CENTCOM’s closed-door planning meeting is the hinge between a ceasefire on paper and a postwar security order in Gaza.
January 14th, 2026: UK PM Keir Starmer poised to accept Board of Peace positionNew here? Follow stories to track developments over time. Create a free account to get updates when stories you care about change.
A Gaza force is being designed like it's real—but the December 16 Doha conference exposed how unreal it remains. U.S. Central Command convened more than 40 countries to game out command structure, basing, and rules of engagement for a proposed U.N.-authorized International Stabilization Force, but attendees failed to agree on the force's mandate or composition. Italy is the only country to have formally committed troops. Fifteen invited nations declined to attend, and Turkey was excluded at Israel's insistence—a sign that coalition-building is entangled with regional politics before a single soldier deploys.
The hard part nobody can fake is playing out in real time: who takes risks, who takes orders, who shoots if shot at, and who owns the political fallout when Hamas refuses to disarm. On January 8, former U.N. envoy Nickolay Mladenov was named director-general of the Board of Peace, giving the governance mechanism a face but not a solution. The U.S. is now planning to advance to Phase 2 without waiting for Hamas disarmament—acknowledging the central contradiction that the force was designed to resolve but cannot enforce.
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CENTCOM is the U.S. military command turning Gaza stabilization from diplomacy into operational planning.
The Board of Peace is the political control room meant to outlast the ceasefire’s fragility.
The Security Council is the legal engine that makes a multinational force possible—or contested.
The CMCC is the prototype of “boots near Gaza” without “boots in Gaza.”
The IDF is the force the ISF is supposed to replace—without creating a security vacuum.
Hamas is the problem the plan tries to solve without naming a single clean solution.
British Prime Minister Keir Starmer reportedly prepared to accept role on 15-member Board of Peace chaired by Trump, expected to meet in Davos to discuss technocratic government and reconstruction.
Hamas states it will dissolve its administrative control of Gaza when a new Palestinian governing body is established, but disarmament remains unresolved.
U.S. officials signal intention to advance ceasefire to Phase 2 before Hamas disarmament or return of last hostage's body, acknowledging the ISF will not fight Hamas to enforce demilitarization.
Netanyahu announces former U.N. Middle East envoy Nickolay Mladenov as designated director-general of the Board of Peace, confirmed by senior U.S. officials as day-to-day administrator.
Israel reports ongoing ceasefire violations including failed rocket launches from Gaza; Hamas alleges Israeli strikes have killed over 400 Palestinians during ceasefire period.
European officials report the December 16 conference failed to decide on ISF mandate. Around 15 countries including Belgium, Romania, South Korea, and Nepal declined to attend; Italy remains the only formal troop commitment.
More than 25 countries are expected as planners debate command structure, basing, rules of engagement, and governance linkages.
Despite Turkey's expressed readiness to contribute troops, Israel vetoed its participation in the CENTCOM-led planning conference, limiting attendance to approximately 40 nations.
U.S. officials describe an ISF that may deploy early 2026, while acknowledging unanswered questions on Hamas disarmament.
CENTCOM reports aid and goods throughput at scale and a broader set of partner representatives involved in the hub.
Trump says he plans to name Board members early next year, after claiming interest from global leaders.
CENTCOM reports rapid growth in partner representation and continued facilitation of aid and commercial goods movements.
Resolution 2803 (2025) authorizes a temporary ISF under unified command and a transitional Board of Peace through 2027.
A U.S.-led hub in Kiryat Gat begins coordinating aid flows, logistics, and stabilization planning linked to the ceasefire.
The U.S., Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey sign a political support document separate from the warring parties.
A fragile ceasefire starts, with hostage releases and prisoner exchanges reported as part of Phase 1.
A document frames ceasefire mechanics, humanitarian relief, withdrawals, and hostage-prisoner exchanges.
The U.S. outlines a broad roadmap tying ceasefire, reconstruction, governance reform, and demilitarization into one sequence.
Discussed by: Reuters reporting on U.S. officials; CENTCOM’s CMCC build-out signals operational readiness
Troop contributors commit enough personnel for an initial footprint in Israeli-held areas, with conservative rules of engagement and heavy coordination through the CMCC. Israel withdraws in measured steps as security benchmarks are certified, while vetted Palestinian police expand their role. This becomes a “stabilization first, politics later” model—imperfect, but durable if attacks stay low and donors keep paying.
Discussed by: Security-policy commentary on mandate ambiguity; reporting emphasizing planning without deployment decisions
Doha exposes the dealbreakers: basing rights, command authority, legal protections, and who authorizes force under “all necessary measures.” Countries keep seats at the table but avoid binding commitments, waiting to see the Board of Peace membership and Israel-Hamas compliance. The ISF remains a concept with PowerPoints, while the CMCC continues as the de facto mechanism for incremental stabilization.
Discussed by: Chatham House analysis on broad force authority and Chapter VII-style ambiguity; Reuters reporting on demilitarization debates
A major attack, weapons cache discovery, or persistent armed resistance forces the ISF to either use force aggressively or admit it cannot demilitarize. If the ISF engages, some contributors may withdraw or caveat their participation, leaving a smaller, more hardline coalition and a legitimacy problem. If it doesn’t engage, Israel pauses withdrawals and the mission is branded as theater.
Discussed by: Analysts citing the disarmament impasse and fragility of phased agreements; reporting on Hamas’s conditions for disarmament
If hostage/prisoner provisions collapse, rocket fire resumes, or political shocks hit Israel or Gaza, the entire sequencing fails. No country wants to insert troops into a restarting war with unclear consent. The CMCC pivots back to crisis logistics, and the “international governance” concept becomes a postmortem rather than a transition plan.
Discussed by: U.S. officials quoted in Times of Israel and Bloomberg reporting; analysis by FDD and Soufan Center
The U.S. advances to Phase 2 without waiting for Hamas disarmament, reframing the ISF as a reconstruction security presence rather than a demilitarization enforcer. The Board of Peace coordinates donors and oversees a technocratic Palestinian administration while Hamas retains arms but dissolves visible governance. This becomes a managed stalemate: international presence without confrontation, reconstruction without resolution, and Israeli freedom of action if attacks resume.
Discussed by: Netanyahu statements on disarmament as precondition; Israeli security analysts cited in JPost and Times of Israel
Netanyahu refuses further IDF withdrawals unless Hamas disarms in a verifiable way, not a symbolic handover of obsolete weapons. The U.S. cannot deliver credible enforcement, and the Board of Peace becomes a diplomatic shell without operational authority. Troop contributors withdraw pledges, the CMCC continues as a logistics hub, and the ceasefire fragility extends indefinitely without transitioning to stabilization.
After the Kosovo war, a NATO-led force entered to provide security, prevent reprisals, and manage demilitarization in a contested political landscape. The mission mixed hard security tasks with nation-building support, under intense international scrutiny.
Large-scale violence dropped, but flashpoints persisted and required sustained troop presence.
A long-lived international force became the backstop for a fragile political settlement.
It’s a reminder that “temporary” stabilization forces often become multi-decade fixtures when politics lags security.
A NATO-led force implemented the Dayton Accords, separated armed factions, and enforced military provisions while civilian reconstruction and governance reforms struggled to keep pace. Success depended on credible enforcement authority and unified command.
The war stopped and major combat didn’t resume under robust enforcement.
Security gains outlasted the initial deployment, but political dysfunction persisted.
Shows why command unity and enforcement credibility matter more than optimistic transition timelines.
The U.N. administered a territory during a transition, building institutions while managing security with international forces. The mission blended governance authority with security responsibilities in a legitimacy-sensitive environment.
Institutions were built fast, but security shocks still erupted later.
Statehood emerged, but stability required continued international support beyond the handover.
Clarifies the gamble behind a Board of Peace: transitional authority can work, but only with real control and funding.