China's rare earth weapon

Overview

China controls 70% of rare earth mining and 90% of refining—the 17 obscure elements that power everything from F-35 fighter jets to iPhones. In April 2025, Beijing weaponized that dominance. When Trump announced Liberation Day tariffs, China retaliated by restricting exports of seven rare earth elements. By October, it expanded controls to twelve elements and invoked the foreign direct product rule—the same tool America used to choke China's chip industry—claiming jurisdiction over any product globally that touches Chinese rare earth technology.

In This Story

2 People

3 Orgs

China Reinstates Controls, West Scrambles

3 Context

1973 OPEC Oil Embargo

Key Indicators

90%

China's share of global rare earth refining

Even rare earths mined elsewhere must be sent to China for processing

920 lbs

Rare earths in each F-35 fighter jet

Critical for avionics, stealth coatings, and guidance systems

145%

Peak retaliatory tariff rate

Escalation from April's Liberation Day to October trade war peak

Rare earth elements under export controls

Expanded from 7 in April to 12 by October 2025

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People Involved

Donald Trump

President of the United States (2025-present) (Negotiated temporary truce with Xi in October 2025)

Xi Jinping

President of China (Secured rare earth leverage in trade negotiations)

Organizations Involved

Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM)

Government Agency

Status: Enforcement authority for export controls

China's primary authority for trade policy and export licensing.

MP Materials

Mining/Processing Company

Status: U.S. DOD 15% stakeholder, operates Mountain Pass mine

America's only operating rare earth mine and processing facility, based in California.

Lynas Rare Earths

Mining and Processing Company

Status: Australia's rare earth producer, Malaysia processing facility

Australian miner operating the Mt Weld mine with processing facilities in Malaysia.

Timeline

Military Export Ban Takes Effect (Suspended)
Policy

Date when automatic denials for military end-users would have started, but suspended under Busan agreement.
December 1st, 2025
Trump-Xi Busan Summit Deal
Negotiation

Leaders agree to one-year trade truce: U.S. cuts tariffs to 47%, China suspends rare earth export controls.
October 30th, 2025
China Expands Controls, Invokes FDPR
Escalation

MOFCOM Announcement No. 61 adds five more elements and claims jurisdiction over any product globally using Chinese rare earth technology.
October 9th, 2025
Pentagon Buys MP Materials Stake
Strategic

Department of Defense acquires 15% of MP Materials for $400 million to secure domestic rare earth supply.
June 15th, 2025
Tariff War Escalates to 145%
Economic

Tit-for-tat tariff increases push U.S. rate to 145% and China's to 125%, choking bilateral trade.
April 9th, 2025
China Restricts Seven Rare Earth Elements
Retaliation

Beijing announces export controls on samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium in direct response to U.S. tariffs.
April 4th, 2025
Trump's Liberation Day Tariffs
Policy

President Trump declares national emergency, imposes 54% total tariff on Chinese goods using IEEPA authority.
April 2nd, 2025
Technology Export Ban Announced
Policy

China bans export of rare earth separation, refining, and magnet-making technologies.
December 1st, 2023
China Restricts Gallium and Germanium
Policy

Beijing imposes licensing requirements on semiconductor-critical materials, retaliating against Western chip sanctions.
July 3rd, 2023
China Eliminates Export Quotas
Policy

Following WTO ruling, China drops quota system but begins developing more sophisticated technology-based controls.
January 1st, 2015
WTO Rules Against China
Legal

WTO panel finds China's export quotas violate trade rules, rejecting environmental conservation defense.
March 26th, 2014
U.S., EU, Japan File WTO Case
Legal

Obama administration joins allies in challenging China's export quotas at WTO Dispute Settlement Body.
March 13th, 2012
China Slashes Export Quotas 72%
Policy

Beijing cuts second-half 2010 export quota by 72% compared to previous year, triggering global price spike.
December 1st, 2010
China Cuts Rare Earth Exports to Japan
Geopolitical

Following territorial dispute over Senkaku Islands, China unofficially halts rare earth shipments to Japan for two months, demonstrating weaponization potential.
September 7th, 2010

Scenarios

China Reinstates Controls, West Scrambles

Discussed by: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Chatham House, Carnegie Endowment

When the one-year Busan truce expires in October 2026, China resumes export controls with tighter enforcement. Licensing delays stretch to months. Rare earth prices spike 30-50% as they did during the 2010-2011 crisis. Western auto manufacturers and defense contractors face production slowdowns. The Pentagon accelerates MP Materials expansion and Lynas partnerships, but refining capacity takes 3-5 years to build. Meanwhile, China leverages controls for concessions on Taiwan policy, South China Sea access, or technology transfer restrictions.

Western Supply Chains Diversify Successfully

Discussed by: Resources for the Future, Baker Institute, Atlantic Council

U.S., EU, and Japan quadruple investment in alternative sources—Australian mines, Greenland exploration, recycling technology. By 2028, China's refining share drops from 90% to 60%, similar to OPEC's oil production decline after 1973. Prices stabilize at modestly higher levels. China retains influence but loses veto power over Western manufacturing. Joint EU-Japan procurement and DOD-funded domestic processing create resilient supply chains. Beijing's rare earth weapon becomes a manageable inconvenience rather than existential threat.

Permanent Trade War, Bifurcated Supply Chains

Discussed by: Brookings Institution, Institute of Geoeconomics, SFA Oxford

U.S. and China abandon integration entirely. Beijing restricts all rare earth exports to Western defense contractors and strategic tech firms. Washington subsidizes complete domestic supply chain at enormous cost—DOD estimates $50 billion for full mining-to-magnets capability. Two parallel rare earth markets emerge: Chinese-controlled for Belt and Road countries, Western for allied nations. Global tech innovation slows as duplicated infrastructure increases costs. Both sides pay premium for strategic autonomy.

WTO Ruling Forces China to Retreat

Discussed by: European Parliament Think Tank, U.S. Trade Representative

U.S., EU, and Japan file WTO case as they did in 2012. Panel rules China's extraterritorial FDPR claims and military end-user bans violate trade commitments. China faces choice: comply as it did in 2015, or ignore ruling and risk broader WTO retaliation. However, unlike 2015, China may calculate that strategic leverage outweighs trade law compliance. Previous WTO victory took two years and China still controls processing regardless of export quota legality.

Historical Context

1973 OPEC Oil Embargo

October 1973 - March 1974

What Happened

Arab members of OPEC proclaimed an oil embargo against nations supporting Israel in the Yom Kippur War, cutting production 25% and banning exports to the U.S. Oil prices quadrupled from $3 to $12 per barrel. Gas stations ran dry, economies entered recession, and Western nations faced energy rationing.

Outcome

Short Term

Five-month embargo caused economic crisis, inflation spike, and political turmoil across the West.

Long Term

High prices incentivized non-OPEC production. Within a decade, OPEC output dropped from 1,500 to 850 million tonnes annually while rest-of-world production doubled to 2,000 million tonnes.

Why It's Relevant Today

Deng Xiaoping said 'the Middle East has oil, China has rare earths,' recognizing parallel strategic chokepoint. But today's contest differs: China controls processing more than mining, uses regulation rather than embargo, and maintains plausible deniability while shaping adaptation terms.

2010 China-Japan Rare Earth Dispute

September 2010 - November 2010

What Happened

After Japan detained a Chinese fishing captain near disputed Senkaku Islands, China unofficially halted rare earth shipments to Japan for two months. Japan imported 90% of its rare earths from China, facing immediate industrial disruption. Beijing demonstrated supply chain weapon without formal embargo.

Outcome

Short Term

Japan scrambled for alternative sources, prices spiked globally, diplomatic crisis intensified.

Long Term

Japan invested heavily in Lynas (Australia), built stockpiles, and reduced Chinese dependency from 90% to 60%. Japanese consumption dropped by half through efficiency and substitution.

Why It's Relevant Today

First modern demonstration that rare earth dominance could be weaponized for geopolitical objectives. Proved informal restrictions could achieve policy goals while avoiding WTO violations. Led Japan to pioneer diversification strategies now adopted by U.S. and EU.

2018-Present U.S. Chip Export Controls on China

October 2018 - Present

What Happened

U.S. imposed escalating restrictions on semiconductor exports to China, invoking the Foreign Direct Product Rule to claim jurisdiction over any chip made anywhere using American technology. October 2022 controls targeted AI chips and manufacturing equipment. December 2024 expansion added 24 equipment types and restricted high-bandwidth memory.

Outcome

Short Term

Devastated China's advanced chip industry, forced SMIC and Huawei to redesign around restrictions, created bifurcated semiconductor supply chain.

Long Term

China accelerated domestic chip investment ($150 billion+), developed workarounds, and created alternative standards. Effectiveness debated as China achieved 7nm production despite controls.

Why It's Relevant Today

China's October 2025 rare earth controls explicitly invoked FDPR—turning America's weapon against it. Beijing claims jurisdiction over any product globally using Chinese rare earth technology, mirroring U.S. semiconductor playbook. Shows how supply chain dependencies create reciprocal vulnerabilities in great power competition.