Overview
A Gaza force is being designed like it’s real—because, quietly, it might be. On December 16, 2025, U.S. Central Command convened more than two dozen countries in Doha to game out command structure, basing, and rules of engagement for a proposed U.N.-authorized International Stabilization Force.
This is the hard part nobody can fake: who takes risks, who takes orders, who shoots if shot at, and who owns the political fallout. The Doha meeting signals a shift from “concept” to “coalition mechanics,” but it also exposes the central contradiction—building a force tasked with “demilitarizing” Gaza while publicly insisting it won’t be a war against Hamas.
Key Indicators
People Involved
Organizations Involved
CENTCOM is the U.S. military command turning Gaza stabilization from diplomacy into operational planning.
The Board of Peace is the political control room meant to outlast the ceasefire’s fragility.
The Security Council is the legal engine that makes a multinational force possible—or contested.
The CMCC is the prototype of “boots near Gaza” without “boots in Gaza.”
The IDF is the force the ISF is supposed to replace—without creating a security vacuum.
Hamas is the problem the plan tries to solve without naming a single clean solution.
Timeline
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CENTCOM convenes Doha planning conference
OperationsMore than 25 countries are expected as planners debate command structure, basing, rules of engagement, and governance linkages.
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U.S. signals January deployment window—without clarity on disarmament
ReportingU.S. officials describe an ISF that may deploy early 2026, while acknowledging unanswered questions on Hamas disarmament.
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CMCC claims 30,000+ truck movements milestone
OperationsCENTCOM reports aid and goods throughput at scale and a broader set of partner representatives involved in the hub.
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Trump teases Board of Peace lineup for early 2026
StatementTrump says he plans to name Board members early next year, after claiming interest from global leaders.
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CMCC partner footprint expands
OperationsCENTCOM reports rapid growth in partner representation and continued facilitation of aid and commercial goods movements.
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U.N. Security Council authorizes ISF and Board of Peace
Rule ChangesResolution 2803 (2025) authorizes a temporary ISF under unified command and a transitional Board of Peace through 2027.
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CENTCOM establishes the CMCC in Israel
OperationsA U.S.-led hub in Kiryat Gat begins coordinating aid flows, logistics, and stabilization planning linked to the ceasefire.
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Mediators sign a “Declaration” backing the roadmap
DiplomacyThe U.S., Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey sign a political support document separate from the warring parties.
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Ceasefire phase begins
Force in PlayA fragile ceasefire starts, with hostage releases and prisoner exchanges reported as part of Phase 1.
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Implementation steps announced for ending the war
AgreementA document frames ceasefire mechanics, humanitarian relief, withdrawals, and hostage-prisoner exchanges.
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Trump launches the 20-point Gaza framework
PlanThe U.S. outlines a broad roadmap tying ceasefire, reconstruction, governance reform, and demilitarization into one sequence.
Scenarios
International Force Deploys in Early 2026, Gradually Replaces IDF in Gaza Pockets
Discussed by: Reuters reporting on U.S. officials; CENTCOM’s CMCC build-out signals operational readiness
Troop contributors commit enough personnel for an initial footprint in Israeli-held areas, with conservative rules of engagement and heavy coordination through the CMCC. Israel withdraws in measured steps as security benchmarks are certified, while vetted Palestinian police expand their role. This becomes a “stabilization first, politics later” model—imperfect, but durable if attacks stay low and donors keep paying.
Coalition Talks Stall: Too Many Flags, Not Enough Yeses
Discussed by: Security-policy commentary on mandate ambiguity; reporting emphasizing planning without deployment decisions
Doha exposes the dealbreakers: basing rights, command authority, legal protections, and who authorizes force under “all necessary measures.” Countries keep seats at the table but avoid binding commitments, waiting to see the Board of Peace membership and Israel-Hamas compliance. The ISF remains a concept with PowerPoints, while the CMCC continues as the de facto mechanism for incremental stabilization.
“Stabilization” Turns Into Combat—And the Mission Splinters
Discussed by: Chatham House analysis on broad force authority and Chapter VII-style ambiguity; Reuters reporting on demilitarization debates
A major attack, weapons cache discovery, or persistent armed resistance forces the ISF to either use force aggressively or admit it cannot demilitarize. If the ISF engages, some contributors may withdraw or caveat their participation, leaving a smaller, more hardline coalition and a legitimacy problem. If it doesn’t engage, Israel pauses withdrawals and the mission is branded as theater.
Ceasefire Breaks, ISF Never Deploys, Israel Reasserts Direct Control
Discussed by: Analysts citing the disarmament impasse and fragility of phased agreements; reporting on Hamas’s conditions for disarmament
If hostage/prisoner provisions collapse, rocket fire resumes, or political shocks hit Israel or Gaza, the entire sequencing fails. No country wants to insert troops into a restarting war with unclear consent. The CMCC pivots back to crisis logistics, and the “international governance” concept becomes a postmortem rather than a transition plan.
Historical Context
KFOR in Kosovo
1999–presentWhat Happened
After the Kosovo war, a NATO-led force entered to provide security, prevent reprisals, and manage demilitarization in a contested political landscape. The mission mixed hard security tasks with nation-building support, under intense international scrutiny.
Outcome
Short term: Large-scale violence dropped, but flashpoints persisted and required sustained troop presence.
Long term: A long-lived international force became the backstop for a fragile political settlement.
Why It's Relevant
It’s a reminder that “temporary” stabilization forces often become multi-decade fixtures when politics lags security.
IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina
1995–2004What Happened
A NATO-led force implemented the Dayton Accords, separated armed factions, and enforced military provisions while civilian reconstruction and governance reforms struggled to keep pace. Success depended on credible enforcement authority and unified command.
Outcome
Short term: The war stopped and major combat didn’t resume under robust enforcement.
Long term: Security gains outlasted the initial deployment, but political dysfunction persisted.
Why It's Relevant
Shows why command unity and enforcement credibility matter more than optimistic transition timelines.
UNTAET and peacekeeping in East Timor (Timor-Leste)
1999–2002 (transition administration), broader missions into mid-2000sWhat Happened
The U.N. administered a territory during a transition, building institutions while managing security with international forces. The mission blended governance authority with security responsibilities in a legitimacy-sensitive environment.
Outcome
Short term: Institutions were built fast, but security shocks still erupted later.
Long term: Statehood emerged, but stability required continued international support beyond the handover.
Why It's Relevant
Clarifies the gamble behind a Board of Peace: transitional authority can work, but only with real control and funding.