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Russia’s Winter Energy War on Ukraine’s Grid

Russia’s Winter Energy War on Ukraine’s Grid

From 2022 missile barrages to record drone swarms, Moscow targets power, heat and transport as diplomacy stalls

Overview

Since October 2022, Russia has waged a parallel war on Ukraine’s electricity, heating and transport systems, launching repeated waves of missiles and drones at power plants, high-voltage substations, rail hubs and ports. The goal, according to Western and Ukrainian officials, is to weaponize winter by plunging cities into blackouts and disrupting heat, water and mobility, in hopes of breaking civilian morale and pressuring Kyiv into concessions.

The 653‑drone, 51‑missile barrage of December 6, 2025—striking energy facilities in at least eight regions, briefly cutting external power to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, and damaging the key railway junction at Fastiv—marks the most massive air attack of the war and the latest escalation in this infrastructure campaign. It comes just days after renewed strikes that left tens of thousands without electricity or heat in southern Ukraine, and as U.S.-brokered peace talks struggle to gain traction, underscoring how energy vulnerability, nuclear risk and diplomacy are now tightly intertwined.

Key Indicators

653 drones & 51 missiles
Scale of 6 Dec 2025 barrage
Russia’s overnight assault used 653 unmanned aerial vehicles and 51 missiles, with 585 drones and 30 missiles reportedly intercepted while 29 locations were still hit.
≈1/3
Share of pre‑war power capacity left by mid‑2024
By mid‑2024 Ukraine had only about one‑third of its pre‑invasion electricity generating capacity remaining after repeated Russian strikes on the energy system.
>1,000
Missiles and drones fired at grid in first 2022–23 winter campaign
By mid‑December 2022 Russia had launched more than 1,000 missiles and drones specifically at Ukraine’s energy grid, causing nationwide rolling blackouts.
>1,000,000
People left without power after 22 Mar 2024 strike
A massive March 22, 2024 attack—88 missiles and 63 drones—hit the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station and major thermal plants, leaving more than one million Ukrainians without electricity.
≈90%
DTEK thermal capacity destroyed or damaged by June 2024
Ukraine’s largest private energy firm DTEK reported around 90% of its available thermal generation destroyed or damaged after seven large‑scale attacks between March and June 2024.

People Involved

Volodymyr Zelenskyy
Volodymyr Zelenskyy
President of Ukraine (Leads Ukraine’s response to Russia’s infrastructure and winter energy campaign)
Vladimir Putin
Vladimir Putin
President of the Russian Federation (Authorizes and politically owns the long‑running campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure)
Rafael Mariano Grossi
Rafael Mariano Grossi
Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Warns about nuclear safety risks from repeated grid attacks and plant power losses)
Maksym Timchenko
Maksym Timchenko
CEO, DTEK Group (Leads Ukraine’s largest private energy company through repeated attacks and capacity loss)
Yulia Svyrydenko
Yulia Svyrydenko
Prime Minister of Ukraine (since 2025) (Chairs emergency response and reconstruction efforts after large‑scale strikes)

Organizations Involved

Russian Armed Forces
Russian Armed Forces
Military
Status: Conducts missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian energy, transport and port infrastructure

The Russian Armed Forces execute the long‑range missile and drone campaign against Ukrainian civilian and dual‑use infrastructure, employing cruise and ballistic missiles, S‑300/400 systems in surface‑to‑surface roles, and Shahed‑type UAVs supplied by Iran or domestically produced.

Government of Ukraine
Government of Ukraine
Government Body
Status: Manages defense, civil protection, grid repairs and diplomacy under sustained infrastructure attack

Ukraine’s executive leadership coordinates military defense, air defense acquisition, emergency services, and rapid repair of damaged energy and transport infrastructure, while negotiating international support and potential peace frameworks.

Ukrenergo
Ukrenergo
National grid operator
Status: National transmission system operator managing a heavily damaged grid

Ukrenergo operates Ukraine’s high‑voltage transmission network and is responsible for balancing supply and demand, scheduling imports from Europe and directing emergency outages during shortages.

DTEK Group
DTEK Group
Energy company
Status: Main private energy producer heavily targeted by Russian strikes

DTEK is Ukraine’s largest private energy holding, owning multiple coal‑fired thermal power plants and playing a key role in electricity and heating supply.

Ukrzaliznytsia (Ukrainian Railways)
Ukrzaliznytsia (Ukrainian Railways)
State Enterprise
Status: Targeted as a critical logistics and passenger network

Ukrzaliznytsia operates Ukraine’s national rail network, vital for military logistics, grain exports and civilian evacuation, making it a frequent target in Russia’s infrastructure strikes.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
International organization
Status: Monitors nuclear safety risks from grid attacks and plant strikes

The IAEA is the UN’s nuclear watchdog, tasked with monitoring nuclear safety and security, including at Ukrainian plants affected by the war.

Timeline

  1. Record 653‑drone, 51‑missile barrage hits energy and transport

    Attack

    Overnight, Russia launches 653 drones and 51 missiles against Ukraine, targeting energy facilities in at least eight regions, rail infrastructure including Fastiv station, and ports such as Odesa. Most drones and many missiles are intercepted, but 29 locations are hit; blackouts spread, nuclear plants reduce output, Zaporizhzhia NPP briefly loses off‑site power, and Poland scrambles jets as sirens sound near its border.

  2. Strikes cut power and heating to tens of thousands in the south

    Attack

    Russian attacks on facilities in Odesa and Kherson regions leave more than 50,000 households without electricity and around 40,500 without heating, marking a sharp escalation as winter sets in.

  3. Deadly Ternopil apartment strike amid renewed winter campaign

    Attack

    A Russian missile strike on Ternopil in western Ukraine kills at least 36 people, one of the deadliest attacks in the region, as analysts note an intensified winter campaign combining attacks on residential areas and critical infrastructure.

  4. MT Orinda tanker fire after Izmail port drone attack

    Attack

    Russian Shahed drones strike Izmail in Odesa region, hitting energy infrastructure, port facilities and several civilian vessels, including the LPG tanker MT Orinda, whose fire is detected from space—highlighting risks to Ukraine’s export corridors and energy‑linked shipping.

  5. Drone strike damages Chernobyl’s New Safe Confinement

    Nuclear Safety

    Ukraine reports that a Russian drone carrying a high‑explosive warhead struck the New Safe Confinement at the Chernobyl nuclear plant, damaging the protective structure but not increasing radiation levels, raising alarms about attacks on nuclear sites.

  6. Poltava residential and energy infrastructure hit

    Attack

    A Russian Kh‑22 missile strikes a residential building in Poltava, killing 15 people and damaging nearby buildings and some energy infrastructure, in one of several deadly winter attacks on civilian areas and grid assets.

  7. Mass November 2024 strikes target grid ahead of winter

    Attack

    Russia launches about 120 missiles and 90 drones in one of the fiercest attacks in months, killing at least seven people and striking hydropower and other energy facilities as Ukraine prepares for another winter under fire.

  8. DTEK reports 90% of thermal capacity destroyed or damaged

    Infrastructure

    After a new wave of Russian attacks, DTEK says three workers were injured and that around 90% of its available generating capacity has been destroyed or damaged since March, underscoring the long‑term impact on Ukraine’s grid.

  9. Trypilska thermal power plant destroyed

    Attack

    Russian strikes destroy the Trypilska thermal power plant in Kyiv region, further reducing Ukraine’s dispatchable generation and deepening reliance on imports and remaining nuclear output.

  10. Russia’s largest attack on Ukraine’s energy system to date

    Attack

    Russia launches 88 missiles and 63 drones, striking the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station, Kharkiv’s TEC‑5, other thermal power plants and grid nodes. Over a million people lose electricity, and DTEK reports losing about half its generating capacity in a single day.

  11. December 29, 2023: One of the largest airstrikes of the war

    Attack

    Russia fires at least 122 missiles and 36 drones at cities across Ukraine, including Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa and Zaporizhzhia, killing at least 58 people and injuring more than 160; many targets include energy and industrial sites.

  12. 81‑missile attack hits grid, cuts power to Zaporizhzhia NPP

    Attack

    Russia launches 81 missiles at infrastructure across Ukraine, leaving 40% of Kyiv without heat and cutting electricity to Odesa and other regions; the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant loses external power and switches to diesel backups before being reconnected.

  13. Pre‑Christmas strikes knock out multiple power plants

    Attack

    Russia fires more than 70 missiles at Ukrainian infrastructure, striking at least nine power plants; three people die in Kryvyi Rih and hundreds of thousands lose electricity and heating during winter conditions.

  14. Massive November strikes and spillover into Poland

    Attack

    Russia launches about 100 missiles and drones at Ukraine’s energy infrastructure; a missile explodes in the Polish village of Przewodów during the barrage, killing two people and briefly raising fears of NATO escalation.

  15. Russia launches first nationwide barrage against Ukraine’s power grid

    Attack

    Russian forces fire 84 cruise missiles and 24 suicide drones at targets across 14 regions, hitting power plants and substations; Ukraine’s energy minister says around 30% of energy infrastructure is damaged, triggering widespread blackouts.

Scenarios

1

Protracted ‘energy attrition’ with a fragile but functioning grid

Discussed by: Ukrainian officials, European energy analysts and think tanks such as the European University Institute

In this scenario, Russia continues high‑volume winter attacks on Ukraine’s energy system but at a pace Ukraine can partially absorb through repairs, imports and rationing. Ukrenergo and DTEK patch together capacity, ENTSO‑E imports grow, and rolling outages become a normalized feature of Ukrainian life each winter. Civilian hardship remains severe but not decisive militarily; frontline positions change slowly while the ‘energy war’ settles into a grinding stalemate.

2

Western air defenses and grid aid blunt Russia’s winter campaign

Discussed by: Western governments, Ukrainian leadership, and military analysts

Here, accelerated deliveries of Western air defense systems, radars and munitions, plus large‑scale donor financing for transformers and high‑voltage equipment, significantly increase Ukraine’s interception rates and repair capacity. The March 2024 and December 2025‑type barrages become harder for Russia to repeat as its missile and drone stocks are depleted and Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries and ‘shadow fleet’ tankers erode Russia’s ability to fund and fuel its long‑range campaign. Blackouts still occur, but less frequently and for shorter duration, reducing Moscow’s leverage.

3

Energy terror plus corruption fatigue drive pressure for a compromise peace

Discussed by: Political commentators in Europe and North America; some U.S. and European policymakers

Sustained infrastructure destruction, combined with corruption scandals in Ukraine’s energy sector and slower Western aid, could increase Ukrainian public fatigue and Western doubts about long‑term support. In this scenario, U.S.‑brokered talks—such as those underway in Florida in late 2025—gain momentum around a ceasefire and partial territorial concessions in exchange for security guarantees and reconstruction funds. However, domestic opposition in Ukraine and skepticism about Russian compliance could make such a deal fragile or unsustainable.

4

Major nuclear or dam incident triggers regional crisis and harder red lines

Discussed by: IAEA officials, nuclear safety experts, some NATO and EU policymakers

A worst‑case scenario involves a successful strike or cascading grid failure that causes a serious incident at Zaporizhzhia or Chernobyl—such as prolonged loss of cooling power, structural damage, or significant radioactive release—or at another major dam or hydropower facility. Even without a full‑scale meltdown, contamination or flooding could force mass evacuations and push NATO and the EU to set much harder red lines on attacks near nuclear and critical water infrastructure, potentially including new sanctions, air defense commitments near borders, or limited protective measures.

5

Russian long‑range strike capacity degrades, reducing intensity of future winters

Discussed by: Military intelligence assessments, open‑source defense analysts

Ukraine’s ongoing campaign against Russian refineries, fuel logistics and ‘shadow fleet’ tankers, combined with sanctions and production bottlenecks, may gradually reduce Russia’s ability to sustain huge missile‑drone salvos. Over time, Moscow could shift to fewer, more selective strikes, easing pressure on Ukraine’s grid. However, as the December 2025 barrage shows, Russia still retains substantial stockpiles and can surge attacks around key diplomatic or political moments, so this scenario likely unfolds over several years rather than one winter.

Historical Context

1991 Gulf War: Allied bombing of Iraq’s electricity system

January–February 1991

What Happened

During Operation Desert Storm, U.S.-led coalition aircraft systematically targeted Iraq’s power plants and grid infrastructure. Attacks such as repeated strikes on the al‑Hartha power plant near Basra shut off electricity, water pumps and sewage systems for millions of civilians, leaving the country largely without power for weeks and reducing generation to roughly 20–25% of pre‑war capacity.

Outcome

Short term: Allied forces achieved rapid military objectives, but Iraq’s civilian population endured severe hardships, including contaminated water supplies and increased disease and infant mortality due to disabled electricity‑dependent infrastructure.

Long term: Iraq’s power sector never fully recovered before the 2003 invasion, remaining under‑invested and unreliable. The campaign became a reference point in debates about the legality and morality of striking dual‑use infrastructure and the long‑term humanitarian costs of such strategies.

Why It's Relevant

This precedent illustrates how targeting a country’s electricity system can quickly disrupt water, sanitation and health services on a national scale, as Russia’s campaign has done in Ukraine. It also shows that even when framed as a way to pressure a regime or weaken its military, infrastructure attacks can produce humanitarian crises that outlast the war—parallels that inform legal and policy debates around Russia’s strikes on Ukraine’s grid.

1999 NATO bombing of Serbian power and fuel infrastructure

March–June 1999

What Happened

During the Kosovo war, NATO aircraft attacked Serbia’s power stations and fuel depots, temporarily knocking out much of the country’s electricity supply and forcing authorities and the military onto backup generators. NATO officials described the strategy as a way to degrade military command‑and‑control and pressure Slobodan Milošević, though it sparked controversy over civilian suffering and long blackouts.

Outcome

Short term: The bombing campaign contributed to Belgrade’s decision to accept a peace agreement and withdraw forces from Kosovo, but at the cost of significant damage to civilian infrastructure and loss of life in some strikes, fueling later criticism and legal scrutiny.

Long term: Serbia’s power sector recovered over time, but the episode became a benchmark for debates on ‘strategic’ bombing of infrastructure and proportionality in modern air campaigns, often cited by both critics and proponents of using air power to coerce adversaries.

Why It's Relevant

NATO’s 1999 campaign shows that even Western democracies have targeted energy infrastructure to gain leverage in conflicts, a point Russian officials sometimes invoke to justify their own strikes on Ukraine. However, the scale, duration and winter timing of Russia’s campaign, combined with occupation of Ukrainian territory and attacks near nuclear sites, make today’s situation more akin to a sustained ‘energy terror’ strategy than to time‑limited coercive bombing.