuggling typologies keep producing high-value SAR clusters—and investigators can tie specific shipments to identifiable companies—Treasury’s next move is to sanction the “respectable” layer: brokers, logistics firms, and U.S.-linked importers that make stolen crude look clean. The trigger is documentation: repeat counterparties, consistent routing, and payment narratives that match the typology (like mislabeling cargo).

2

CSRL Weakens, CJNG Expands—Guanajuato Gets a New Boss

Discussed by: Mexico security reporting and cartel-tracking researchers focused on Guanajuato’s turf war dynamics

Sanctions increase friction for CSRL’s facilitators, but the more immediate impact could be organizational: tighter money access, more paranoia, and more internal theft. If CSRL’s fuel-theft revenue becomes harder to monetize, CJNG—already fighting for the same corridor—can absorb crews, routes, and corrupted nodes. The trigger is a run of arrests/seizures that disrupt CSRL’s local cashflow and protection structure.

3

FinCEN “Special Measures” Become the New Cartel Weapon

Discussed by: Financial-crime specialists analyzing FinCEN’s 2025 escalation against cartel-linked institutions

If Treasury concludes that cartel oil money and precursor-chemical payments are repeatedly clearing through particular institutions, FinCEN can tighten the noose by restricting access to U.S. transmittals of funds—pushing the pain onto banks, brokerages, and money transmitters. The trigger is political and evidentiary: clear examples of processing tied to cartel nodes, plus a willingness to absorb diplomatic blowback.

4

Sanctions Land with a Thud: The Huachicol Market Just Reroutes

Discussed by: Skeptical analysts of cartel adaptation and illicit trade displacement

CSRL is already operating in a heavily criminalized environment, and El Marro is already in prison. If the network can keep selling locally in pesos and laundering through non-U.S. channels, the designation becomes more symbolic than disruptive. The trigger is the absence of follow-on actions against intermediaries and the lack of meaningful chokepoints in trade, insurance, shipping, and finance enforcement.

Historical Context

Mexico’s 2019 fuel-theft crackdown and the Tlahuelilpan pipeline disaster

2019-01

What Happened

Mexico escalated enforcement against pipeline tapping, producing shortages and backlash. Then a tapped pipeline explosion in Hidalgo killed scores, exposing how deeply fuel theft had sunk into local economies and criminal control.

Outcome

Short Term

Government doubled down on enforcement while facing public anger and humanitarian fallout.

Long Term

Huachicol adapted—shifting methods, routes, and laundering—rather than disappearing.

Why It's Relevant Today

It explains why fuel theft isn’t “petty crime” anymore: it’s a mass-casualty, state-revenue threat.

Obama’s 2011 transnational criminal organization sanctions framework (E.O. 13581)

2011-07

What Happened

The U.S. created a sanctions tool specifically for significant transnational criminal organizations, treating them as threats to international stability and the U.S. economy—not just law-enforcement targets.

Outcome

Short Term

OFAC gained a durable legal basis to block assets and deter enablers across borders.

Long Term

Financial isolation became a standard playbook against organized crime and its facilitators.

Why It's Relevant Today

CSRL’s designation fits a long U.S. pattern: attack the network by making its money unusable.

Treasury’s 2025 shift to cartel-linked oil smuggling typologies

2025-05

What Happened

Treasury paired sanctions with a FinCEN alert describing how stolen Mexican crude can be smuggled into U.S. commerce through brokers, mislabeling, and complicit firms, then laundered back as “legitimate” proceeds.

Outcome

Short Term

Banks began flagging patterns, generating large volumes of suspicious transaction reporting.

Long Term

The energy-trade layer became a frontline compliance and enforcement battleground.

Why It's Relevant Today

It shows the CSRL action isn’t isolated—it’s part of a broader campaign against the huachicol supply chain.

19 Sources:
+13
U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control CBS News FinCEN Congressional Research Service (via Congress.gov) The White House The Washington Post Al Jazeera Pemex Reuters Crowell & Moring LLP START (University of Maryland) CNBC White House Archives EL PAÍS English U.S. Senate Committee on Finance Office of Foreign Assets Control U.S. Department of the Treasury Reuters