The Philippines signs its first visiting forces agreement with a European power, extending a rapid alliance-building campaign from Washington to Paris
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Why it matters
A thickening web of military agreements across the Indo-Pacific is reshaping how nations deter aggression in the world's most contested waterway.
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France maintains five permanent military commands across the Indo-Pacific — in New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Reunion/Mayotte, Djibouti, and the United Arab Emirates — with approximately 7,000 troops, 18 defense attaches covering 33 countries, and the world's second-largest exclusive economic zone.
The Philippine defense department is executing a rapid expansion of military partnerships, signing four new visiting forces agreements in under two years while deepening trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan.
Defense Secretary Teodoro and Minister Vautrin sign a visiting forces agreement at the Ecole Militaire in Paris, making France the first European Union member state with a military access pact with the Philippines. Both sides reaffirm UNCLOS and the 2016 arbitral ruling on the South China Sea.
The three allies conduct joint exercises in the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines — the first such drills beyond the South China Sea — triggering strong protests from Beijing.
The amphibious warship Dixmude and frigate Aconit depart France on a five-month Indo-Pacific training mission, bound for the Philippines to participate in Balikatan 2026.
A trilateral patrol exercise in the South China Sea prompts China to respond with "combat readiness patrols," illustrating the escalatory dynamic as more international actors operate in disputed waters.
The Philippines and Canada sign a visiting forces agreement, the second new SOVFA in six months, as Manila continues to diversify its military partnerships.
The Philippines and New Zealand sign a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement, beginning Manila's rapid expansion of military access pacts beyond its traditional US and Australian alliances.
President Marcos and Prime Minister Kishida sign a Reciprocal Access Agreement allowing Japanese and Philippine military forces to operate on each other's soil for joint exercises and disaster relief.
Chinese Coast Guard personnel board Philippine Navy boats near Second Thomas Shoal, brandish bladed weapons, and injure Filipino sailors — one of the most severe physical confrontations in the South China Sea dispute.
President Biden, Prime Minister Kishida, and President Marcos hold the first-ever trilateral leaders' summit in Washington, announcing joint patrols and deeper defense cooperation in the South China Sea.
The Philippines and United States agree to expand the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement from five to nine military sites, including locations in northern Luzon near Taiwan and on Palawan facing the South China Sea.
Japan releases a new national security strategy committing to double defense spending to 2 percent of gross domestic product by 2027 and introducing counterstrike capability — its most significant military doctrinal shift since World War II.
The United States, United Kingdom, and Australia announce the AUKUS security pact, including nuclear-powered submarines for Australia. The deal cancels a French submarine contract worth tens of billions, triggering a diplomatic crisis.
President Macron outlines France's Indo-Pacific strategy at Garden Island Naval Base in Sydney, becoming the first European leader to formally adopt the Indo-Pacific framework.
Discussed by: CSIS, IISS, and The Diplomat analysts who describe the Philippines' approach as a deliberate 'web of deterrence' strategy
The Philippines-France SOVFA serves as a template for similar agreements with the United Kingdom, Germany, or other European nations with Indo-Pacific interests. Japan, which already has reciprocal access agreements with Australia and the UK, expands its own network. The result is a dense mesh of interlocking bilateral agreements that raises the coordination cost for any actor contemplating coercion — a form of distributed deterrence without a single treaty organization.
Discussed by: IISS and Royal Navy analysts who note the UK is already scaling back overseas deployments to prioritize Euro-Atlantic defense
European nations find their Indo-Pacific commitments squeezed by competing demands closer to home — NATO defense spending targets, the ongoing response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, and domestic fiscal pressures. France, with its permanent territorial presence, maintains engagement, but broader European participation in exercises like Balikatan proves episodic rather than sustained. The latticework remains heavily US-dependent.
Discussed by: East Asia Forum, CFR Global Conflict Tracker, and multiple regional analysts warning about the 'normalization of confrontation'
The growing number of military actors operating in and around the South China Sea — now including French warships alongside American, Japanese, Australian, and Philippine vessels — increases the complexity of any maritime encounter. A collision, weapons discharge, or other incident involving forces from multiple countries escalates beyond the bilateral Philippine-China dynamic, forcing the new network of agreements to function as a real deterrence mechanism rather than a theoretical one.
Discussed by: Bloomberg, Modern Diplomacy, and analysts covering the resumption of Philippines-China bilateral talks in Quanzhou on March 28, 2026
China shifts tactics from maritime coercion to economic engagement, offering trade concessions, infrastructure investment, or joint development proposals in the South China Sea as leverage to discourage further military agreements. The Philippines-China bilateral consultations that resumed in late March 2026 — the first in over a year — could signal a diplomatic track that complicates Manila's appetite for additional military pacts if Beijing offers meaningful concessions.
Eight nations — the United States, United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan — signed the Manila Pact in 1954, creating the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization to contain communist expansion. Unlike NATO's Article 5, SEATO had no automatic mutual defense commitment. France and the UK contributed minimally. The organization proved unable to prevent communist victories in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
SEATO provided a multilateral umbrella for U.S. military operations in Southeast Asia but could not generate collective action from its members.
The organization dissolved in 1977, discrediting the single-treaty-organization model for Asian security. The United States shifted to bilateral alliances — the "hub-and-spoke" system that persisted for decades.
Today's alliance-builders are deliberately avoiding SEATO's model. Rather than one multilateral pact with weak commitments, the Philippines and its partners are building a mesh of bilateral agreements — each tailored, each requiring specific ratification — designed to be flexible and durable where SEATO was rigid and hollow.
NATO expanded from 16 members in 1990 to 32 by 2024, absorbing former Warsaw Pact states and eventually Finland and Sweden after Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Each accession required individual negotiations and ratification. Russia characterized the expansion as a direct security threat, using it to justify military buildups and eventually the invasion of Ukraine.
New members gained a credible collective defense guarantee. Russia's invasion of Ukraine accelerated Finnish and Swedish accession.
NATO expansion demonstrated that alliance networks can grow rapidly when a perceived threat crystallizes political will, but also showed that expansion itself can become a grievance the adversary exploits.
The Indo-Pacific lattice faces a similar dynamic: each new military agreement strengthens deterrence but risks being framed by Beijing as encirclement, potentially accelerating the very coercive behavior the agreements are designed to prevent. The key difference is that no Indo-Pacific arrangement carries a NATO-style collective defense commitment.
The announcement of AUKUS on September 15, 2021, killed a $66 billion French contract to build conventional submarines for Australia. France learned of the deal only hours before the public announcement. President Macron recalled ambassadors from Washington and Canberra — an unprecedented move between allies — and accused both governments of lying.
A severe diplomatic rupture between France and its Anglosphere allies. Relations were gradually repaired over the following months through direct engagement between Macron and Biden.
France recalibrated its Indo-Pacific strategy, deepening partnerships with India, Japan, and Southeast Asian nations — including the Philippines — rather than relying on the Anglosphere. The AUKUS experience made France a more independent and assertive Indo-Pacific actor.
The Philippines-France SOVFA is a direct product of France's post-AUKUS pivot toward Southeast Asia. Locked out of the inner Anglosphere security circle, France built its own network of partnerships — and the Philippines, eager to diversify beyond the United States, proved a willing partner.